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CANDIDATES, PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE  
EFFECTS OF STAGNATION ON THE ELECTION OF WOMEN TO THE  
U.S. CONGRESS

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science  
in the Graduate School of  
Binghamton University  
State University of New York  
2011

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Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science  
in the Graduate School of  
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State University of New York  
2011

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## ABSTRACT

Stagnation as a theory suggests that women may somehow play a role in holding their overall numbers in the U.S. Congress constant as oppose to encouraging the greater influx of women into the political system. This dissertation examines candidates, parties and the political system as the three primary institutions potentially responsible for the lesser influx of women to the U.S. Congress and what role women play within those institutions that hold their numbers constant. Specifically, the analysis examines the necessary resources for electoral success, which are defined as the ideological leaning of the congressional district, candidate expenditures and previous political experience and explores whether those resources are consistently distributed among candidates regardless of gender.

## DEDICATION

For little girls everywhere who possess the audacity to aspire beyond “the ceiling.”



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*“... the race is not to the swift...but time and chance happen to all”*  
Ecclesiastes 9:11, KJV

Thanks and Praise to the Almighty for allowing this chapter in my life to see completion. May He grant continuous grace in memory that this growth process will provide a firm foundation for those life chapters ahead, and that this time was a necessary part of my development. Amen!

For my personal and spiritual support: Thanks for (and to) my husband, Jamar Johnson whose encouragement, support and patience have made this research possible. Thanks to my family for their continued support and prayers in all I set my mind to: Pearl Ann (Sirju) Hoskins, Candice Sirju, Robert and Hilda Johnson, The entire Hall and Johnson family. My inspiration, Jamar,II and Jalan: Mommy had to finish this so I can encourage you to be greater than you envision. Thanks to members of Crown Heights, Church of God of Prophecy, Members of the Mt. Sinai church family; my sorors of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc., the Talented Tenth, thank you for your continued encouragement. And finally, a special acknowledgement to my beloved Grandmother, Clarissa Ransome Hall 1924-2003.

For my professional and academic support: To my committee chair, Dr. Michael McDonald, there are not enough words to express my sincere gratitude for your

wisdom and guidance. Thank you for helping shape my understanding of how the world works in regard to my theories and science in general. Your professional advice, insight and perspective have had more of an impact on me than you know. Your influence is immeasurable! Thanks extend to my committee members, Dr David Cingranelli and Dr. Wendy Martinek, whose every critique improved the quality of the paper tenfold. Thank you to Dr. Sharon Bryant for being an outside examiner and for enthusiastically embracing my work. To Dr. Pat Reagan: we had a brief conversation shortly after my comprehensive exams in 2001. Your words have stayed with me and served as encouragement in trying times - sincere thanks! Thanks to David Vose, and the Libraries staff of Binghamton University for their constant assistance for data and other resources that served to complete this research project.

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## Preface to the Dissertation

As an individual, groomed in the way of conventional gender roles, I struggle with many of the questions that I will present here concerning the relationship between society and government. To offer a personal testimony of my own realization of the depth of male dominance in our society and its implications, none was clearer than the events leading up to my wedding day. In an effort for the wedding to be a memorable and meaningful event, my then fiancé and I discussed every detail, down to the wedding vows. Since we were both raised in the Pentecostal Christian faith, we sought the biblical purpose for marriage. After reading those purposes, I took issue with the idea that I would be asked to submit to my husband as he was asked to forever *cherish* me. The terms we were presented with troubled me. Somehow, it seemed that we were not meeting on common ground. Internally, I simmered over the idea that the vows could possibly be unfair; questioned myself for asking very *un-Christian* questions, for thinking the unthinkable. It was possible that I was taking these meanings the wrong way. Although the terms may have seemed unfair to me, it was possible that they were designed that way for purposes that I wouldn't understand until I had spent a lifetime in marriage. What would my family think of my thought processes? *What would his family think?* Still, these thoughts intrigued me. Surprisingly, my then fiancé energetically engaged the question of difference. After much thought, he suggested that maintaining a marriage



would require above all else, compromise, in which he, at times, would have to submit to me as well. Overtime, we would both have to learn when to give into each other. Therefore, I shouldn't concern myself too much about the promise to be submissive, but that he would, at times be required to do the same. While I certainly appreciated his eloquent response to the issues I had raised, I still found it all unfair. The traditional vows of the scriptures had only commanded that I, the *woman* submit. What could my questioning of these gender roles mean? It felt somehow that I was entering into some unfair contract without counsel. Was my unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the vows some signal that our union was destined for disaster if we married? Was I unintentionally shortchanging the rewards of being a good wife *or* Christian by even entertaining this line of thinking?

As I read the pages of Carol Gilligan's book, *In a Different Voice* (1993), I thought of how deeply engrained in our way of life gender roles were and how they have truly shaped every aspect of our lives. For some, they have been quite stifling, for they have prohibited so many from thinking outside "the box" established by society and reinforced by tradition. My objective here is to draw attention to our general conception of gender roles, our socialization and how they shape how we view every aspect of life, especially politics. Most political practices are so engrained in our way of life; institutionalized; so much so that we soon fail to see how those mechanisms came to be or how to reverse whatever barriers or complications they cause for other groups in society. The

political sphere is of the utmost importance because it affects every other aspect of society. How we think and live; how we move through the social channels of time is most deeply affected by policy outcomes and thus our representation in determining those outcomes. Whether we accept the roles assigned to us in conventional methods of political participation or are drawn to the dismantling of society through unconventional protest, politics is everything and *everything* is political. Thus, representation in democratic society is of crucial importance to what we consider acceptable and unacceptable, desirable and undesirable, fair and unfair. The following chapters of this dissertation offer insight and evidence for a stifled political system in regard to women. While this thesis will argue that there have always existed both direct and indirect hindrances for women's advancement, I do not offer a clear solution to conventional thinking concerning the role of women. However, identifying where and how these barriers exist are essential to understanding the rate at which women participate in society. For me this dissertation is an educational experience in that it is both a challenge to some fundamental problems within our political system that some would argue doesn't really exist at all. It would seem, to even the most open and accepting reader that at some point, a line must be drawn in the sand – at some point, it is not about gender and sex anymore and we must holistically accept what society has told us over and over again; what science has provided evidence for; and what the status quo mandates; that there is and always will remain a clear distinction between man and woman. Furthermore, society (and government)

should be shaped accordingly. This is a primary concern with regard to representation.

## Chapter 1

The following dissertation seeks to develop the theory entitled stagnation; defined here as the inherent barrier in the political system that maintains the number of women legislating at the highest level in a democracy's government at a consistent level overtime. In developing the theory, the researcher identifies what appear to be the obvious culprits operating against the greater influx of women into politics; candidates, parties and the political system. The possibility that these three entities operate collectively or have explanatory power individually is explained in our examination of the American political system and democracies around the world.

Chapter 1 provides an evaluation of representation; a historical perspective, theories of representation and how we conceptualize political leadership. Subconsciously, how we view our leaders determines political characteristics we expect to see in our leaders and challenges those characteristics when they are not obvious. The pretense is that our political system has experienced some resistance overtime to the acceptance and inclusion of political outsiders. Chapter 1 outlines theories of representation and how these traditional constructs work against the inclusion of women. The discussion further outlines why the thesis is more concerned with the numerical representation of women versus their substantive representation.

Chapter 2 provides a summary of the research covered in political science regarding the study of women in regard to experiencing barriers in upward political mobility. Particularly, the chapter breaks down the study of women during the early years in Political science as a discipline in American politics, through the 1960s and 1970s when the Feminist Movement created a means of women participating in government while still completely outside the body of research in the discipline and through the present day (1980s to the present). The chapter outlines the research and all the ways in which women have been traditionally studied in the field. Finally, Chapter 2 presents arguments for how this thesis intends to further the study of barriers and seeks to uncover them rather than continue to assume they are simply present. The hypothesis by which stagnation could be occurring is presented and suggests which theory is tested in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Chapter 3 suggests that stagnation is not an American or single-member district problem. Stagnation occurs in different forms in the most welcoming of political systems around the world. The chapter further outlines the party system of more than eleven European nations and presents a critique of women's participation in those systems. What is particularly important is the chapter discusses in detail party rules that restrict women in spite of women participating in higher numbers in parliamentary systems versus single-member-district systems.

Chapter 4 focuses on the American system and how party rules affect women in Congress as well as women's overall participation in other branches of government at all levels. The chapter examines women in the courts, gubernatorial seats in various states over time and the increase of women legislating in state government. Chapter 5 provides the data and methods for how we arrive at a final model of analysis for testing barriers by way of examining political resources. The chapter first analyzes the conditions necessary to win congressional elections in an all-male world and establishes a baseline for which women should be added. Elections where an incumbent is present are examined separately from open seat races.

Chapter 6 examines electoral success in two ways: 1) Using the model established in chapter 5, chapter 6 examines an all-female world in regards to electoral success and 2) adds women as candidates and incumbents into the analysis with men. Chapter 7 provide the results of our test models for stagnation based on the comparison of reported resources for every election year in our study based on gender. Again, incumbent races and open seat races are examined separately.

Chapter 8 discusses how the results are interpreted and their implications on research concerning women's political advancement. The researcher concludes that the obvious culprits for the barriers women face in gaining access to political office are really never obvious.

## The Concept of Representation

There is much dissension among scholars and the general public as to what is meant by the terms representation and what constitutes representativeness. These terms has evolved so much overtime. In democracies, when we hear the word representation, we instinctively consider government. History tells us that the Romans used the word *repraesentare* to mean, “acknowledgement of what was previously absent.” (Pitkin, 1967) Although the actual origin of the English word we use today extends from the Roman version, the meaning of representation has come to mean something completely different.... or does it? Pitkin states that the idea of representation did not align itself with government or its institutions until British communities began sending respected individuals to stand in their stead at church councils in good faith. Later, these communities were counted in the British Parliament according to those who stood as their representatives. Ironically, these tasks were considered to be chores in which the honorable and respected were *asked* to serve; a stark contrast from the struggle for power among potential candidates seeking to represent American constituencies today.

Although the meaning of representation has evolved, perhaps we can find a solid connection with the original Roman word and usage of representation. In democratic societies, we have come to visualize the concept of representative government in terms of who is represented in *addition to* who is not, in that we are only able to distinguish which groups are represented in government in two

primary ways: Underrepresented groups are present in the system, which make those groups that are represented distinguishable. Secondly, we utilize the quality traits of the representative chosen by a given constituency. The latter description is quite interesting when we explore how the meaning of representation has deviated since the time of the Romans and how much it has indeed remained similar. Consider the American Congress: 100 seats to equally represent the 50 states in the upper house and 435 states designed to represent the population. This appears to be the fairest way to represent the population. However, Jacobson (1997) acknowledges in his discussion on representation that demographically, the Congress consistently seats an over-represented number of representatives who are white, male, college educated and from white-collar backgrounds when compared with the national constituency. In addition, there are a very high number of congressional representatives who are attorneys, much more than the American constituency yields. Blue-collar professions are a rarity in the Congress. As a result, the Congress seats an overpopulation of millionaires when less than five percent of the U.S. population earns a million dollars or more annually.<sup>1</sup> However, with all the similarities members of Congress share, it is important to note that they represent a broad range of ideological views that virtually mirror the American constituency. While in most governments, we are unable to pinpoint all the ways in which democratic leaders

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<sup>1</sup> Jacobson, 1997. Chapter 8 entitled "Representation, Responsibility and the Future of Congressional Elections", pages 205-208.



resemble the represented, we know that at the very least, a large majority of representatives are chosen among the elites at the local or grassroots level of most, if not all, societies. In this instance, one can argue that Congress is indeed highly representative of the American population. We can also argue effectively that the American Congress is not representative of the population at all- not even proportionately. Lack of representation in regards to race and gender are just a few examples of disproportion of government to society.

This dissertation concerns itself with the very concept of representation in the United States. In particular, the under-representation of women is of primary concern here. The importance of this thesis is that while women as a group are advancing in all aspects of American society, their under-representation in the federal legislature remains significant. It is interesting to examine how and why this continues to occur. This chapter primarily discusses the general issues of representation in government and various hypotheses for why women have had problems advancing their numbers in government. In discussing the way political scientists have modeled representation and how the American political system has adjusted for new theories of representation, I discuss the role that political institutions such as political parties and the general constituency has played in the development of women's integration into the American political system. It can be argued that when more than half the population in any given society is underrepresented in the legislature that governs its population, the problem is in direct violation with the principles of

representative democracy. Yet, the irony prevails that the most industrialized democracies in the world have failed to elect women to serve in the highest legislatures in such a manner that is reflective of their numbers in society or even their numbers in the voting pool of constituents. While I focus primarily on the United States, the issue of women's under-representation is significant in democracies around the world. Many democratic nations utilize proportional representation systems in electing their legislatures; systems that place parties in government according to their electoral vote share. We can then, interpret representation as the Romans did which is "the acknowledgement of what *continues* to be absent", and encourage in this thesis that women be that *thing* that was previously missing from democratic government. Before we indulge in the discussion of women and government, we may want to fully dissect the concept of representation and how it plays into the discussion on government.

### Representation and Government: A Discussion

There are a variety of ways in which scholars have defined representation, most of which have been assigned to the role of government. Pitkin (1967) suggested that representation could be defined in an individual-group paradigm. For example, if the action of an individual can be ascribed on a larger group to which the individual belongs and *such action is perceived by the larger group as legitimate*, the individual is said to be representative of that group in some way.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In Pitkin, page 39

The German theory *Organschaft* suggests that representatives are the *organs* of their group. One interpretation of this theory as it applies to representation is that the credentials of an organization are garnered in part on how well it represents. Successful organizations garner their reputations based on the manner and consistency with which they successfully represent their clients. Prosperous law firms and insurance companies are examples. Service agencies are often sustained by the extent to which their activities closely mirror the objectives of their mission statements. In short, a good reputation is *representative* of an organization's ability to deliver as promised. With that said, a researcher should be able to assess the extent to which democratic legislatures have performed in their ability to represent their respective constituencies. Is it possible that true democracy exist in a regime where one half of the population is practically absent from the highest decision-making procedures? Why is the question of gender so important in the first place?

The preceding questions lead to a broader discussion concerning representation and democracy. In general, we understand that in any given society, there are those who will always have more influence than others regardless of how democratic a nation is (especially when we add Capitalism as an economic system to the equation). Some scholars would argue that unless smaller groups within a given society establish representatives for themselves, there is little chance that their policy outcomes can be realized. In 1994, twenty districts in the United States had overwhelming Hispanic majorities and thirty-

one were overwhelmingly African American (Jacobson, 1997). Since then, both major political parties have sought to elect candidates who also mirror the racial majority in these districts because many voters would view racial identity as a direct means to ensure representativeness of their groups, at least in regard to policies in which race matters. These facts beg the question of whether we should consider gender in the same way that we consider race when seeking representatives. This line of reasoning would of course, suggest that the Congress dissolve and seek a composition of which more than half of all representatives are women. Since this is highly unlikely, we should explore why women are the underrepresented group that present an extraordinary case for democratic representation in American government.

### Theories of Representation

With the responsibility of representation comes accountability, in that representatives are accountable to the represented for actions made on their behalf. As a consequence for *misrepresentation*, representatives can be removed from their posts and replaced by new ones promising to better translate the preferences of the represented into government policies. This idea of representation best describes the theory behind democratic elections. In most democracies, elections are conducted to allow the electorate an opportunity to reward the current administration by returning its members to their designated posts or to express its dissatisfaction with said administration and replace it with

new administrators. To this extent, democratic government incorporates an accountability principle.

Another theory of representation is the *Delegate* theory. This theory models representation in such a way that the representative acts as a delegate on behalf of the constituency. To this end, representatives do not incorporate their own ideas into the decision-making process but seek to translate the political preferences of the electorate into policy. In contrast to this theory, the *Trustee* model of representation assumes that the representative uses their personal judgment to make political decisions for the electorate. In doing so, the decisions of the representative are considered to be legitimate by the represented. The model assumes that there is some degree of integrity employed by the group when selecting a representative. Thus, the represented instill the highest level of trust in these representatives when allowing them to order their lives politically by employing their best judgment.

A theory that probably best describes the representative/constituency relationship (in the United States) is the *Politico* theory. The Politico theory of representation suggests that representatives employ remnants of both the delegate and trustee models when making political decisions. Therefore, on policy issues that are clear preferences for the constituency, the representative will vote accordingly. In cases where the policy preferences of the constituency are not clear, the representative will utilize their personal judgment to make decisions. This model is sometimes considered to be more encompassing of

representatives in that as a body, legislatures incorporate a variety of resources in making political decisions that are generally unavailable to average citizens. This could be for a variety of reasons. Gathering data on issues deemed pertinent at any given time can be both time-consuming and expensive to generate. Oftentimes, various experts must be employed in order to make the most educated of decisions for a vast electorate, which will have conflicting preferences within itself. Perhaps, this model best describes how we have come to see representatives as politicians in our modern thought patterns of government. Politicians have come to define *representativeness* in the modern sense through the politico model. The term *politician* is synonymous with *representative*. In the literal sense, the term politician or politico alludes to the act of playing both sides. One can effectively argue that these terms can also be used to describe someone who is not trustworthy or who cannot be depended upon to follow through completely. Since the days when democracy was in its infancy, these sentiments have plagued every office of political power and on every level. However, these individuals or representatives are essential to the continuance of government and thus must be elected. The fact is that representation is by nature a subject of dissension and thus we can find institutional intent to bar undesirables from advancement. This idea is discussed in the following pages. Institutionalization of a political barrier does not allow us to readily identify that barrier as time advances. The general point of this thesis is that the

representation of women is really a problem of being historically excluded from the political system.

### Institutional Influences of Representation: the Electorate and Political Parties

Most of what we witness developing in the political world is a result of interactions between political parties and the electorate. A major debate among political scholars in recent years has focused on the decline in party identification among American voters, while concurrently, political party organizations are resurging. These two phenomena are contradictory in nature (in that we should expect to see a decline in party organizations if there is a national decline in party loyalties). Several scholars have sought to explain these simultaneous occurrences through various analyses (Jacobson, 1990, Cox and Kernell, 1991, Fiorina, 1992, Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Fiorina offers the explanation of divided government. Divided government is a system in which voters elect both parties to government and no one party controls government. Historically, one party would control the presidency (most often, the Republican Party) and another party will control the legislature (most often the Democratic Party)<sup>3</sup>. This phenomenon signifies a lack of trust for any one party in government, or the belief that government is stable when both parties govern and corruption is minimized in that parties are able to police each other. This is a rational option

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<sup>3</sup> In recent years, the Republican Party has controlled both the presidency and at least one chamber of the Congress.

for voters, given the vast array of policy issues one must be familiar with in order to be truly “educated” about all the inner workings of politics. In addition, this system has provided evidence that the majority of voters in modern American elections have no allegiance to either party. Thus, there is a larger pool of voters; those voting as *independents*, which parties seek to win support from. Ironically, while more voters have moved away from the far ends of the ideological spectrum, political parties have appeared to become more polarized overtime. Thus a new institution has emerged to yield a great deal of explanatory power in how American elections are won: the candidates. This dissertation is a focal study of the individual candidate, reasons for their political successes and failures. The rise of Candidate-centered politics calls for a more intimate study of women and political candidates. While the emphasis for the entire thesis rests on the characteristics of the candidates themselves, it is important to analyze the extent to which political parties and constituencies continue to influence the political system.

It should be noted that political parties are a stable institution in American politics<sup>4</sup>. Political Parties were once thought to be the primary influential factor in determining who the nominees for political office would be. In fact, the

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<sup>4</sup> In the last ten years, we have seen single-party dominance in American government. The election of President George W. Bush in 2000 signified a dominant Republican party, controlling both the presidency and both houses of Congress. In fact, the Democratic Party lost key seats again in 2004. The reelection of Bush in 2004 saw the largest voter turnout in history: 54 million American support the incumbent President. However, the Democratic challenger also received 49 million votes, thus dividing the nation by a slim margin. Thus, there is evidence that the influence of both political parties remains strong, even in the wake of a dominant Republican party in government.



researcher has spent much time in research operating under the assumption that the true culprit for the political plight of most underrepresented groups are caused by the parties. We now know that party elites have lost a great deal of power in deciding who is elected to Congress, largely because of primary elections. Primaries were essentially designed to reduce the power of the party elite in deciding who would be the frontrunners for the party in any given district. Before primaries, party leaders could literally self-elect themselves to candidacies in party caucuses and conventions. The primaries allow for greater participation by the voters to determine who they would prefer to represent the party in the general election. Because more states hold primary elections, the power of political party influentials has been minimized at the congressional level. It is possible that in regard to congressional politics, neither political parties nor the electorate have an overwhelming influence in who runs for office. These political institutions work simultaneously to produce representatives for legislative government. In working together, candidates who receive the popular vote from the electorate in state primaries usually receive the endorsement of the party. As the chapter develops, I equally explore the perspective that candidates control more of their own political destinies and that their advancement is highly dependent on strategic planning, ambition coupled with an abundance of resources. The declining influence of parties and what it has meant for individual candidates is discussed further in the following pages of this chapter. The purpose of this dissertation is to uncover why women as

congressional candidates collectively suffer a losing battle, consistently overtime in increasing their overall standing in the federal legislature. To simply state that women face inherent barriers is not enough. It is my contention that these barriers are institutionalized in nature, so much so that the culprit no longer has a face. In the times of the women's movement for example, barriers to women's advancement were blatant. However, the findings of many political scholars have suggested that there is little, if any, evidence of injustice against women. While there is a degree of difficulty in actually putting a face on the phenomenon, we can at least assign it a name; Stagnation. Because there are so many variables in play regarding stagnation, may want to resist the urgency to lay intent at the door of any one political institution. Still, women continue to be severely underrepresented in elected positions of the federal legislature and when elected at all, their numbers appear to remain constant around a stable threshold. The dissertation explores a variety of ideas regarding how stagnation could be occurring. First, the theory suggests that political institutions systemically employ procedures that inherently hold the number of women in government constant. Stagnation also suggests women candidates handicap themselves in operating the political system, which is a real possibility for any minority group seeking entrance into a system where they are traditionally outsiders. Barriers to the electoral success of women could occur in stages at different levels at different times or simultaneously. The researcher considers the possibility that women's numbers are stagnated in the federal legislature because

they are most likely concentrated in similar regions at the state level.

Additionally, the researcher suspects the possibility that women purposely seek out electoral races where women are already legislating. Logically, the voters of these districts are perceived as more accepting of women candidates if in fact they have elected one previously or one is currently serving. This practice is more likely to generate situations where women face other women in elections, thus creating opportunities for the number of women in office to hold constant instead of increase. The researcher equally cannot ignore the possibility that stagnation is simply a consequence of too few women operating in the political system. The discussion surrounding each idea is discussed here, providing an objective view of women in politics and an in-depth analysis for future research, new strategies for political advancement in addition to a new perspective on the disparity of women versus men in government. However, we first examine the problems of representation in general; how our conceptualization of democratic representation shapes our view of women in government.

### Problems with Democratic Representation

John Adams suggested that *“a representative legislature should be an exact portrait, in miniature of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them.”*<sup>5</sup> Even with the foundation of government designed to insure the mirror-image of society be installed in office, this has still proved difficult for democratic

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<sup>5</sup> Pitkin, 1967

societies in general. In the United States for example, conflicting views of representative government were evident in legislation from the beginning. Representation was such a powerful issue during the American Revolution; the colony states authored a governing document that allowed each colony to retain its own sovereignty. The Articles of Confederation proved vulnerable in sustaining the nation because there was no strong centralized system. Even after events like Shay's Rebellion<sup>6</sup> made it obvious that the Articles of Confederation had serious deficiencies, the issue of representation still divided the colonies. In restructuring the government, the debates of the Constitutional Conventions that followed clearly document the reservations of the authors of the Constitution in protecting the regime against tyranny and how the masses would be represented. The larger colonies believed that the legislature should be based on population, in that the states with larger populations should have more representatives than those states with smaller populations. The smaller states argued that representation should be equal among states. A compromise from these debates produced a combination of both viewpoints in the American Congress. The American legislature is a bicameral legislature consisting of two houses. All states have equal representation in the Senate (the Upper House) and the lower House (of Representatives) is based on population.

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<sup>6</sup> Shay's Rebellion involved an uprising of Farmers in 1786 Massachusetts, which prevented the procedures of a Mass, court to repossess farms for nonpayment of taxes. The inability of the Articles of Confederation to maintain order in the states and the ineffective national government proved reasons for redrafting a governing document. (Greenberg and Page, 2001)

While the framers of the Constitution reached a sound compromise concerning the representation of states, there remain issues of representation in other aspects of government that are still debated over today. The creation of the Electoral College solidified that the American electorate would only be able to *indirectly* elect a President. Thus, a candidate could receive a majority of the popular votes cast by the American people and lose the election without a majority of Electoral College votes. In essence, these electors (for whom there is little known) serve as *electoral representatives* for the people of each state. Interestingly enough, there have been more than seven hundred proposals introduced in Congress to eliminate the Electoral College since the inception of the nation and none has been successful (Janda, et al., 1997). The point here is to emphasize that representation continues to be an issue of great dissension on many levels. While some would argue that the Electoral College is precisely a democratic institution because its fundamental purpose is to provide protection for the minority *from the majority*<sup>7</sup>, some could argue that the voice of the people on this issue has not been heard.

One of the great dilemmas of representative democracy is the absence of government responsiveness. Political parties in democratic governments have come to be more of a socializing agent in such a manner that individuals in society seem to identify with the ideals of one party over another. Even though

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<sup>7</sup> In an effort to establish a unified America, the Electoral College was introduced as a means to balance the influence of the larger states over the smaller ones; each state was given a single, unified voice in a presidential election.

some scholars have argued that the influence of political parties is on the decline in the United States,<sup>8</sup> parties retain socialization elements that allow the electorate to form ideological bonds in spite of the representatives for a given party. Ironically, this socializing element seems to contribute to the lack of responsiveness by government. Campbell, et al (1960) presented the first major research study done on the American electorate, in which we learned that party identification was a major explanatory factor in why people vote in the first place. What is most important here is that identification with a political party not only influences whether or not we vote, it also has some influence on how we view candidates. For example, we know with some degree of certainty that there is a consistent pool of voters (though this pool is declining in size overtime) who rarely ever deviate from voting for the candidates representing their party. With that said, many voters assume (to some degree) that if an individual's party of choice has selected a candidate, that candidate is the most acceptable choice. Therefore, the study of political candidates is crucially important in understanding the extent to which they influence government and how candidacies themselves are developed. Focusing on the candidates from a general perspective provides insight into who is elected in addition to who is not, *and why*.

With this in mind, I emphasize that political institutions complement each other in the continuance of traditional political practices to a large degree, while

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<sup>8</sup> Wattenberg, 1996

forging new ones. Regardless of what style of representation one assumes, it would seem that there must be some commonality among all representatives (at least in the sense of government); something about them that is almost always the same when building a case for potential candidates for public office. Keefe and Ogul (1985) note that “social characteristics of the constituency encourage conformity of potential candidates in four distinct ways: race, religion, ethnic and national backgrounds tend to be “givens” in the availability formulas to which candidates must conform.”<sup>9</sup> This, however, does not necessarily exclude other forces. What happens when potential candidates fall outside the criterion described by Keefe and Ogul is important. History tells us that the most obvious (and consistent) trait for politicians is being male. However, as new forces in the American political system emerge, the system will adjust itself to include those groups that have fallen outside the traditional criteria of representation. As is often the case in democratic government, change is incremental and when entertained at all, the system appears to suggest a level of tolerance that is acceptable; in the sense that adjustments are made to encourage (or at least create the appearance of encouraging) compromise while the traditional system is sustained without threat of overhaul.

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<sup>9</sup>Keefe and Ogul, (1985) page 81

## Nominating Candidates for Legislative Seats

Institutional change can be a very difficult concept to embrace. The legacies of businesses, organizations and governments are built on legitimate forms of structure. This structure usually involves an identifiable hierarchy of power and some social method of producing desired outcomes. The same can be said for democratic government and its operations. In the legislature, there is a clear hierarchy of power and influence and oftentimes a common road to candidacy. The driving force behind these operations in democratic government is political parties. In the American Congress for example, partisanship in the House of Representatives determines the balance of power (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). The majority party determines the rules for debate, agenda of the sessions and committee assignments. The hierarchy of power is clearly identifiable along party lines in addition to each party's caucus selecting individuals to serve in the capacities of leadership; majority/minority leaders, whips and the like.

Countless studies have tracked the recruitment process of state and federal legislators (Seligman, 1961, Bowman and Boynton, 1966Tobin, 1975). We can also draw on research involving the nomination process at the state level. Nomination practices vary across states. Previous research has suggested that political party dominance (or a strong party machine) is most prevalent in states with more restrictive nominating systems (Tobin, 1975). *Restrictive* refers to nomination events such as primaries that are discriminatory based on partisanship, such as closed primaries or party conventions. The party



organization has more power over the nomination process in these instances. It is in these systems where the party machine is strongest at the state and local level that we are more likely to see candidates running for office with prior political and/or party experience. In contrast, those states that have open or blanket primaries see less party influence in the nomination process. In essence, the party officials in these states must “share the crucial nominating power with even the least committed partisans and the most casually affiliated voters.” (Sorauf, 1963) Interestingly enough, party machines in these areas are often without a large pool of potential candidates for office. Many party officials in open systems find more difficulty in recruiting potential candidates to run for office. Thus, party machines tend to be weaker as a consequence of the state or district’s nominating system and it is often probable that potential candidates in these systems have little if any prior political experience. Keefe and Ogul (1985) claim that in the late 1950’s, a third to one half of state legislators (in some states, depending on the nomination process) had no previous government experience at the local level. Clearly, the standards differ across regions, but for now we will assume that prior political experience is not always necessary in gaining access to political office at the local level. Given prior political experience is not a necessary criterion for gaining access to political office, we infer there are other criteria. Keefe and Ogul (1985) site three provisions: Motivation, resources and opportunity.<sup>10</sup> The motivation of an individual to run for office involves two

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, page 82

major factors that party recruiters take into account: (1) Primarily, an assessment of the individual's personal needs being met through participating in politics and (2) their disposition toward politics. In order to run for public office, party officials want to ensure that their potential candidate believes that they can make a difference in the office and that they personally believe they can win the seat, regardless of the party's standing in a given district. The resources of potential candidates are essential for party recruiters. In essence, parties want to know that the pool of potential candidates have the necessary skills to conduct themselves in a manner most *representative* of the party and that they are able to essentially "hold their own" in all areas concerning politics and other issues made popular in American campaigns and elections. Other important resources concern the finances to assist in potential campaigns. Historically, politicians have been successful businessmen who have had the financial resources to sustain a political campaign. In addition, successful businessmen usually can afford the luxury of time away from their professions to run for public office. Finally, there is opportunity, which is really an evaluation of the other two factors. Political recruiters must evaluate if the timing is best for potential candidates, whether or not their personal motivation and resources complement each other for the current election than they probably would given the same circumstances in a future election. Considering these ideas that several researchers have discussed, it is clear why outsider groups have historically fallen short in nominations for political candidacies.

## Women and the Problems of Exclusion

In the previous pages, we have discussed what political parties look for in recruiting certain candidates. Scholars have documented the many ways in which women have been denied access to office. Motivation for public office involves an individual believing that they have a legitimate chance at winning a seat in the legislature. Historically, women have been absent from the legislature. Thus, party recruiters have most likely overlooked women candidates because measuring their motivations can be somewhat difficult. Several researchers have suggested that the most popular measure of a candidate's motivation for office is one's political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966, Bledsoe and Herring, 1990, Constantini, 1990, Herrick and Moore, 1993). We can infer to some extent that if women have been absent from the election process, then there is a higher probability that not only would it be difficult for women to have the same personal beliefs as men that they could win an elected seat, but a woman is more likely to have a negative disposition toward the political system. Indeed, political experiences matter and women have consistently been few in numbers. As a group, being excluded from networks that provide these resources can be intimidating. The effort for *her* becomes an issue of motives for seeking office in the first place. Any potential candidate must be entirely comfortable with him/her self in deciding to run for office, believe that they

have a fair shot at winning and that they have a serious interest for legislation. Scholars have long suggested that one reason why many women were absent from politics because they simply lacked interest in legislating (Carroll, 1994). We now know that this is not the case. Bledsoe and Herring (1990) suggest that the needs (meaning political ambition) of men and women are different and that comparing the two proves problematic in linking attitude with behavior. In other words, women and men have often perceived their office in government differently.

The issue of resources appears to be gaining momentum as an important variable in the equation for who does and does not get nominated for public office. Rule (1981) found that when compared to men, women have significantly lacked the education needed to communicate and even manipulate people effectively *in a political setting*. This stemmed from a lack of advanced education and professional experience in political environments. A lack of education usually equates to limitations in personal finances. Historically, women have faced barriers in the workplace in that wherever they were over-represented in industry, they were (and continue to be) grossly underpaid. Traditional family structure and gender roles have proven to severely limit a woman's ability to function effectively outside the home, thus stifling her availability to have a career much less run for political office. This is precisely why scholars (Bledsoe and Herring, 1990) have found that there is a clear differential in the political attitudes of men and women. While men are more likely to facilitate their

political careers through business and social connections, they garner other resources for advancement that have generally been closed to women. Bledsoe and Herring (1990) contend that “the (current) system of obtaining political office....is highly individualized and competitive, emphasizing characteristics that are fundamentally inconsistent with women’s status and role orientations.”<sup>11</sup> While these variables are interconnected, they represent a serious disadvantage for women having sufficient resources to seek nomination for office. Exclusion for women effectively means “lack of resources.” Given the traditional life situations of women, the opportunity to get nominated for public office has been a generally rare occasion. In the past, when the opportunity has presented itself it has been prevalent under completely different circumstances. For example, many of the early women legislators have come into office by way of their deceased husbands. Thus, a deceased husband often signifies a loss of family life, vital family income and meant a clear shift in women’s responsibility in the home. The motivation to complete a husband’s term in office can be viewed as purely a psychological one, which incorporates patriotic sentiments to fulfill one’s obligation to government. As more legislators died in office, the practice seemed encouraged when they were survived by a spouse. More women came into to office to serve in place of their husbands post-mortem. Once their terms were completed, the party nominated others and women were not encouraged to run for reelection (Foerstel and Foerstel, 1996). Thus, this practice suggests that

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<sup>11</sup> Herring and Bledsoe (1990) page 221. I expand on these ideas more in Chapter 2.

the idea of women delegates in the Congress was somehow unsuitable or sustainable for politics. The expectation of women in government was to simply serve out the terms of deceased men. Expectations have a way of becoming standards. There have been other ways in which barriers for the advancement of women have manifested themselves. For example, women interested in political careers have generally been rewarded with political jobs that have placed them on completely different career paths. Women have more often been rewarded with positions in the party organization. These positions do not lead to endorsements for office. Women have been steered towards party maintenance jobs, rather than promoted in the way of nomination. As discussed earlier, the system adjusted itself to create an appearance of encouraging inclusion, while maintaining traditional standards without risk of complete overhaul of the system. Through these channels, women have more often garnered political experience within the party, so much so that in recent years, they hold equal if not more political experience than their male counterparts. Additionally, in areas where party systems are weakest, we have come to see women being nominated to run in elections where the party has little if any chance of winning. Keefe and Ogul note "...it is not unusual for the minority party in such circumstances (predominantly one-party districts) to forfeit the election by failing to put up its own candidate or by offering only token opposition."<sup>12</sup> Eulau and Wahlke (1978) contend that the problem may not stem from

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<sup>12</sup> Keefe and Ogul, (1985) page 84, last paragraph.

representation as we see and experience it, but perhaps we probably should take issue with the scientific models of representation.

As Susan Carroll (1994) and many other scholars, I am primarily interested in the numerical representativeness of women; of increasing their overall standing in government. I believe that the number of women in government is more important than their substantive representation in the long run for a variety of reasons. Firstly, small groups within organizations are more identifiable and they are often easier to manipulate. For example, fewer women in government inherently supposes that they will legislatively behave in a manner that is uniform. Hence, to some extent, they can be controlled. The larger group within the legislature is able to facilitate what is expected or needed from the smaller group. In the political sense, smaller groups are often expected to serve government by drafting and/or supporting legislation dealing with issues primarily pertinent to their “group” within the constituency. Much of the literature charges that most women/African Americans/Hispanics in government would contend that their presence is a necessary condition in bringing about policy outcomes desirable to those constituencies. While I would support this charge, I believe all legislators, regardless of background possess a broader context in how they interpret their responsibilities- meaning, they have political interests outside of those policy outcomes specific to a smaller constituency they represent. At the lower levels of government, Nelson (1991) found that the presence of these groups were important signals to these

communities but essentially, these groups lacked power in their respective offices. In other words, a necessary condition for power is numbers. Perhaps, women and other underrepresented groups have come to see their representative offices differently. Certainly, women elected to serve out the term of her deceased husband prior to the 1970s perceived their objectives in office completely differently from that of women elected to public office in the 1990s. Equally, an African American elected in the 1970s, would have a different policy agenda than an African American elected in 2000. The point here is that the motives of decades past are vastly different than those presently held by representatives from smaller groups within the constituency today. Potential minority candidates for public office in the new millennium are just as concerned with foreign affairs, the economy, and defense spending as any given legislator. Substantive representation is therefore a secondary matter here. The influx of women in representative government is of primary concern in this thesis.

To reiterate, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature related to women in American politics, particularly as legislators. The chapter examines women's historical rise to congressional office and how this ascension is substantially different in recent decades. Further examination includes various theories in the literature regarding barriers constricting the greater influx of women into political office at all levels of government.

Theories regarding barriers to the greater representation by women are not confined to single-member district systems. I insist that women are



prevented from reaching sizable numbers in other democracies as well. Chapter 3 examines how stagnation may possibly be occurring in other democracies. The chapter looks at the party systems of 12 European parliamentary systems and women's representation within those systems. Chapter 4 examines women's participation in the American government in all branches of government from a historical perspective, with specific attention to the concept of participation and representation in social science theory.

Chapter 5 presents the first of three data chapters testing for stagnation theory based on incumbency, the presidential vote share, expenditures and previous political experience. The chapter examines what success looks like in an all-male election system. Chapter 6 utilizes the findings of chapter 5 to expand on electoral success based on gender. Finally, chapter 7 presents analysis based on differences in resources based on gender and the thesis concludes with chapter 8, which summarizes the data chapters and presents ways to expand research regarding barriers to women's electoral success.

## Chapter 2

Most of the early literature on women and politics has almost always assumed bias against women. By law women were considered second-class citizens who had neither the right to own their own property or exercise political discord (Sapiro, 1983). Legal interpretation of the law suggested that women were represented entirely by their husbands and were apolitical beings when there was no husband to represent them. Women did not obtain the right to suffrage in the United States until 1920. This was largely the result of traditional gender socialization, which reinforced the traditional role of women as homemakers and caretakers. The idea that women could participate in social and political arenas besides voting did not gain momentum until the Women's Movement cast light on inherent institutional biases throughout society. Prior to this time, women were almost entirely excluded from political research involving empirical theory (Rinehart, 1992, Carroll and Zerilli, 1993). As the women and politics literature began to grow into a sub-discipline, scholars attempted to acknowledge women as political actors. However, the problem remained that traditional analytical frameworks were inadequate in providing explanations for the political behavior of women. For example, in examining the collective characteristics of women candidates, they are as ambitious, determined individuals who possess the necessary leadership qualities to maintain substantial political careers. It would almost seem as if they would have to be in order to step away from traditional gender roles to compete in an

unwelcoming, male-dominated arena like politics. Ironically, much of the previous literature suggested that women lacked the experience, connections and/or ambition to be as effective as men in the world of politics. The very problem lay in the constructs for which we have studied women once we acknowledge that they are legitimate political actors. The male-dominant paradigm is stifling, in that it can severely limit how we view the potentialities of women office holders. These issues are discussed further in the following pages.

Historically, the political behavior of women has been studied from two major perspectives: The level of participation (the number of women in a particular level of government) and distinctive participation (how women legislate differently from men). Although I acknowledge the relevance of the latter perspective (but only with regards to women's issues), the broader scope of this dissertation will involve the level of women's representation at the federal level in the United States. It should be clearly stated that one cannot discuss how women are to address issues politically if they are in fact absent from the bargaining table. Thus, the (increasing) presence of women in political office is of crucial importance here. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart (2006) assessed the discipline of Political Science during three time periods regarding the presence and position of women as political actors. She describes the discipline as "gendered" in that all analytical constructs are structured to acknowledge men as the only actors in the early decades of the discipline's founding. The Political Science

Quarterly published only 10 of 1038 articles regarding gender between 1886-1925. The Quarterly was the leading political science journal during this time. Since then, the American Political Science Review became the major journal of the discipline, “published only 3 of 406 articles related to gender between 1906-1924”<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, Political Science as a discipline regarded women as political actors differently when compared to the level of activism women participated in during the early years. During the time of APSR published its first issue in 1906, women were embattled in a political battle for suffrage all over the country. For the few women who earned doctorate degrees in the discipline during this time, finding work in faculty positions posed tremendous problems for women. The article goes on to highlight the 1970’s and 1980’s as decades of change in which the discipline finally began to acknowledge the effects of women’s activism both within and outside the field. The American Political Science Association established the Committee on the Status of Women in 1969 to study the status of women in discipline. Later that year, the Women’s Caucus for Political Science was formed. In an effort to separate advocacy for women in the profession from academic scholarship on gender, the Women’s Caucus of Political science appointed a committee that established a section on Women and Politics research. Hence, the study of “Gender Politics” was born. Carroll (1994) states that the emergence of the Feminist Movement and “the need

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<sup>13</sup> P. 509 of Tolleson-Rinehart’s article.

for the re-incorporation of classical democratic ideals in Political Science”<sup>14</sup> have led to public concern with the numerical representation of women. The Feminist Movement gained momentum in the late 1960s and 1970s because the movement specifically emphasized a host of policy areas that had received inadequate attention from government officials. Of course, these policy areas became known as “women’s issues” and many believe that the presence of women in the federal government was a necessary condition for change. It seemed that the common belief among politicians was that men and women had the same policy preferences and there was no need to separate constituents according to gender. The late 1970’s saw the mobilization of women’s organizations and groups that organized to support the campaigns of women candidates who sought to implement the necessary changes at all levels of society to reduce the gender gap in economic, social and political arenas of society.

### Women and Democratic Theory

The part that women play in politics has historically been shaped by how we view our ideal society. Democratic theorists of old fall along a continuum, which would in part explain how researchers have perceived the participation of women in our society, at least in the political sense (Carroll, 1994). Political participation of the masses has been classified by two opposing theories of democracy: Elitism and Pluralism.

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<sup>14</sup> P. 10 of Carroll’s 1994 article.

Most Social scientists would agree that the accepted democratic theory within the discipline is indeed pluralism. Historically, Political Science has accepted the idea that power in American government is diffused among different groups while Sociologists have insisted on a highly centralized system of power in American government. (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Bachrach, 1967). Robert Dahl (1956) is one of the most formidable proponents of pluralist democratic theory. Pluralism is the idea that the power of influencing government shifts across different groups in society. In essence, no stable, identifiable group holds complete power over government all the time. Pluralist theory does appear to be more closely aligned with the idea of democracy, which is government by the people. Most any introductory textbook on American politics advocates the pluralistic model for the American political system. In opposition to pluralism, scholars have argued that the American political system more closely resembles an elitist model of democracy (Hunter, 1953, Mills, 1959, Dye, 2000). Elitism is the idea that democracy is survived by a few privileged individuals who make all decisions for society in government. According to elitist theory, a handful of individuals are responsible for organizing government, creating policy and defining the law. The great masses of citizens within society simply follow the laws set by the select few and have no power in determining the outcome of policy (regardless of our embedded system of universal participation). Scholars who adhere to the elitist theory of democracy are at one end of the spectrum. Democratic theory is important in terms of how

we view the roles of women in society. Scholars like Dahl who adhere to the pluralist model of democracy are probably more inclined to view women as a group within the political system who influence a given set of policy areas. Given the historical background of women in government at the local and community levels, such influence is most prevalent in school politics and education. However, we can still understand this to mean that the presence of women is indeed necessary at all levels of government, at the very least in terms of policy agendas most directly affecting the woman citizenry. On the other hand, scholars such as Dye and Mills (1959) who adhere to the elitist school would probably contend that a more passive role for women is expected and thus inherently encouraged in the American political system (Carroll, 1994). Arguing in general, elitist scholars contend that elites are inclined to restrict the intake of new members into their circles. Therefore, women and other underrepresented groups are mere sectors of the masses of underprivileged citizens that must be controlled in order that democratic government can operate effectively. In essence, if men outside the elite class are restricted in their influence, the same is true for women as a group and other groups. We can assume that if women are to participate at all, their participation will be severely limited or restricted to the influence of certain policy areas (i.e. women's issues and those pertaining to children). In light of these arguments, we are then forced to ask ourselves which democratic principles are most representative of government's assimilation of women. The elitist model echoes the plight of

many women politicians in America who were *offered* the federal seat of their deceased husbands, so long as they consented not to run for another term (Foerstel and Foerstel, 1996). In democracies around the world who utilize the party system, we can argue that remnants of elitist theory are evident within party systems, so much so that women are more often given ornamental positions on party lists (Haavio-Mannila et al. (1985). Advocates of pluralist theory would argue that women's participation is important because they represent a segment of the population whose policy preferences would not be recognized without their presence in government. In no way, do I advocate one school of thought over another here. I simply argue that regardless of what democratic school of thought we adhere to, we can safely conclude that how we view the role of women in government is holistically limited.

### Women and the Electoral Process

Much of the research of the 1980s to the present day has emphasized that we question the empirical stability of traditional frameworks of analysis especially in their assessment of women (Palmer and Simon, 2003, Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef and Lin, 2004, Tolleson-Rinehart, 2006) . The career paths of men and women can be viewed as a means for separating the legislative style and goals of men and women politicians. Burrell (1994) suggested that women politicians are evolving in terms of their ascension to political office. The first wave of women politicians came into these positions by way of their deceased



husbands or fathers. These women politicians were the majority of those who held office prior to the 1970s. The second wave of women politicians were those who worked tirelessly in civic organizations and shifted their energies to politics, oftentimes in an effort to further their cause. This would describe many women politicians during the 1970s and 1980s. The third wave of women politicians is those of the present day who have built their careers from serving in political offices at the local and state level. In essence, the career paths of men and women today often mirror similar experiences in government (Burrell, 1994 p. 57-58). As the career paths of men and women become more similar, the less likely we are to acknowledge any difference in their legislative styles (Darcy and Choike, 1986, Gaddie and Bullock, 1995).

In much of the research of the past, scholars have suggested that the elective system has shown a significant bias to women candidates (Welch and Karnig, 1979, Rule, 1981, Sapiro, 1983). A host of scholars have sought to demonstrate the means by which women have faced barriers in pursuing elected office. Many began with an examination of the nomination process as it pertains to women. Scholars found that the recruitment of women was highly dependent on party politics (Darcy and Schramm, 1977, Rule, 1981). In previous decades, the recruitment of women was least favorable in states dominated by the American Democratic Party, whereas women's participation in Republican states was above the national average (Rule, 1981). This could be the result of the pioneering Mid-West, where both men and women worked equally as hard to

engage frontier life. Fundamentally, the presence of women in these communities were crucial. Thus, the Mid-West was a hotbed for women entering politics. Nechemias (1987) found that the Democratic party-dominance theory did not hold as strongly outside of southern states. Rule found four major predictors of the lesser recruitment of women: (1) Women are less likely to be nominated to legislatures in non-proportional representation systems (Matland, 1993, Matland and Studlar, 1996). (2) They are also less likely to be nominated in states that adopted a late acceptance of women's suffrage and in states where both (3) the overall percent of women receiving advanced degrees and (4) women in the workforce were low. There is another important feature to Rule's research. She outlines three phases of the recruitment process in which women will encounter obstacles to winning elections; (1) the *eligibility* phase, (2) the *selection* phase and (3) the *election* phase. She argued that the problems concerning women's recruitment preceded formal nomination at an earlier stage, which she considered to be eligibility. Prior to the 1970's, there were very few women legislating at the federal level. During the Woman's Movement, the number of women in office began to increase, but at a very incremental rate. Many women were not pursuing careers in politics, mainly because of the low number of women graduating from college and the low number of women legislating at even the local levels. Contrary to this idea, Darcy and Schramm (1977) argued in an earlier article that the problems for women lay at a more advanced stage - the nomination stage. According to their findings, the authors

claimed that voters see women as equal candidates to men. In this regard, the stage of the political process that women will face some resistance becomes more evident with each advanced stage of the political process. In either case, scholars agree that barriers *do* exist and that political parties play some role in maintaining such barriers. Hill (1981) offers a counter argument, in that structural institutions are not responsible for low representation of women but the political culture within districts are to blame. However, one could argue that these sub-cultures within districts are not only influential in voting patterns of the constituents, but are precisely what influence the behavior of structural institutions like political parties that vary in culture dependent on district-level influences.

As time passed, we find that women enjoyed a significant increase in the overall percentage of women participating in state legislatures. We should, of course, expect an increase in the electability of women considering sharp increases in the proportion of women receiving advanced degrees and women in the workforce. Nechemias (1987) compared the conditions in the election of women to state legislatures in three time periods: (1) 1963-1964, (2) 1971-1972, and (3) 1983-1984. What she finds is that over time, education has become an even stronger predictor of the election of women to state legislatures. She attributes this finding to the women's movement. An increased awareness of obstacles barring women from advancement on every level of society has prompted more and more women to seek college level degrees. Nechemias

argues that this finding indicates that the obstacle to women's recruitment is not necessarily action by the Democratic Party, but "that the actual culprit is the attitudes and values of the traditionalistic subculture" (1987, p. 134).<sup>\*</sup> Several other authors have offered support for this theory as well, referring specifically to Elazar's model of political subcultures. (Diamond, 1977, Hill, 1981, Nelson, 1991, Matland and Brown, 1992, Hogan, 1997) In response to the overall changes in the election of women, Nechemias finds that over time, "(scholars) are losing explanations for state-to-state disparities in the proportion of women representatives more rapidly than we are formulating new ones." (1987, p.136) As time persists, we are unable to use many older theories in explaining the current state of women's representation in the United States. Whether barriers against women persist at the eligibility, selection or election stage, it is safe to conclude that the question of how and why women continue to face barriers is still an open one. The literature continues to suggest that gender bias is inherent at all levels of society. At the congressional level, scholars have examined what appears to be a major problem with women: essentially, women running as "women representing women's issues" when all else is equal with their male opponent will continue to see electoral shortcomings, even when facing a man in the election. (Perkins and Fowlkes, 1980) Perkins and Fowlkes surveyed party activists in regard to the role of gender in candidate selection and found that party activists were less likely to nominate women who felt their candidacies were essential to supporting women's issues, even when they had the same

position as male candidates. They suggested that there was a distinction among activists of opinion representation and social representation. Furthermore, women who sought to illuminate the fact that they were women running for office would work against them. The findings were important in that it draws attention to the fact that party officials matter in shaping the election choices. Twenty years later, Herrnson, Lay and Stokes (2003) argued opposite the findings of Perkins and Fowlkes. Essentially, Herrnson et al found that the electoral climate had changed and that women needed to highlight their gender differences in campaigning to demonstrate their strengths to the electorate. What really called for the changes in the electoral climate? Scholars have suggested that issues on the political agenda also play a role in how successful women will be in their campaigning efforts. Michele Swers (2004) cited national issues that emerged during the 1992 elections, which saw the largest influx of women into the U.S. Congress that did not follow in 2002. Besides the fact that many incumbents retired from office, the major topics of the national agenda in 1992 were healthcare and the confirmation hearings of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court which involved a sexual harassment suit by his former law clerk, Anita Hill. The case brought gender to the forefront of national politics. Redistricting also created a positive environment for the influx of women. The national agenda was completely different in 2002. While redistricting and a number of retirements allowed more open seat opportunities, the nation focused on a war with Iraq and the idea of terrorism took on a bigger meaning to the

American public, which was dealing with the recent terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of New York City in the fall of 2001. The war on terrorism ushered in a resurgence of male-dominated areas of political strength. Dolan (2004) cites that the influx of women in 1992 did not repeat itself in 2002 because the changing national agenda encouraged the electorate to examine traditional gender roles. Women are viewed as strong advocates in regard to healthcare and on issues of sexual harassment/fairness in the workplace. Men are viewed a traditionally strong on issues of national security and the economy. As time changes, bias shifts to varying levels and is also institutionalized.

### Research in the 1990s on Women and Politics

From a historical perspective, women legislators have been studied to a significantly lesser degree than men. Scholars have suggested that women in general have less of an interest in pursuing political careers, due to social and situational circumstances (such as homemaking and motherhood), which absorbs much of the time and energy, more women would apply to politics, if possible (Constantini, 1990). As a result, politics is often viewed as a “man’s game.” The following sections of this chapter offer a connection between the role of women and literature on candidate-centered politics, party politics and the success rate of women in obtaining elected office.

The problem of the politics-as-a-man’s-game paradigm is that it constructs the very definition of politics in masculine terms, in the sense that politics is an

overall struggle for victory. *Survival of the fittest* constructs suggest that masculinity is synonymous with power. Such paradigms are not inclusive of women. In adding gender bias to the mix, the result is an almost exclusive political system of men. So it would make sense to logically question the specialty women bring to politics when we do actually find them in these male-dominated systems. Much of the gender politics literature has focused on defining more than just disparities in representativeness based on gender but rather on how the sexes legislate differently and how these differences further reinforce reasons why the number for women legislating at higher levels of government will probably remain significantly lower than that of men. In other words, many scholars believe that a great deal of the explanatory power for why women have such a lower representation level can be explained by a woman's political ambition to get elected.

### Women and Political Ambition

A major area of study in the women and politics literature is the emphasis on women and political ambition (Constantini, 1990, Bledsoe and Herring, 1990, Fowler and McClure, 1989, Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Jacobson and Kernell (1983) argue that the level of ambition among potential candidates is what ultimately determines who will and will not win elected office. Constantini (1990) suggested that women view ambition differently, or rather that there is both a power *and* purposive dimension to political ambition. The power

dimension suggests that the goal of politics is to be victorious over the opposition in elections. This definition of ambition has masculine connotations and it is therefore understood that the power dimension is what defines political ambition in general. However, Constantini goes on to argue that more women adhere to the purposive dimension of ambition, in the sense that they are more committed to the maintenance of the political party as an organization and pay a great deal of attention to major issues surrounding politics. Fowler and McClure offer evidence of purposive claims for women in evaluating the political ambitions of highly qualified female politicians (1989, chapter 5). They suggest that some women may decline to run for higher office because they may consider themselves highly effective politicians in current political positions at lower levels. Running for higher office may be a potentially greater risk to a politician if they in fact care about the political work that must be done at the lower levels. Although some have suggested that women have different ambitions or may regard their careers differently from men, several authors have suggested that men and women have the same ambitions and find no evidence to suggest that women are in any means different (Darcy and Choike, 1986, Gaddie and Bullock, 1995). In addition scholars have continued to suggest that women simply seek political careers at a significantly lower rate than men do and so we should expect to see a lower level of women legislating in government. In opposition to this argument, one cannot help but question why women would be ambitious enough to steadily increase their overall representation in state and local



governments and abandon that same ambition with regard to representation at the federal level.

There is an interesting side to both arguments. Firstly, the purposive argument would suggest that women would remain at lower levels of government because they are in fact effective legislators that have entered the political arena for selfless purposes. For example, women legislate in school boards, city and county legislatures in high numbers. To this end, women have entered government to bring about change due to their dissatisfaction with (educational) policies and the overall objectives of local governments. Needless to say, women have made a significant difference. If one adheres to the purposive argument, then there is no need to seek advanced office outside of the community for which one has intended to serve. However, the opposing argument would suggest that once women have brought about some significant change in the local and/or state government, one learns a great deal about government in general: how to manipulate the system while simultaneously implementing much needed policy changes. Furthermore, higher office also means greater influence. Greater influence equates to greater change. Indeed, women have advanced in high numbers beyond the eligibility phase of the political process (Rule, 1981). Political women are now seeking nominations for congressional office in high numbers. However, some force has halted their overall representation in Congress. Political parties may play an important role in determining the success level of women – not only in the United States, but in

all democracies. Political parties are precisely the vehicle used to evaluate the advancement of women in federal legislatures/parliaments throughout the world.

### Party Politics Around the World: The Case of Parliamentary Systems:

As stated earlier, political parties are in fact among the most influential factors in determining who advances to the national legislature or parliament in all global democracies. Political parties play a large role in democratic institutions around the world. Parties symbolize the basis of human liberty in that they provide a vehicle for citizens in a given state to politically express their desires for government through policy preferences. Most democracies throughout the world are in fact parliamentary systems in that the highest legislature of the land is comprised of delegates from a multitude of political parties. In parliamentary systems, constituents support the party whose objectives for government are most similar to their personal ideology. There is less incentive to misrepresent the ideals of the party in parliamentary systems in that parties participate in government according to their vote share. In this sense, political recognition is emphasized through the ideals of the party. Although we can often identify the parties in these systems that tend to yield considerably more power in government over other parties (and over time), multi-party systems tend to be somewhat decentralized in their approach to government. The influence of parties extends in different contexts, depending

on the party. Parliamentary systems also tend to utilize a party-list system in the electoral process of most, if not all parties. This system allows candidates for office to be listed under the party name to serve as representatives in the event that the party is successful during the election. Once the votes are counted, each party places representatives in office according to the percentage of the seats the party was able to secure during the election. If a party wins 60% of the vote share, the top 60% of the party's listed delegation will be placed in office. In comparison to a winner-take-all system, the party-list system places a great deal of attention on the party platform as opposed to the individual candidates. In addition, the popularity of candidates only matters among party officials. In this sense, the leaders within each political party yield a tremendous amount of influence in the sense that they alone choose the delegation that will represent the party in government. In two-party systems however, the constituency plays some role in determining the favorite candidates before elections by participating in party sponsored events such as caucuses and primaries. In most contemporary democracies, women have become a mobilizing force within political parties. Their level of participation is largely dependent upon the nature of the electoral system which affects the rules for selection within the party.

Historically, several scholars have found that women were more likely to participate (in higher numbers) in parties with a more liberal ideological base versus a conservative one. Traditionally, conservative parties throughout

democratic societies have been generally concerned with issues of economic stability and international business, areas where fewer women have been successful professionally. Parties on the Left or liberal parties have traditionally been concerned with issues of the working class and expansive social policies; areas which have traditionally been more welcoming to women and other underrepresented groups. Some scholars would argue that these traditional definitions of social ideology are no longer entirely representative of contemporary political parties in global democracies (Caul, 1999). In the United States for example, contemporary parties have a growing number of women and minority groups joining the ranks within the party. Although conservative parties retain an agenda for economic policy, there is a shift to redefine social policy in terms of the traditional family and the preservation of traditional society and gender roles. Liberal parties continue to represent the ideas of the working and lower class as they have done traditionally, while some have evolved to promote ideas of social tolerance. Conservatives tend to believe however, that some social policies of tolerance are gained at the cost of breaking down traditional family values. Thus, political parties (especially in parliamentary systems) are important because they mirror the general vision of how society should be structured according to their constituencies. Regardless of where they fall along the ideological spectrum, parties remain vital institutions in democratic societies throughout the world. The legitimacy of political parties is as fundamental to democracy as government itself.

Democracy defines itself through parties, which symbolize representative government.

### Electoral Systems: SMD versus PR Systems

The two major types of electoral systems in democratic societies are single-member district systems and proportional representation systems. Single-member district electoral systems appear to present greater difficulty in regards to advancing women to the federal legislature. SMD systems produce a single winner to represent a district in the federal legislature. What these types of electoral systems tend to reveal is a great deal of emphasis placed on the individual who is running for office as opposed to the party and its program for government. More often in SMD systems, the lives of potential candidates become the center of public evaluation. The success of these campaigns largely depends on how well a potential candidate is known by constituencies and increasingly, we can predict the winner of elections almost entirely based on how much money potential candidates are able to raise. Thus, name recognition is built by candidates making public appearances throughout the districts. Many scholars would argue that this deviation of attention from the party's program and centralization of candidates actually weakens the entire electoral system in that to some degree government officials, once elected cannot be trusted to implement what they have pledged to do in getting elected. There appears to be some incentive to misrepresent themselves while seeking constituency support.

Although smaller parties exist in most SMD systems, the race for political power

is often a competition of the two largest parties in the system. Coalition building is not a frequent occurrence in SMD systems. Due to the winner-take-all principle, candidates have more incentive to provide a broader base for appeal to attract as many voters within the constituency as possible. For example, a candidate running on the Republican ticket (prior to constituency events like caucuses and primaries) is likely to appear to be very conservative when compared to the Democratic candidate, in an effort to secure the support of that party. Once a candidate has successfully secured a party nomination for political office, there is a tendency for the candidate to move their preferences away from the party's center, to reflect policy preferences more in line with voters in the true center; those voters who do not align themselves with either of the two major political parties. In these cases, candidates then seek to maximize their vote share by broadening their appeal among those who fall outside the stable, predictable pool of registered voters (Downs, 1957). This can more consistently be done with two parties. More often, constituents find difficulty in seeing major differences in the policy preferences of the major party candidates after they have secured the nomination of the party. If in fact women are viewed as less desirable candidates, this is precisely the reason why parties would see a disincentive to nominate them more frequently in political races in SMD systems. A two-party system indicates a stable nomination tradition that is custom to both major parties and an equally traditional career path to higher office. Because these systems produce a single winner in a given district, the stakes for winning

are much higher than in proportional representation systems. The prestige of winning is extremely important to the party. Therefore, because the party system is highly structured, the characteristics of potential candidates will undoubtedly be highly structured as well. The nomination of women to the federal legislature in SMD systems deviates sharply from this traditional structure. Many comparative scholars would argue that a society is more democratic when its constituency is represented by a host of political parties as in parliamentary electoral systems. In these systems, no one party has complete rule. These ideas reinforce why many believe multi-party systems are more democratic than SMD systems.

Some scholars of the women and politics literature have argued that parliamentary systems are more welcoming to the election of women specifically because of the type of electoral system (proportional representation) associated with multi-party governments (Welch and Studlar, 1986, Rule, 1987, Matland, 1998, Caul, 1999). Proportional representation refers to the number of seats obtained by a political party in the legislature based on their proportion of the national electoral vote. Rule (1987) conducted a study of 23 democratic countries around the world to examine the positive and negative factors influencing women's opportunity to gain representation in national legislatures. She suggested that the type of electoral system matters in regard to a woman's ability to reach representative parity with men in the national legislature. In essence, she argued that the number of seats available in electoral contests matter. In

many proportional representation systems, parties create national lists of candidates for the ballot. This is called a party-list system in which candidates tend to run as a team as opposed to individuals for seats in parliament, as opposed to single-member district systems (SMD) in which individuals representing a party run in winner-take-all races for one seat in the legislature. Her findings suggested that women have better chances of increasing their numbers on multi-member tickets versus running in winner-take-all races. She also controlled for other contextual factors, including party influence and socioeconomic conditions throughout various democracies. She found that the major predictors of women's advancement to parliament are the party-list PR system, the percentage of women in the paid workforce and percentage of women graduating from colleges respectfully. District magnitude is important in the sense that even PR systems with fewer representatives per districts even tended to have more women in their delegations than SMD systems. In contrast, Matland and Taylor (1997) argued that there are inconsistent findings among scholars because too much emphasis is placed on district magnitude as opposed to what they believed to be the true predictor of women's representation in regard to electoral system effects. They suggested that party magnitude, not district magnitude makes the difference (1997, p.193). Party magnitude is the number of seats a party expects to win in a district. It is possible to have a large number of seats in a district and some parties are only able to win a small number of seats. Thus, while districts with more seats may appear to be more



welcoming environments for women and other underrepresented groups, we cannot be confident that they will fare better in these districts. In essence, the environment completely depends on the *party*, not the district. In Nordic states, for example the party-list systems would imply that the candidates to be elected to represent the party in government is indicative of the parties alone (Haavio-Mannila et al., 1985 p 55). The overarching theme here is that electoral rules affect the representation of women in more ways than we think.

This thesis asserts that stagnation occurs in general across democracies, including parliamentary systems. Scholars further argued that women face barriers in party-list systems in such a way that is not obvious to scholars drawing on comparisons of participation levels of women in SMD systems. For example, in party-list systems, candidates are generally listed in such a manner as to their influence within the party. In other words, the top listed candidates are designated to take those seats that the party is certain they can win. Haavio-Mannila et al. (1985) call these seats the “mandate” positions; those seats the party is expected to hold onto in a favorable election. The names listed lower on the list represent the “fighting” positions; the seats the party can hold if they win additional seats than what was previously held in a given district. Finally, those positions for which the party stands no chance of winning are called the “ornamental” positions, in which candidates are slated at the very bottom of the party-list. As is consistent with research on Nordic electoral systems, Matland and Taylor (1997) concluded that the party-list system of Costa Rica listed

women in such a manner where they were either absent or underrepresented in winnable positions while being over-represented in ornamental positions on party-lists. Therefore, in order to be slated for seats that are considered winnable, struggles within the party for women take on the same characteristics as faced by women candidates in a two-party system. These are precisely the issues with party-list systems that are not exactly obvious to many scholars comparing the participation level of women in SMD-systems versus those of women in proportional representation (list) systems.

An important point to note is that women's political activity within parties is essential to increasing women's recruitment to parliament. This point is evident in various studies. Miki Caul (1999) specifically examined the role of political parties on women's representation in parliament. She suggested that there are 4 major party characteristics that may have some significant impact on women's representation; (1) organizational structure (2) the party's ideology (3) proportion of women's party activities and (4) party rules for recruitment. In all, the most significant predictor of women's representation in parliaments across 12 democracies was party ideology. This effectively translates to mean the more liberal a party in its ideology, the more welcoming the party is to endorsing women and other traditionally underrepresented groups. However, the noteworthy finding in Caul's study (which supports the findings of Rule's previous study) was that women's activism within the party is crucial to the recruitment of women to seats in parliament.

The *women's activism* variable in these studies support a common theme that women in politics have long argued: A woman must work significantly harder than men to gain access to the national legislature. The idea that women must work within the party at the lower ranks in order for other women to advance suggest one of two ideas: Women are recruited to do the grunge work of the parties or women with aspirations of pursuing higher offices are rewarded with party-level positions which offer more party influence at higher levels but tend to place women on different career paths within the political structure. These career paths end in terminal party positions as opposed to putting women on track for MP status in the legislature. Furthermore, it can be argued that even though women seem to fair better in proportional representation systems, there quite possibly are still hindrances to women's advancement in these systems as well.

#### Party Politics In America: Congressional versus Presidential Influence

As stated earlier, political parties are a staple among American institutions. The effects of partisanship are felt across all branches of government. Early studies in voting found that a primary basis for predicting voting behavior was partisanship (Campbell, et al 1960). Party identification is a constant over life cycles for American voters and even more so for those seeking representative office. As a powerful institution, political parties yield a great deal of influence in determining who party candidates and front-runners will be (Schlesinger, 1991, Jacobson, 2001). This is the basis for which we suggest that party

leadership often possess the power to elevate certain candidates from into higher offices, both within government and the party. Although parties have influence in selecting presidential and congressional representatives, the level of influence is vastly different for both branches.

Wattenberg argues that since the mid 1960's, there has been a substantial decline in the influence of American political parties when it comes to choosing presidential candidates and a sharp increase in the influence of the individual candidates themselves among the constituency (1991, 1996). The 1960 presidential election is evidence of this. Kennedy receiving the democratic nomination marked a transitional point from "*leadership choice to popular choice.*" Although most Americans identify themselves with one of the two major political parties, they are increasingly unaware of the substantial policy differences between Republicans and Democrats. Wattenberg argues that many voters view the two major political parties as two of the same. An increase in popular-choice voting would probably explain an increase in voters labeling themselves "Independent" as opposed to affiliating with one of the two major political parties. Furthermore, Wattenberg argues that primaries and caucuses eliminate much of the nominating power from political parties. On the contrary, this is not always the case. For example, Former President George Bush Sr. placed third in the early primaries prior to the election and still received the Republican Party nomination for office of the President.

Although Wattenberg is correct in his assessment of presidential candidate influence, his research is also applicable to congressional candidates. However, some scholars would argue that parties retain tremendous influence in choosing federal legislators (Schlesinger, 1966). Partisan influence in nominating an executive president and members of the legislature differ in many ways that radically define the extent of influence. From a traditional standpoint, it appears that the rules for nominating candidates for the office of the President are quite structured. Potential (sometimes as many as five) candidates would already have had to obtain a strong support base in various factions of the party, their state and with a variety of large constituent groups. In contrast to presidential nominations, the rules for selecting congressional candidates are not as structured. Less attention is given to congressional races, in part because multiple races occur simultaneously. In addition, many districts are sometimes unable to identify quality candidates to run a campaign. Thus, the involvement of the political party organization is warranted. There is more of an advantage to risk-taking at the congressional level. However, there remains a disincentive to take major risks because partisanship is a driving force in congressional politics. Each party seeks to maximize representation in Congress. We should expect a greater influence at the congressional level in regard to parties determining what constitutes viable candidates for Congress. In the House of Representatives (the lower and significantly larger chamber of the U.S. federal legislature), the rules of government are based almost entirely on the discretion

of the political party holding a majority of the seats. Although there are 435 seats, obtaining a majority is a tremendous task. Therefore, choosing congressional candidates warrants strategic planning on the part of party officials, who must then determine which candidates have the greatest potential to win. In these terms, women candidates may experience great difficulty in obtaining congressional nominations, especially if they view politics from a more purposive standpoint (Constantini, 1990). Proponents of the purposive argument would argue that women in general enter politics at the state and local level due to some disenchantment with the local policy outcomes that directly affect them. The logic follows that once an individual has brought about the desired social change at a lower level of political office, they may very well lose the incentive to pursue higher office. Most candidates (regardless of gender) tend to follow the road most traveled by those seeking congressional office: the state legislature. In essence, we are more likely to see women legislating at the state level than federal level. In addition, where women are present in state legislatures, they often tend to be highly represented. The researcher considers the possibility that stagnation could be occurring in such a way that women are likely to be concentrated in similar areas at the state level and thus exhaust the number of highly qualified women candidates that are able to run for federal office at any given time. If this is true, the expectation is that more women will face each other in congressional races simply because there are more of them coming out of the same state legislatures.

Cook, Thomas and Wilcox (1994) labeled 1992 the “Year of the Woman” for several reasons. A substantial number of incumbents retired that year, allowing for the number of first-time challengers to increase two-fold. Open seat races improved the chances of women being elected to office. Twenty-seven women were elected to office that year. However, considering the rate at which women increased their standing in Congress, a repetition of this pattern did not follow in congressional elections since then. An immediate rebuttal to why we did not see women’s numbers increase in 1994 is obvious: 1992 was a presidential election year, during which turnout is significantly higher than in other years. The absence of continued gains raises serious questions however, especially since more and more women than in previous years have been serving in state legislatures. These facts may suggest some disincentive on the part of political parties to nominate women to run for congressional seats.

Among several determinant factors in who will be frontrunners for elections are most obviously political party leaders and the candidates themselves. Some scholars have suggested that the greatest predictor of winning party nominations for congressional office is the most ambitious of candidates (Schlesinger, 1966, 1991, Fowler and McClure, 1989). Ambition is measured by the skill applied in the strategic decision-making process that highly qualified candidates utilize to gain access to political office. In making strategic choices, potential candidates for congressional office calculate the cost and benefits to every political move prior to making them. To this end, many candidates select

themselves into particular congressional races that they believe will yield the best returns for their efforts toward successfully winning the election. It is my belief that women seeking congressional election operate utilizing the same strategies. Those congressional races that appear to be particularly attractive to the ambitious woman are easily identifiable in that they already include a woman candidate (a race in which a female is already present as an incumbent). This strategy poses several benefits for women. Choosing a race where a woman is currently serving suggests that voters within the district have accepted women as legitimate politicians. The long-term effects of this strategy, however, can yield serious consequences for women in general. As more and more women run for congressional office against each other, the overall number of women actually legislating will remain the same. One objective of this research is to determine empirically whether ambitious female candidates are in fact selecting themselves into congressional races in districts where women have already been successful in gaining access to congressional office. The theory suggests that women are serving as replacements to those currently serving in congressional office as opposed to adding to the current number of women in Congress. In essence, the overall proportion of women gaining access to congressional seats will remain stagnant.

Having discussed various ideas concerning how stagnation could be occurring in the political system, stagnation is developed as a theory based on several primary hypotheses; (1) exhausting the qualified pool of women at the



state level (*the Female Centralization Hypothesis*), (2) analyzing candidate self-selection into particular races (*the Woman vs. Woman Hypothesis*) and (3) finally the lack of necessary resources will prevent the greater influx of women into legislative government (*Limited Resource hypothesis*). The *Female Centralization* hypothesis suggests that large pools of potential women candidates for federal office are concentrated in demographic areas where women politicians are simply more prevalent. Overtime, as more women express interest in running for congressional offices, more and more women candidates will appear to come from districts in areas where women already serving have come from. To this end, the centralization of women may contain their numbers in Congress because they are concentrated in the same states and/or districts. This idea is also connected with the secondary hypothesis (*the Woman vs. Woman hypothesis*) of how stagnation works. If women are concentrated in the same areas, we should find that eventually, they will face other women in attempting to run for congressional office. Thus, the probability of women candidates facing other women is increased simply because women are highly concentrated in the same areas. The *Woman vs. Woman* hypothesis however, suggests that women will intentionally seek races where another woman is already legislating, simply based on the inherent idea is that voters in such districts are more accepting of women candidates because they have elected them in the past. The *Limited Resource* hypothesis suggests that women simply receive a significantly lesser amount of the essential resources that drive electoral success, when compared to

men. Because data is available on the resources of candidates prior to the election, the *Limited Resource* hypothesis will be tested in the final stages of this thesis. Through this study, I also seek to find out if effects regarding the woman-vs-woman hypothesis are evident through this investigation and whether any of the variance in the lesser influx of women can be explained. What is unknown is whether or not the hypotheses operate simultaneously or independently.

The research in this dissertation is multi-faceted in that I investigate other elements of influence in regard to the election of women to congressional office. There is evidence that political parties and the district demographic characteristics play a major role in the advancement of women as well. The idea of stagnation as expressed in this dissertation is unique in that it has never been studied in this manner before. However, while this dissertation focuses primarily on women's participation in the American political system, the researcher asserts that stagnation as a theory has implications in other democracies as well. Chapter 3 examines several European parliamentary systems and the participation of women in each country. Most parliamentary systems boast high representation of women operating in government. However, rules governing party organization and party lists provide means for which stagnation could also be present in political systems other than the U.S.

## Chapter 3

Clearly stated, stagnation is the existence of at least one institutional barrier preventing or suppressing the participation of women as national representatives in democratic legislatures. Before such claims can be made or considered valid about the American political system, it would be advantageous to examine whether barriers for women are evident in other democracies as well. Chapter 3 is an examination of women's success in getting elected to the national legislative body in other global democracies, specifically the democratic states of Western Europe. These nations were chosen for examination in this chapter for several reasons: Firstly, the democracies of Western Europe are among the oldest in the world and constitute many industrialized nations today. Secondly, the data on these nations were readily available in Katz and Mair's data set, dating back to the 1940s. While most of the data are derived from Katz and Mair, more recent statistics are provided from Inter-Parliamentary Union and the International Institute for Democracy and Global Assistance (IDEA), two other primary data resources for this chapter. I examine the political party system within European nations and the role these institutions play in women's inclusion in government. Specifically, I examine whether parties have documented rules for including women in the respective nation's politics. I also analyze whether a nation's type of electoral system, historical events and indigenous politics play a role that would either enhance or hinder women's participation in government. Stagnation is not evident in any one democracy but

is manifested in other legislative systems as well. While a given political system may inhibit barriers to the increased representation of women in one particular way, stagnation can be occurring in other legislative systems in another form. Government structural changes and coalition building, a popular feature of parliamentary systems, play vital roles in the extent to which women participate in government. With all of these changes, overtime, women have served in government in significantly higher numbers in European governments than women in the United States. Still, the idea of stagnation, while it is a theory involving the political system, has implications in society as a whole. The following chapter offers some insight into the ways in which stagnation can suppress the overall inclusion of women in different ways in parliamentary systems. The nations in this study offer a range of electoral systems to examine.

While women constitute more than fifty percent of the population everywhere, no country has yet to seat women in any legislature at that rate. Women have made and continue to make great advances in realizing their capabilities in legislating at the national level. However, in some sense, we should expect some difficulty in electing women to legislatures in general. The context of democratic representation is changing across nations. The nature of modern representation is one of great distance between voters and representatives. Cries for increased political participation on the part of voters come as a result of increased disenchantment with the processes and institutions of representative government (Rao, 2000). Still, there are other scholars who

would argue that this is the very environment for which we should expect to see an influx of women or more generally stated: traditional outsiders. As disenchantment increases among the global populous, voters are more likely to pursue other avenues toward greater satisfaction with its representatives. The growing number of parties in multi-party states serve as that vehicle. In addition, for parties to attract new support, we should expect parties to run candidates who can speak to a wider variety of voters and draw support from other factions of the voting population. In the case of women, the global movement to include more women appears to have taken shape. In the United States, the Women's Movement began to take shape in the 1970s. Politically, the fruits of those laborers in the 1970s were not realized until the early 1990s when women gained office in record numbers. The same appears to be true for global democracies as a whole. On average, women's numbers in the national legislature of any given country had increased dramatically between 1987 and 1995 (IPU, 1995). What is evident from data taken from the Inter-parliamentary Union as we examine women's inclusion on the national level across European countries is that the elections of the late 1980s into the early 1990s saw substantial increases in the number of women seated in parliaments. Overall, the increase appears gradual, but for some nations the rate of change has virtually shocked the system. Table one illustrates the gradual changes in the rate at which women participate in the national legislature of worldwide democracies since 1945. The

rate of participation for women has steadily increased from 3% in 1945 to around 11.6% in 1995.


Table 3:1 : Women in Parliaments<sup>15</sup>

<i>Year</i>	Average Women MPs in Parliaments around the world
1945	3.0%
1955	7.5%
1965	8.1%
1975	10.9%
1985	12.0%
1995	11.6%

In the analysis of political parties, data is presented from Katz and Mair's 1992 study of political parties in which we examine the influence of parties, whether they have rules governing the inclusion of women and how these rules effect women's position and placement within the party and thus in government. At the outset, women in European Parliaments have politically fared better than women anywhere else in the world. However, the study of women in European politics is still relevant to the study of stagnation for two primary reasons: Firstly, it is important to note that the theory of stagnation does not suggest that women are not included. The implications of stagnation are that women as a group are politically suppressed. Therefore, some mechanism may exist that could prevent the greater influx of women, even when the current rate of

<sup>15</sup> Data taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union, Series Number 23, Women in Parliaments, 1945-1995

Chart 3:1- Women in Parliament in Twelve Democracies  
Growth Trends, 1975-1989



The countries are indicated as follows:

- 1 = Austria
- 2 = Belgium
- 3 = Denmark
- 4 = Finland
- 5 = Germany
- 6 = Ireland
- 7 = Italy
- 8 = The Netherlands
- 9 = Norway
- 10 = Sweden
- 11 = United Kingdom
- 12 = United States

women's participation is as high as 40%. Secondly, the parliaments of many European nations are among the most studied in the world. Thus, there is a wealth of data on the political parties of European nations. Because these party-

level data are available, documented rules for the inclusion of women are essential to building a theoretical foundation for stagnation. In examining these rules, we gain insight into how various European nations view women's place in national government, especially when many European electoral systems tend to encourage widespread pluralism. For the majority of the chapter, the unit of analysis is the political party as the primary variable influencing the rate of women's participation. Such an analysis isolates the effects of parties on women's representation. The overall theme is that among European political systems, political parties and their influence as gatekeepers to government still matter across democracies. Parties continue to determine who is and is not elected to serve in the national legislature. Of the twelve countries in Katz and Mair's study, this examination covers the eleven nations of Europe previously listed. The United States, which is the last nation in their study is covered in chapter 4 along with the rest of the thesis.

If stagnation exists in global democracies, the expectation is that parties who win more than their normal share of the popular vote are likely to seat more women than parties that win less than their normal popular vote share. This is important to highlight because parties can have different vote shares and seat a similar percent of women. The size of the vote share matters because it directly determines the extent of the party's participation in government and I believe this matters in the case of how many women, if any, get seated. In addition, the expectation is that if stagnation exists, women will have a higher likelihood than



men of being rewarded with positions within the party that do not lead to seats in parliament. This chapter will examine the following aspects of each national government: the electoral system and structure of the national legislature, the political parties that get seated in parliament. In some instances, we examine the ideological stance of the party and how it affects women, rules that govern the incorporation of women within the party, women's representation in the party and an overview of their representation in the national legislature. The chapter also includes data on growth trends of women in the party and the party's overall growth overtime. While most European nations have many parties operating in the system, political parties that have failed to win seats in parliament between the years 1945 and 1989 are excluded from this examination.

The political parties of European nations in general acknowledge the presence of a women's organization within the party. Women's party organizations are interesting features of the party system. Firstly, the presence of women's organizations implicitly promotes the idea that women indeed have a place in politics and thus, have influence. This organ of the party is a primary reason why we should expect the participation of women to be higher among European nations in general. At the same time, when we examine the rules of women's inclusion among European political parties, in some instances, women tend to be somewhat confined to the role of addressing women's issues and thus, seem somewhat restricted to participate by way of the women's party organization.

## Austria

Austria is the first nation in the dataset. The Austrian government utilizes a proportional representation-list system. While this system invites multiple parties to participate in government, the *Nationalrat* must have a majority from one party in order to legislate effectively. A majority from one party makes it possible to seat the cabinet. National policy is initiated in the cabinet. In the event that there is no clear majority, coalitions among parties become essentially important to seating government. The *Bundesrat* is set up according to a proportional representation system in which they are elected by the Lander diets<sup>16</sup> according to their proportion of the population. This system however, allows the members of the Bundesrat to be seated along party lines similar to party representation in the Nationalrat. While the Bundesrat is designed to represent the interest of the Lander, its institutional power is inherently weak, in that its only form of political power rests in a suspensory veto. Furthermore, its actions mimic more of the same politics as the first chamber of the legislature as oppose to acting in the interest of the Lander.

Politics has been dominated by three distinct subcultures in Austria overtime. The Socialists, German-national liberals and Catholic Conservatives. Between the years 1945 and 1989, five major political parties existed: The Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (SPO, Socialist Party), the Kommunistische

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<sup>16</sup> The Lander is the second level of government under the national level. There are four levels of government in Austria: the local level, district level, land level and national level.)

Partei Osterreichs (KPO, Communist Party), the Osterreichische Volkspartei (OVP, the Catholic Conservatives Party), the Freiheitliche partei Osterreichs (FPÖ, German national liberal) and the Grüne Alternative (GA, the Green Party). The OVP and SPÖ are the two major parties in Austrian government. All political parties in Austria have rules that have governed women's representation at all levels of government over the years. The presence of women within the party is important because their presence has implications on whether they will be nominated for a legislative seat. For example, among Austrian parties alone, how many female members a party has at any sub-national level may determine how many women can serve in the legislature at that level. Women's advancement in the party may depend on membership of the party's women's organization. The SPÖ (which has most often been the dominant party in Austrian government), for example, issued rules in 1945 that female members of the party had to be represented in all committees and in all units of the party organization and at all levels<sup>17</sup>. The expectation is that the number of women serving at the local level should be the same at all (higher) levels within the party. The number of party offices women can hold at each level had to at least be proportional to the number of women activists in the party. This is also true at the *Land* level, including a stipulation that at least one woman had to be nominated by each Land party organizations. Overtime, these

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<sup>17</sup> Katz and Mair, 1992. Table II.D.8.a: Austria, Rules governing the representation of women for the SPÖ Party.

rules have allowed for a somewhat consistent proportion of women's representation in the party at the lower levels. The number of women representing at the lower levels has been approximately 16% between the years 1945-1990. However, this number has not translated into MPs. The average proportion of women MPs in these same years is 8%; exactly half of those at lower levels. Interesting enough, the women's organization within the party is responsible for nominating a representative, which it sends to the party's district level conference. This representative is an ex-officio delegate without voting rights in the conference. In addition, SPO party rules indicate that among parliamentary candidates:

....."the women's share of the candidate population must be at least proportional to the percentage of female party activists, with a minimum of 25 percent." Katz and Mair (1992, page 106)

The examination is interesting. There are several implications present in the system that can lead us to reevaluate women's chances for advancement in politics. Firstly, one must acknowledge that when an organization documents its rules, those rules often set precedence for how the organization will make decisions. An important factor is that at least for the SPO, the rules do not specify whether women are able to operate outside of the women's organization within the party. For example, it is not documented whether women are able to seek higher rank in the party without being members of the women's organization. The assumption here is that the women's organization seeks mandatory membership of all women who identify with the party and thus

women may be unable to provide solid legislative agendas without addressing “women’s issues.” Further, the women’s organization has an ex-officio position at certain levels within the party. Non-voting status implies that women’s presence within the party is confined to women’s political issues as opposed to drafting legislative policy outside the realm of political gender issues. Gender rules present a great avenue for the influx of women, however, in the case of Austria, these rules have widespread limitations. While the party’s rules suggest proportional inclusion at all levels, other rules can serve as the mechanism in the system that restricts the translation of women’s widespread participation within the party and at the national level. The SPO has been primarily the dominant party in Austria in terms of popular vote share since the 1970 election. The average vote share for the SPO since the 1945 election is approximately 45%. Overtime, women have been elected as members of Parliament almost consistently around the 9-10% mark. The 1990 national election was clearly a special election for women (as noted earlier) in that it was the first time women ever comprised 25% of the national legislature, more than doubling the stable average of 10%. It should be noted as well that there was no gradual increase in women’s numbers preceding the election. Women were averaging about 10% of the legislature for the four elections prior to 1990. It is important to note that while I infer that system-level mechanisms exist that inherently restrict the greater influx of women into the Austrian system, its Parliament has consistently exceeded the global average of women in government since the 1960s. Another

major Austrian party, the OVP offers another interesting example of how women face limits in government.

The OVP dominated Austrian government in terms of its percent of the popular vote prior to 1959. Since the 1959 election, the party lost votes almost exclusively to the rising SPO Party, considering the average of the vote share for all other parties in the system has remained virtually the same. For the OVP, the rules governing the representation of women took effect in 1946. For the Party Congress (Bundesparteitag, national level), 10 delegates of the women's organization would serve as representatives and for the Full Party Executive (Bundesparteileitung, Land level or second highest level within the party), the chairperson of the women's organization is an ex-officio member. There are no rules regarding gender in nominating parliamentary candidates and as of 1990, this had not changed. Again, these documented rules of inclusion imply that women can be held to a certain rate of incorporation within the party system.

Austria's party system offers a close-up look into how stagnation may be occurring within the party ranks that thus affect the number of women that actually serve in the national legislature. Katz and Mair (1992) have recorded the rules for each political party in Austria in regard to how women are to be represented on each level of government. The ideal information for this analysis would be to obtain the data on women's activism for the party (specifically, the number of women activists within the party). These data, however are unavailable. Being that inclusion rules exist to guide our understanding of what

the party views as an acceptable level of representation for women, we can assume that at the lowest levels of government for which we have data, that the number of women in offices is, at the very least, indicative of the number of women activists for the party. What should follow according to party rules is that the proportion of women serving at the national level should be similar, if not the same as the proportion of women serving at the lower levels. Table 3:2 illustrates the proportion of women serving within the party ranks of the SPO. As is evident from the data, the number of women serving in various party offices are nearly twice the number of those who become parliamentary candidates. The number is lower for those who actually win seats in the parliament by the party. While all parties have different variations of rules governing the inclusion of women, the SPO offers great insight into how the system operates in regard to women. In many party rules systems, women are often given positions as ex-officio members within the party. By definition, the power of these positions are limited in that the member lacks voting power on deciding the party direction and is thus an *unequal* member. What should guide our understanding of these inferences is that the higher up a party member moves within government, regardless of gender, the fewer “activists” members one will encounter. In essence, we can assume that there are much more men activists at the lower levels of the party organizations also.

Table 3:2- Representation of Women, SPO Party 1945-1989

Year	Full Party Executive	Party Executive	Parliamentary Candidates	Women MPs
1945	7/40 = 17.5%	4/20 = 20%		6/76 = 8%
1949	6/40 = 15%	4/20 = 20%		7/67 = 10%
1952	6/40 = 15%	4/20 = 20%		8/73 = 11%
1954	6/40 = 15%	5/20 = 25%		
1956	6/40 = 15%	5/20 = 25%	45/330 = 13%	7/74 = 9%
1959	7/50 = 14%	5/25 = 20%	47/329 = 14%	7/78 = 9%
1962	7/50 = 14%	5/25 = 20%	35/330=11%	7/76=9%
1966	7/50 =14%	5/25 = 20%	46/330=14%	7/74=9%
1970	7/54 =13%	2/12 = 17%	44/330=13%	6/81=7%
1971	7/54=13%	2/12 = 17%	47/366=13%	8/93=8%
1975	7/54=13%	2/12 = 17%	55/366=15%	9/93=9%
1979	7/56=12.5%	2/12 = 17%	59/366=16%	11/95=11%
1983	8/56=14%	2/13 = 15%	65/366=18%	8/90=8%
1985	8/56=14%	2/13 = 15%		
1986	8/56=14%	2/13 = 15%	96/366=26%	10/80=12.5%
1987	17/65=26%	2/13 = 15%		
1989	18/65=27%	2/13 = 15%		
<b>Avg1945-1989</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>7%</b>

However, when the inclusion rules state that the proportion of women at the lower levels should be similar at higher levels, and the numbers are not proportional, there is cause for concern. In fact, women's numbers are half of those represented at lower levels. Table 3:2 and 3:2a provide the total number of women serving in both chambers of the Austrian Parliament, what percent of parliament they comprised in each election year since 1945, all political parties included. The graph illustrates the growth trends in women's participation over the years. The lines in the first graph represent the percent of women serving in the Nationalrat (Natpctwn) and the Bundesrat (Pctwmn).



**Table 3:2a - Austrian Bundesrat - Upper House of Parliament<sup>i</sup>**

Elections	Seats	Men	Women	Percent Women
1945	49	49	0	<b>0.0</b>
1949	48	47	1	<b>2.1</b>
1953	45	44	1	<b>2.2</b>
1956	48	42	6	<b>12.5</b>
1959	48	42	6	<b>12.5</b>
1962	51	44	7	<b>13.7</b>
1966	51	45	6	<b>11.8</b>
1970	54	45	9	<b>16.7</b>
1971	51	42	9	<b>17.6</b>
1975	55	44	11	<b>20.0</b>
1979	55	46	9	<b>16.4</b>
1983	61	51	10	<b>16.4</b>
1986	62	49	13	<b>21.0</b>
1990	60	47	13	<b>21.7</b>
1994	63	49	14	<b>22.2</b>

**Table 3:2b - Austrian Nationalrat - Lower House of Parliament**

Elections	Seats	Men	Women	Percent Women
1945	165	156	9	<b>5.5</b>
1949	165	157	8	<b>4.8</b>
1953	165	156	9	<b>5.5</b>
1956	165	157	8	<b>4.8</b>
1959	165	156	9	<b>5.5</b>
1962	165	156	9	<b>5.5</b>
1966	165	156	9	<b>5.5</b>
1970	165	157	8	<b>4.8</b>
1971	183	172	11	<b>6.0</b>
1975	183	169	14	<b>7.7</b>
1979	183	165	18	<b>9.8</b>
1983	183	166	17	<b>9.3</b>
1986	183	162	21	<b>11.5</b>
1990	183	147	36	<b>19.7</b>
1994	183	143	40	<b>21.9</b>

Chart 3:2 Women MPs in Austrian Parliament




Table 3:2c- Austria- Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
OVP	Yes -ex-officio member	No	Yes - Chair, Women's Organization	Yes	No
SPO	Yes- ex-officio member	Yes, 25% women at Land Level	Yes	Yes	No
FPO	No	No	Yes- At least 1 member in the Party Executive	Not specified	No
GA	No	No	No	Not specified	Yes-Parity for both genders

Table 3:2c offers information regarding rules for Austrian parties in the political system that govern the seating of candidates in parliament. While there are a

host of other parties in the system, they do not win the necessary votes to be seated in parliament and are thus not included in Table 3:2c. The column "*Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level*" suggests whether each party in the system has documented rules regarding women participating in party government in a non-voting form. These positions are thus reserved for women. As stated earlier, parties will have designated positions for women, which are labeled *ex-officio* positions in which they do not vote. The third column labeled "*Rules for Voting capacity at some level*" offers information on whether the party has specifically outlined the conditions for which women are selected for voting positions and at what level. For example, party rules may state that women must hold certain previous positions (most often in the Women's Organization of the party) to hold seats in certain levels of party government or this category will offer the proportion of the body (i.e. 20% seats are for women) that women should comprise. The fourth column states whether the party has a women's organization within the party. This information is important because generally, parties that tend to have women's organizations within the party see those organizations as the primary means of representation for women as a whole. The expectation is that women's representation within the party is dependent on their role within the women's organization of the party. The implication here is that a distinct group of members are more likely to be channeled through a micro-party organization before moving into the larger party organization at each level. This distinction is essential in observing a significantly higher

number of women at the local levels of party government versus the state and national levels because they must achieve status in one organization most often before moving into the larger party organization, a feature not warranted for men. The final column indicates whether the party has documented rules regarding women's inclusion as candidates for the national parliament. The expectation is that while most political parties will have some rule for women's inclusion at the local, state or district levels, those rules will either be strained or not apply at the national level.

Table 3:2c offers important information about how parties have incorporated women over the years. Among Austrian parties, all political parties have rules that acknowledge women in some form. For example, both the OVP and SPO, have women's organizations within the party and have rules that place women in non-voting or ex-officio positions at local or land levels. For the SPO, female members should comprise 25% of all party committees and party delegation at the Land level. There is no rules regarding women as parliamentary candidates in the OVP, SPO or FPO. The Green party is the only political party in Austria that has documented rules for equal representation among men and women within the party.

## Belgium

Since 1830, Belgium has had a federal parliamentary system of government with a bicameral legislature. The first chamber of the national

legislature is called the Chamber of Representatives (Chambre des Représentants) and the second chamber is called the Senate (Senat). The Chamber of Representatives are elected utilizing a proportional representation list system. A portion of the Senate is directly elected, while another portion is chosen by Community Assemblies. Belgium has sharp regional cleavages in that the country has large Dutch (60%) and French (40%) populations that seek some degree of autonomy from the national government. For these reasons, party identification is a highly salient issue in Belgian society. The distinction among parties in Belgium depends in large part on regional demographics. The party factions include the Communist Party of Belgium (PCB/KPB), the Belgian Franco Socialist Party (PSB), the Belgian Flemish Socialist Party (BSP), the Franco Social Christian Party (PSC), the Flemish Christian People's Party (CVP), the Franco Liberal Reform Party (PRL), the Flemish Party of Liberty and Progress (PVV), the Flemish People's Union (VU), the Franco Ecology Party (ECO) and the Flemish Ecology Party (AGA). Historically, no one party has had an overwhelming majority in Belgian government because political cleavages make it nearly impossible.

Like Austria, Belgium does have a party system in which some parties have rules for the incorporation of women. However, while parties tended to have rules for incorporating women, they were largely at lower levels within the party organizations and few had rules regarding women as parliamentary candidates. The Flemish Christian Party has held a majority in the Belgian

Parliament since the late 1970s. Prior to that, its political strength was rivaled only by the Socialist Party, which separated along regional lines (French and Dutch) before the 1978 elections.

Table 3:3-Belgium- Representation of Women among Parliamentary Candidates and MPS<sup>a1</sup>


<b>Election Year</b>	<b>CVP</b>	<b>BSP</b>	<b>PVV</b>	<b>VU</b>	<b>AGA</b>
1971	2/23/210		1/18/210	1/21/210	
1974	6/29/213		0/26/213	2/27/213	
1977	12/35/213		1/29/213	1/40/213	
1978	11/31/213	2/19/213	2/27/213	0/32/213	
1981	11/37/213	2/30/213	2/34/213	0/39/214	1/36/-
1985	9/42/214	2/26/214	1/34/214	1/39/214	2/71/-
1987	9/43/214	3/38/214	1/34/214	2/28/214	1/96/-

a. Women elected/women candidates/total party candidates in Parliament, both houses. Katz and Mair (1992)

These party factions have rules regarding the incorporation of women at the national level. The BSP and CVP contend that 20-25% of its elected members within the party should be female, but such rules do not extend to parliamentary level candidacies. The PSB and PVV have rules mandating that 20% of its candidates for Parliament be female. Table 3:3 for Belgium indicates the number of women candidates each party presented, how many women were actually elected and the overall number of candidates for both chambers of Parliament.

Among European nations, the increased rate of women's representation is lower in Belgium when compared to other European nations.

Chart 3:3: Belgium – Women MPs in Government



The major party in Belgian government, the Flemish Christian People's Party, seated the most women in the Belgian parliament at a rate of 3-5% in all elections from 1974-1987. The previous graph for Belgium illustrates the growth trends in women's representation over the years. Sharp cleavages among party factions may also contribute to the lesser influx of women. Belgium's party system acknowledges racial and other demographic bias in membership and policy preferences. This fact makes it more difficult for political outsiders to participate in the system.

In addition, no political party in the Belgian parliament had record of any women's organization within the party. Among European nations, the absence

of women's organization directly affects the number of women active in political life. Thus, fewer women have participated in Belgian government.

Table 3:3a- Belgium, Rules for Women's Inclusion  
Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Candidates National level
PSB	Not Specified	Yes- at least 20% women	No	Not Specified	Yes- at least 20% women
BSP				Not Specified	Not Specified
PSC/CVP (1960 – 1967)	No	Yes- female with highest number of votes is automatically elected	Yes- Secretaries for Party Nat'l Committee must be female	No	No
CVP	No	Yes- At least 20% elected must be female	No	Not Specified	No
PRL	No	Yes- 20% of Constituency delegates in Party Congress only	No	No	No
PRL/PVV	No	No	Yes- 4 members of Permanent Bureau, 1 member Direction Committee	No	No
PVV	No	Yes, 20% of Constituency Delegates in Party Congress only	No	Not Specified	Yes- 20% should be female

The Scandinavian countries of Europe are similar in their approach to women's inclusion in government. For this reason, they are analyzed together.



With the exception of Finland, (Scandinavia is really comprised of) Denmark, Norway and Sweden have very high levels of women legislating at the national level of Parliament and these countries have been studied specifically for their high rate of women's participation among global democracies (average 20-35%). All four nations have unicameral governments, which is an interesting feature for high inclusion because unicameral governments tend to have fewer seats to compete over, when compared against the average size of European parliaments.<sup>18</sup>

## Denmark

The Danish parliament, the *Folketinget*, seats 179 representatives. The party system in Denmark is dominated by four major parties that have remained constant for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They are the Social Democratic Party (SD), the Liberal Party (V), the Social Liberal Party (RV) and the Conservative People's Party (KF). Other influential parties in the system include the Progress Party (FRP), the Christian People's Party (KRF), the Socialist People's Party (SF) and the Centre Democrats (CD). With the exception of the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party, all other Danish parties have no rules regarding the inclusion of women as Parliamentary candidates (See Table 3:4a). This is an important feature in Danish politics because documented rules for inclusion encourage the participation of women and further mandates that a proportion of

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<sup>18</sup> Average size of Parliament for the 11 European nations in Katz and Mair's study is 381 seats.

women hold seats in parliament. Ironically, among European nations, the percent of women serving in parliament is among the highest in Denmark. Both

Table 3:4- Denmark, Representation of Women : Parliamentary Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>

Year	SF	SD	RV	KRF	CD	V	KF	FRP
1960	9/91 0/11	8/124 7/76	23/116 2/11			11/122 2/38	15/114 6/32	
1964	15/113 1/10	8/124 7/76	19/116 2/10			11/122 1/38	16/116 6/36	
1966	17/122 3/20	9/126 5/69	20/117 3/13			11/124 1/35	19/121 6/34	
1968	18/120 1/11	7/126 3/62	19/117 5/27			16/128 3/34	19/120 6/37	
1971	18/107 4/17	14/104 10/70	18/102 6/27	11/72		19/113 3/30	18/93 7/31	
1973	16/104 3/11	17/104 6/46	18/100 5/20	11/57 2/7	13/103 2/14	21/108 3/22	20/95 2/16	22/195 3/28
1975	23/104 2/9	16/104 6/53	23/99 4/13	13/80 3/9	13/98 0/4	19/106 7/42	20/96 2/10	12/118 3/24
1977	24/104 2/7	15/104 12/65	21/99 1/6	10/80 2/6	12/82 2/11	19/102 2/21	22/90 4/15	17/108 1/26
1979	26/103 7/11	17/104 16/68	24/98 3/10	13/73 1/5	20/94 2/6	18/98 3/22	15/86 7/22	17/102 1/20
1981	22/99 9/21	23/105 11/59	29/98 3/9	19/81 1/4	16/77 6/15	19/95 1/20	20/88 9/26	18/96 1/16
1984	29/102 9/21	24/104 10/56	29/99 2/10	17/85 1/5	25/96 3/8	22/96 6/22	22/103 13/42	18/96 1/6
1987	36/103 9/27	29/104 13/54	29/101 5/11	22/94 1/4	24/97 4/9	25/96 2/19	21/104 13/38	23/99 5/9
1988	39/105 8/24	30/104 18/55	30/100 5/10	25/92 1/4	24/95 4/9	28/98 3/22	24/103 11/35	27/105 7/16


a- Women candidates/Total party candidates  
Women MPs/Total party MPs

the SF and SD parties encourage gender equality among its parliamentary candidates, and have seated women in parliament at an average

rate of 33%. All other parties in the system seat women at a rate between 25-50%.<sup>19</sup> Parity between genders among parliamentary candidates is promoted by electoral party rules that alternate gender on party lists. For example, for every

Chart 3:4 Denmark – Women MPs in Parliament

Denmark - Percent Women MPs  
in Parliament



male listed on a party’s electoral list, a woman will alternate in the following list position. This is a direct means for ensuring women are seated in the parliament according to the party’s vote share. This rule for parliamentary candidates is evident in other Nordic democracies. In Norway, for example, four of the seven political parties that are represented in the national parliament require that a minimum of 40% of all parliamentary candidates be women and that candidates

<sup>19</sup> These results for the 1988 national election.

alternate on party lists according to gender for legislative government at all levels (See Table 3:5). This process ensures solid representation of women in government. In fact, as of 2003, data taken from International IDEA's website indicates that of the top ten nations in the world with the highest level of women's participation in the national legislature, the Scandinavian nations of Denmark (#3), Norway (#5) and Sweden (#2) are all ranked. Indeed, there is

**Table 3:4a- Denmark, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level</b>	<b>Rules for Voting Capacity at some level</b>	<b>Specified Participation At some level</b>	<b>Party has Women's Organization</b>	<b>Rule for Candidates National level</b>
SF	No	Yes- right to 40% rep. in all elected assemblies	No	Not Specified	Yes- gender alternates in list order
SD	No	Yes- recommend real equality in Nat'l Congress, right to 40% rep. In Committees		Not Specified	Yes- recommends real equality in nominations
RV	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
KRF	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
CD	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
V	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
KF	No	Yes- At least Chair of Women's Committee	Yes- Chair, Women's Committee	Yes	No
FRP	No	No	No	Not Specified	No

something unique about the Scandinavian nations in regards to women's representation. Women have been traditionally denied access but are making great strides within Scandinavian states. The liberal nature of society in

Scandinavian nations also contributes to the greater influx of women in government.

## Norway

As stated before, Norwegian government and society is considered one of the most progressive in Europe in regard to the advancement and inclusion of women. Women received the right to vote in Norway in 1913. An interesting feature of Norwegian law-making was the realization that women needed more than the vote to be properly integrated into Norwegian society early. Inter-Parliamentary Union documents women's right to stand for election between 1907-1913 because :

*"Women were granted the right to vote and to stand for election in 1907 but on special conditions between 1907 and 1913: private means, property and good position and income were necessary for a woman to be elected a Member of Parliament." (IPU, 1995).*

Parliament acted to implement laws that would give women the capabilities needed to realize equality in other areas of society, which were necessary means to become members of Parliament. When compared to most other nations, women had to petition Parliament to implement such laws over a longer period of time. On average, the *Stortinget*, the unicameral house of the Norwegian Parliament, is smaller than the average national legislature in Europe with 165 members. Women have comprised more than 20% of Parliament since the national election of 1977 and an average of 34% between the years of 1981 and

1994 (IPU, 1995). See graph on *Norway-Percent Women MPs in the Stortinget*.

Table 3:5 indicates the number women presented by each political party in Norway, which utilizes a proportional representation-list system. Among many

**Table 3:5 - Norway, Representation of Women: Parliamentary Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>**

Year	SV	DNA	V	SP	KRF	H	FRP
1961	14/86 0/2	51/270 1/74	44/206 0/14	36/218 <sup>b</sup> 1/16	42/235 0/15	60/270 1/29	
1965	36/269 0/2	50/270 9/68	55/212 0/18	37/217 0/18	42/220 0/13	62/270 1/31	
1969	28/270 -	60/270 11/74	57/270 2/13	45/190 0/20	47/259 <sup>c</sup> 1/14	62/270 2/29	
1973	79/235 3/16	74/268 12/62	38/152 0/2	78/269 <sup>d</sup> 3/21	61/243 1/20	72/269 5/29	26/243 0/3
1977	124/268 1/2	100/269 20/76	90/209 0/2	81/217 1/12	83/269 <sup>e</sup> 3/22	82/269 12/41	46/256 -
1981	127/267 2/4	109/269 22/66	97/209 0/2	103/263 2/11	88/233 1/15	97/269 13/53	51/263 0/4
1985	135/271 3/6	126/271 30/71	133/271	114/271 <sup>f</sup> 2/12	117/271 4/16	110/271 15/50	62/270 0/2
1989	134/271 7/17	131/271 32/63	131/271	124/268 3/11	118/270 4/14	116/271 9/37	72/271 1/22

a- Women candidates/Total parliamentary candidates  
Women MPs/Total MPs

b- Includes electoral pacts with V Party in some counties.

c- Includes electoral pacts with SP.

d- Includes electoral pacts with V.

e- Includes electoral pacts with V and SP.


f- Includes various electoral pacts.

parties in the Norwegian political system, the Parliament seats an average of eight parties. The parties in the Norwegian Stortinget are: The Socialist Left Party (SV), the Norwegian Labour Party (DNA), the Centre Party (SP), the Christian People's Party (KRF), the Liberal Party (V), the Conservative Party (H) and the Progress Party (FRP). As of 1989, the major party in Parliament is the DNA with 34% of the national vote, followed by the Conservative Party (H) with 22% and the Progress Party (FRP) with 13%. Table X illustrates some interesting

features about the party organizations in Norway.

Chart 3:5 Norway - Women MPs in Government

### Norway - Percent Women MPs in the Stortinget



All but two parties seated in Parliament have women's organizations within the party. Currently, only three parties (the KRF, H and FRP parties) do not have documented party rules for the inclusion of women as MPs on the books.

However, the KRF and H parties still sent 24% or more women to Parliament as elected MPs. All other parties in the Norwegian system have documented rules for women to be included as Parliamentary candidates at a minimum rate of 40%. Interestingly, the KRF is the only party on record to designate a non-voting position at the party level for women (See Table 3:5a).

Table 3:5a- Norway, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
SV	No	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list	No	No	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list
DNA	No	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list	No	Yes	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list
SP	No	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list	No	Yes	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list
KRF	Yes, Nat'l Sec of Women's Org. does not vote	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
V	No	Yes Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list	Yes- Members of Women's and Youth Orgs. According to size of memberships	Yes	Yes- Minimum of 40% for women. Alternate gender on party list
H	No	Not Specified	Yes- Leaders and Members of Women's Org.	Yes	No
FRP	No	No	No	No	NO



## Finland

The year 2006 will mark the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Finnish women being granted the right to vote and stand for election. Finland's Parliament was the first European nation to grant women the right to vote in 1906 and was the first nation in the world in which women were able to run for election as candidates for the national parliament. Thus, Finland has continued to be a progressive nation in regards to women's inclusion and mobility in society. In 1991, all political parties in the Finnish government had elected a minimum of 25% women MPs.

Table 3:6 - Finland, Representation of Women: Candidates and MPs


Year	SKDL	SDP	KESK	SFP	KOK
1962	37/200 9/47	22/199 6/38	18/156 4/53	2/51 -	38/183 4/32
1966	30/178 7/41	27/199 9/55	25/184 6/49	6/53 -	38/186 5/26
1970	39/178 10/36	39/199 13/52	29/192 6/36	7/55 1/12	42/193 10/37
1972	39/186 9/37	37/199 15/55	32/171 6/35	11/51 1/10	50/199 7/34
1975	54/209 9/40	56/224 13/54	39/151 7/39	6/38 2/9	50/179 9/36
1979	57/220 11/35	69/225 16/52	43/185 5/36	12/57 2/9	63/226 13/47
1983	75/227 10/26	74/227 18/57	62/199 9/38	22/65 2/10	67/227 18/44
1987	85/229 5/16	92/229 18/56	65/177 11/40	22/61 1/13	80/229 22/53
1991	98/230 5/19	97/230 22/48	82/215 15/55	28/71 3/12	100/230 20/40

Women candidates/total candidates  
Women MPs/Total Party MPs

Chart 3:6 Finland – Women MPs in Parliament

## Finland

### Percent Women MPs in Parliament



That year, women's overall standing in the Finnish parliament peaked at 37% before taking a slight decline (See Chart 3:6). In Finland, the major political parties are: The Democratic Alternative (SKDL), Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Centre Party (KESK), the Swedish People's Party (SFP) and the Conservative National Coalition (KOK). There are a host of other smaller parties in the Finnish system. The three dominant parties in Finnish government are the Finnish Social Democratic Party, The Centre Party and the Swedish People's Party. In 1991, all five major parties (listed) seated women at a rate of 25% or better (See Table 3:6). The Finnish government has a relatively smaller legislature than the global average size of parliament (global average= 380 seats, Finnish size= 200 seats, as of 2003). Size of government matters in that higher

numbers of women in a smaller government is a relevant detail. Other interesting features of Finnish government is that while most political parties have women's organizations within the parties, women still serve in non voting positions in several parties. Interestingly enough, no Finnish party has documented rules for women as parliamentary candidates, yet still, 25% of parliamentary seats are occupied by women.

Table 3:6a -Finland, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
SKDL	No	Yes- At least 40% in both genders	No	Not Specified	No
SDP	Yes- Reps for Women's Org, ex-officio	No	No	Yes	No
KESK	No	Yes- Max 3 reps for Party Congress and Women's Org nominates one member for Nat'l Executive	Yes- must be member of women's organization for some positions	Yes	No
SFP	Yes- President of Women's Org, ex-officio	Yes- 1 rep from Women's Assoc. Board	Yes-	Yes	No
KOK	Yes- General Sec. Of Women's Org, ex-officio	Yes- 1 rep per 2,000 members in each district's women org in Party Congress only.	No	Yes	No

The Finnish system is indeed a progressive one, in that women are making phenomenal strides in government and society. According to the data presented here, there is little room to suspect that women encounter inherent problems in seeking political advancement in Finland. To add, most Finnish parties are ideologically right of center, when compared to political parties of Western Europe. This feature is important in that most often, parties that ideologically lean to the right tend to have fewer women or traditional outsiders participate within their ranks.

## Sweden

International IDEA ranks Sweden second in the world for women's representation in parliament. As of 2002, Sweden was the first nation to reach a world record of 45% of its Parliament, *the Riksdagen*, being women. While the data from Katz and Mair's study ended with the election results from the 1991 parliamentary election, The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has the most current data on parliamentary election results in Sweden. Sweden is also among the top ten nations in the world where more women than men voted in the last election (82.8% women versus 81.5% men voted in Sweden in the 1998 election). Sweden utilizes a proportional representation-list system to elect its Parliament. The major political parties of Sweden are: The Left Party (VKP, formerly the Swedish Communist Party and

Table 3:7- Sweden, Representation of Women in Parliament<sup>a</sup>


Year	VPK	S	C	FP	M	MP
1960	0/2, 0/5	5/78, 18/111	0/22, 0/32	4/32, 4/38	0/17, 7/45	
1964	0/2, 1/5	7/78, 24/114	1/18, 0/34	2/27, 4/40	3/26, 6/39	
1968	0/1, 2/8	9/79, 25/113	2/21, 0/36	2/25, 3/43	3/25, 5/33	
1970	0/1, 2/3	9/79, 24/125	2/21, 2/39	2/27, 3/34	2/23, 5/32	
1973	3/17	29/163	9/71	6/58	4/41	
1976	4/17	34/152	24/86	9/39	9/55	
1979	5/20	42/154	20/64	9/38	16/73	
1982	4/20	50/166	18/56	3/21	21/86	
1985	3/19	54/159	14/44	20/51	17/76	
1988	8/21	63/156	16/42	19/44	18/66	8/21

a- Figures for 1960-1968 indicate women MPs and total MPs for the First and second chambers of Parliament, respectively.

Chart 3:7 Sweden - Women MPs in Government

### Sweden-Percent Women MPs

#### in the Riksdagen



then the Left Party Communists.), the Swedish Social Democratic Worker's Party (S), the Centre Party (C), the People's Party (FP), the Right Party (M, Moderate Unity Party), and the Environmental Party (MP, The Greens).

Table 3:7a- Sweden, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
VPK	No	No	No	No	No
S	Yes- 1 rep from Women's Org without vote in Party Congress/ In Nat'l Exec, Head of Women's Org attends, but no vote	No	Yes- Head of Women's Organization	Yes	No
C	No	Not specified	Yes- Reps from Women's Org	Yes	No
FP	No	Not Specified	Yes- Reps from Women's Org	Yes	No
M	No	Yes- recommendation to include reps from women's org.	No	Yes	No
MP	No	Yes- At least 40% from each gender	No	Not Specified	No

Among Scandinavian nations, Sweden highlights several ironies. No party in the Swedish Riksdagen has parliamentary quotas for women. (See Table 3:7a) In

spite of this fact, Sweden has continued to seat women in Parliament at a growing rate which has exceeded 30%. In addition, half of the parties seated in Parliament specify women's participation by way of the respective party's women's organization. The Swedish Social Democratic Worker's Party is the only party in the Swedish system that designates party seats for women without voting rights. However, the party has consistently seated more than 25% women in parliament since the 1970s.

## Germany

Germany utilizes a more complicated electoral version of the mixed member proportional system (MMP). Firstly, a mixed member system is a system in which about half the government is elected under a party list system and the other half is elected from plurality-majority elections. Essentially, Germans vote twice in order to seat the German Parliament. The first vote elects candidates directly in each of the 299 electoral districts of Germany. The German Parliament, the *Bundestag* is elected according to their proportion of the popular "second" vote. 299 is about 60% of parliament and in this respect, each district is represented in the Bundestag. The second vote selects the party majority in the Bundestag. The parties that receive the most votes can then seat candidates according to their vote share. The second vote is important because the majority party in the Bundestag selects the chancellor. In 1953, a five-percent clause was introduced in the Bundestag which required all parties to receive a minimum of

five percent of the popular vote in order to seat delegates in Parliament. This rule was passed mainly as a mechanism to keep small, extremist parties out of government.

The parties seated in the Bundestag as of 1990 are: The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens (G). The rate of inclusion for

**Table 3:8- Germany, Representation of Women Among Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>**

Year	CDU	CSU	SPD	FDP	G
1957-61	47/315 19/224	7/60 3/53	46/407 22/181	24/273 3/43	-/-
1961-65	56/344 15/201	6/50 3/50	42/413 21/203	25/291 4/67	-/-
1965-69	67/387 12/202	3/47 3/49	46/461 19/217	21/264 2/50	-/-
1969-72	53/381 12/199	6/53 2/49	52/480 18/237	23/282 2/31	-/-
1972-76	66/537 14/186	7/68 1/48	55/601 13/242	28/328 2/42	-/-
1976-80	76/545 17/201	7/73 2/53	64/629 15/224	34/333 4/40	-/-
1980-83	79/427 16/185	9/59 2/52	74/459 19/228	57/326 7/54	53/166 -/-
1983-87	78/405 14/202	5/45 3/53	65/447 21/202	43/318 3/35	45/204 10/28
1987-90	96/394 16/185	11/54 3/49	125/455 31/173	58/294 6/48	60/144 25/44
1990 West Germany	86/330 30/195	9/43 5/51	141/401 55/200	60/308 13/60	69/135 0/0
1990 United Germany	121/483 39/268	9/43 5/51	168/531 65/239	74/389 16/79	86/204 3/8

a- Women candidates, Land level / Total Candidates Land Level Women MPs/Total MPs



women in German parties tend to be lower among European political parties in general. (See Table 3:8). This low tendency is believed to be a result of German politics being right of center, on average across all parties. In addition, the Nazi government of WWII threatened the civil rights of all citizens who opposed its policies. As of 1987, women in the Bundestag constituted about 15%. See chart 3:8. In our analysis of the rules for inclusion among German parties, only one party as of 1990 had a women’s organization within the party; the FDP. The SPD and G parties had quotas for women as 40% of its parliamentary candidates. Interestingly, the SPD is the only party in our entire analysis that documented a termination date for its quota for women as MPs. The SPD will eliminate its 40% quota for women in the year 2013. Prior to 1987, the party seated an average of 10% women among its MPs. Between 1987 and 1990, the party seated an average

Chart 3:8 Germany - Women MPs in Government




Table 3:8a- Germany, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
SPD	No	40% quota to be abolished in 2013	No	Not Specified	40% quota for both genders to be abolished in 2013
CDU	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
CSU	Yes- Chair of Women's Org. is ex-officio member	Yes- 1 of 3 Deputies to the Chairman must be a woman	No	Not Specified	No
FDP	No	Not Specified	No	Yes	No
G	No	Yes- 50% quota for women	No	Not Specified	Yes- separate voting for men/women. All uneven positions on party list reserved for women

of 18-27% women among its MPs, a figure still a great distance from the 40% on record. The CSU party is the only party on record to have designated positions for women without voting rights in the party. Consistent with my expectations is the absence of rules for women as MPs when women are designated in non-voting positions at some level within the party. (See Table 3:8a).

Table 3:9- Ireland, Representation of Women Among  
Candidates and MPs


Year	FF	FG	LAB	PD	WP	G
1961	3/107 1/70	2/96 1/47	1/35 0/16			
1965	4/111 2/72	2/101 2/47	2/42 1/22			
1969	4/122 1/75	3/125 2/50	4/102 0/18			
1973	2/118 1/69	4/111 1/54	2/55 1/19		2/10 0/0	
1977	9/132 4/84	5/116 0/43	4/56 1/17		0/16 0/0	
1981	10/138 4/78	15/126 5/65	9/60 1/15		0/15 0/1	
1982	7/132 4/75	12/115 9/70	5/40 1/16		0/20 0/2	2/7 0/0
1987	10/122 5/81	11/97 5/51	3/37 0/12	7/51 4/14	3/29 0/4	4/9 0/0
1989	9/115 5/77	11/86 6/55	3/33 0/15	7/35 2/6	4/23 0/7	5/11 0/1

## Ireland

Ireland utilizes a Single Transferable Vote (STV), a version of proportional representation, as its electoral system. This means that candidates must receive a certain number of first-preference votes (a specified amount) from the popular vote. When candidates do not receive the required number of first preference votes, their votes can be transferred to successful candidates that were the voter's second preference. Parties seated in both houses of the Irish Parliament are: the Worker's Party (WP), The Labour Party (LAB), the Fianna Fail (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Progressive Democrats (PD) and the Greens (G). Since the 1930s, the Fianna Fail has been the dominant party in Irish politics.

Party rules regarding the political inclusion of women prior to 1991 are listed for Irish political parties in Table 3:9. Among democratic nations in general, the Fianna Fail could be considered the envy of all democratic parties. No other European party can boast of such longevity, consistent domination and influence in a multi-party system. The irony is that the FF has dominated the Irish government and as a larger party, has both

Chart 3:9 Ireland - Women MPs in Government



nominated and elected very few women. As of 1990, the percent of women legislating in the Irish Parliament was approximately 10%, peaking at 16% in 1981. See Chart 3:9. In comparison to other western European nations, these numbers are relatively low. The size of the Irish Parliament is also relatively smaller than most European Parliaments, (226 seats total) on average, especially for a bicameral legislature. The expectation is that for nations with smaller

governments, women's representation will be relatively lower, on average across nations. The low representativeness of women may also be an effect of the conservative nature of Irish society. With the exception of the Labour and Worker's Parties, all other parties lean right of center in ideology. This finding is consistent with expectations for the study. As of 1989, the FF party constituted about 34% of the Irish Parliament. However, the party's MPs were about 6% women. In fact, only half of the parties that gained access to Parliament that year seated women in Parliament at all. (See Table 3:9). There are a host of other reasons that would lend to the low representativeness of women. Thus, the figures for women's representation among candidates and MPs for Ireland are presented in Table 3:9, beginning with the election of 1961, since women were virtually non-existent in Irish politics prior to that election. Further, the expectation is that the STV electoral system would actually pose a means for more women to get elected because the transferable vote extends to a secondary party in the event a voter's primary party does not win a minimum number of votes to be included in Parliament. This system should make it easier to include secondary choices. Still, if fewer women appear on the party list or are not listed in alternating positions on those lists, women will still fall short in being seated in Parliament regardless of the electoral system. Ireland presents a good

Table 3:9a- Ireland, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties<sup>20</sup>

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
WP	No	Yes- 40% quota on party list as of 1991	No	Not Specified	Yes- 40% quota on party list as of 1991
LAB	No	Yes- At least 20% of general council must be women, Plus 3 members of Exec. Comm must be women		Yes, Labour Women's National Council	
FF	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
FG	No	Yes- 2 from Women's Group elected to Nat'l Council, 2 non-public reps from Women's Group elected to Nat'l Executive	Yes- Must be from the Women's Group	Yes	
PD	No	No	No	Not Specified	No
G	No	Yes, 60/40% gender balance	No	Not Specified	Yes, 60/40% gender balance

example of a multi-party system in which women face potential barriers embedded in the system.

## Italy

Italy has a mixed electoral system which utilizes a *first-past-the-post* system and proportional representation list system. Among a host of political parties,

<sup>20</sup> Data for Table 3:9a taken from Katz and Mair's chapter on Ireland, updated using data from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004.

those seated in the two chambers of the Italian Parliament are: the Proletarian Democracy (DP), Italian Communist Party (PCI), Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI), which merged with the PSI between 1966 and 1969 to form the United Socialist Party (or PSU), The Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Republican Party (PRI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), Italian Social Movement (MSI), the Radical Party (PR) and the Greens (VER). At any given time, there are as many as 15 political parties in the Italian system. While as many as 10-12 parties seat MPs in Parliament, only about 3 parties receive more than 10 percent of the popular vote.<sup>21</sup> Italy has one of the largest parliaments in Europe, with 956 seats, a combination of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The expectation is that a larger legislature in a multi-party system would yield a higher representation of underrepresented groups, namely women. As of 1987, only about half of the parties seated in the Italian Parliament seated any women. Another 20% of the parties seated only one woman out of more than 200 candidates. (See Table 3:10). Thus, we have a low percent of women seated as MPs overtime in the Italian Parliament. See Graph on *Italy-Percent Women MPs in Both Houses of Parliament* (Chart 3:10). Italian women received the right to vote and stand for election as late as January, 1945. The late acknowledge of women's rights lends to the low inclusion of women at the national level as well. In addition, the Italian government has undergone a series of regime changes, which included the demise of democratic Italy in the

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<sup>21</sup> Applies for parliamentary elections result for 1987 and prior years.

early 1920s when the rise of fascism led to the disbanding of the Parliament. During the tenure of Benito Mussolini as dictator from 1922-1946, civil liberties of Italian citizens were severely constrained. Among political parties seated in the Italian parliament as of 1987, only two list rules for women as candidates and MPs. (See Table 3:10a) However, most parties designate positions for women with the power to vote at some sub-national party level. We should expect lower numbers of women in the Italian Parliament with the absence of these national-level quotas. Few Italian parties reported the presence of a women's organization within the party. The absence of these organizations also lends to the lesser influx of women. What is clear, however is that women are able to participate within the parties at sub-national levels. Women's participation is predominantly confined to sub-national quotas within the party. Operating outside of these positions are rare for women in Italian government. Inconsistent with expectations, the PRI is one of three parties in the entire study that designates non-voting positions for women while having quotas for women as parliamentary candidates and MPs (The ARP and CHU parties of the Netherlands, See Table 3:11). Our understanding of this finding is further complicated by the PRI's lack of adherence to its own rule. In every election between 1963 and 1987, the PRI has never seated more than one woman out of an average of 192 MPs.



**Table 3:10 - Italy, Representation of Women Parliamentary  
Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>**

Year	DP	PR	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	VER	DC	PLI	MSI
1963			15/44/- 2/9/-	2/22/628 -/3/237	0/10/628 0/0/236	0/23/625 0/1/157		11/25/- 1/5/-	0/11/628 1/4/237	1/18/628 0/1/237
1968			9/52/- 8/12/-	1/11/629 -/3/235 <sup>b</sup>		0/14/629 0/2/228		7/32/- 2/3/-	0/18/629 0/6/237	0/17/628 0/2/237
1972			16/71/- 1/8/-	0/18/628 -/5/237	-/14/629 -/4/234	0/16/629 0/2/232		7/25/- 2/3/-	0/18/628 0/4/228	0/19/629 0/3/238
1976	1/84/628 0/4/31	2/321/596 0/76/216	41/124/- 9/14/-	1/75/629 -/6/238	-/21/628 -/2/238	1/47/630 0/2/238		8/42/- 2/8/-	0/34/629 0/4/238	1/40/630 0/1/237
1979		4/204/627 0/42/229	39/119/- 5/17/-	1/89/629 -/9/237	-/39/630 -/5/238	1/58/628 0/6/237		10/46/- 2/6/-	0/42/630 0/8/238	0/47/627 0/8/237
1983	0/71/624 0/20/194	1/150/626 0/57/236	37/115/- 7/13/-	1/66/630 -/11/237	-/24/630 -/5/238	0/63/629 1/13/238		7/48/- 6/13/-	0/44/630 0/9/238	2/46/630 1/7/238
1987	2/142/587 0/29/236	3/159/587 0/35/220	56/177/-	5/69/630	-/36/630	0/61/630 1/10/232	6/186/596 0/42/196	11/76/-	0/51/629 0/10/237	1/37/630 1/8/238

a- Women elected as MPs/Number of Women Candidates/Total MPs

1<sup>st</sup> line – Chamber of Deputies, 2<sup>nd</sup> Line –The Senate

b- Results for both PSI and PSDI.

These findings should raise our awareness of bias evident in the system. Italy is another example of how women could face possible barriers in getting elected to Parliament in a multi-party system.

**Chart 3:10 Italy - Women MPs in Government**

**Italy Percent Women MPs  
In Both Houses of Parliament**




Table 3:10a - Italy, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
DP	No	Yes- Party statute calls for women's rep at all levels of the party	No	No	No
PCI	No	Yes- 1/3 of delegates, Party Congress, 2/5 of membership, Party Central Committee	No	No	No
PDS	No	Yes- at least 40% on all levels. Aim for equality	No	No	Yes- Equal rep on all electoral lists. At least 40% representation
PSI	No	Yes- 15% of party Executive posts reserved for women	No	No	No
PSU	No	No	No	No	No
PSDI	No	Yes- 15 of 141 seats on Central Committee are reserved for women	No	Yes	No
DC	No	Yes- 3-5 reps of women's movement who are members of the party for Nat'l Council	Yes- must be members of women's movement and members of the party	Yes	No
PRI	Yes, 5 reps of MFR are ex-officio members of Nat'l Executive	No	No	Not Specified	Yes- 25% of candidates should be women

PLI	No	Yes- 8 women elected to Nat'l Council	No	No	No
MSI	Yes- members of Nat'l Exec. For Women's Problems, ex-officio Women can attend, but not vote at Central Committee meetings	No	No	Yes	No
VER	No	Yes- Party Coordination Group must include 3 women	No	No	No

## The Netherlands

Like Italy, the Netherlands is also a true "multi-party" state in that it has more than five political parties represented at any given time in its national parliament. Usually, the more parties operating in one government the greater the likelihood that fewer women on average will be legislating at the national level. This is not to be confused with the expectation that larger parliaments will have a greater likelihood of more women, on average than smaller parliaments. The latter acknowledges the amount of seats versus the former, which acknowledges the amount of parties in the system. The Netherlands has seen a consistent influx of women in Parliament. By 1990, more than 20% of Parliament were women and as of 2003, the Dutch Parliament had more than 36% women in its lower house, 26% in the upper house (International IDEA, 2004). The major


political parties in the Dutch chambers of the *States General* or Parliament are: the Dutch Communist Party (CPN), Labour Party (PvdA), The Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), Radical Political Party (PPR), Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), Christian

Table 3:11- Netherlands, Representation of Women: Parliamentary Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>

YEAR	ARP	CHU	KVP	CDA	D'66	PvdA	VVD	CPN	PSP	PPR	GL
1963	1/11/125	1/12/179	3/9/112			5/16/168	4/9/86	0/4/30	0/8/65		
1967	1/6/123	2/9/161	2/11/112		1/12/56	4/12/165	3/16/110	0/3/30	0/22/164		
1971	1/12/108	1/8/126	3/14/117		1/4/42	5/35/271	4/10/79	0/4/30	0/28/165	0/15/119	
1972	1/11/109	0/12/153	3/13/117		1/5/77	5/48/303	3/10/94	0/4/30	0/3/29	0/12/87	
1977				5/21/149	2/6/30	9/50/288	5/22/121	0/4/30	0/31/221	1/11/78	
1981				8/26/171	4/13/52	8/46/254	6/16/82	1/9/30	1/69/300	1/9/60	
1982				7/26/145	4/7/30	10/63/278	7/20/117	2/16/30	1/59/169	1/26/75	
1986				7/35/113	2/6/30	9/64/256	8/13/72	0/37/90	1/88/284	1/44/145	
1989				7/41/140	4/11/30	14/109/279	4/12/69		3/15/30		3/15/30

a- Women elected/women candidates/total number of candidates

Chart 3:11 The Netherlands – Women MPs in Government



Historical Union (CHU), Catholic People's Party (KVP), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats '66 (D'66), People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

(VVD), and the Green Left (GL). In spite of the relatively high level at which women legislate nationally in the Netherlands, there are several ironies in the system, at least in regard to the expectations of this study. Five of the eight parties seated in the Dutch parliament as of 1989 have no rules regarding the inclusion of women as parliamentary candidates and MPs. (See Table 3:11a)

Two of the largest parties in government, the PvdA and the CDA both designate positions for women that do not carry voting rights. For both parties, delegates from the party's Women's Organization may sit in the Party Council, a district level party organization, but cannot vote. The role of these delegates is in an advisory capacity only. The PvdA, however, does have rules that require 25% of

**Table 3:11a- The Netherlands, Rules for Women's Inclusion Within Political Parties**

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level	Rules for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation At some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level
CPN	No	No	No	No	No
PvdA	Yes- Delegates of Women's Org. in the Party Council no longer vote- advisory capacity only	25% of Party Nat'l Exec should be women	No	Yes	Yes- 25% must be women on candidate list, aim is 50%
PSP	No	No	No	No	No
PPR	No	Yes- Equal rep of women at all levels	No	Not Specified	Yes- Equal rep of women in all levels
ARP	Yes- women's committee members chosen by Regional Body serve in advisory capacity only	Yes- Women's committee members appointed by Central Committee are entitled to vote.	Yes- party's women's committee	Yes	No

CHU	Yes- Pres. Of Women's Org. is ex-officio and advisory only	No	Yes- member of Women's Organization	Yes	No
KVP	No	Yes- At least 4 members of the Nat'l Executive should be women, women must compete against women for seat	No	Not Specified	Yes- Members of Nat'l Council, at least 2 women, Advisory committee for candidate selection must be 1 women per committee
CDA	Yes- Exec. Of Women's Org. is Ex-officio and advisory for party council	No	Yes- member or executive of women's organization	Yes	No
D'66	No	No	No	No	No
VVD	No	Yes- 1 rep from Women's Org. is member of Nat'l Executive	Yes- must be rep selected by Women's Org.	Yes	No
GL	No	Yes- aim at 50% rep. in proportion to population	No	Not Specified	Yes- aim at 50% rep in proportion to population

the national candidate list for Parliament be women, with an aim at 50% representation between genders. In 1989, the PvdA presented a party list, which included nearly 40% women, but it only managed to seat about 5% women as MPs. The election numbers for previous elections are similar. (See Table 3:11)

The CDA does not have rules for women as parliamentary candidates and MPs.

When taken individually, the numbers for women in parties initially appear

staggering. Still, the Dutch Parliament has exceeded the global average in seating women.

## The United Kingdom

For a long time, political scientists have viewed Great Britain as a two-party system. The longevity and consistency of the Conservative and Labour Parties have garnered this view, each party winning about 40% of the electoral vote since the 1950s. However, when the Liberal Party won nearly 20% of the popular vote, emerging as a viable third party, this view of the British Parliament has since changed. Ever since, Britain has been predominantly a three-party system. The political parties of Britain include the Labour Party (LAB), Conservative Party (CON), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Liberal Party (LIB), or more formerly known as the Social and Liberal Democrats. While the British Parliament is really a bicameral legislature, the House of Lords is not an elected body, but rather an acknowledgement of traditional nobility in government, given lifetime appointments. Thus, there is very little variation in its composition. The graph presented includes data for the House of Commons which is elected by the national electorate at each election. (See graph for *United Kingdom- Percent Women MPs in the House of Commons*) The House of Commons is a relatively large parliament, seating 651 MPs. At the outset, we should expect that the likelihood for the increased representation of women would be higher on average across nations, especially, since there are fewer parties in the system.

Overtime, however, the level of women's participation in the House of Commons has been relatively low. The graph illustrates a consistent level of participation for women between 1945 and 1983 to be around 4%, climbing to 9% in 1992. Interestingly, the two predominant parties, LAB and CON do not have rules for women's inclusion as parliamentary candidates and MPs. The smaller SDP and LIB parties, however, do have rules for women's inclusion. While the SDP did not win enough votes to be seated in Parliament prior to 1987, the LIB presented a full list of parliamentary candidates that year, about 17% of which were women. Of the 22 seats the party won that year, 2 were women.

Compared to the dominant parties, the LAB presented a party list which was 15% women and seated about 9%. The CON presented a party list which was 7% women and seated about 5% in Parliament. (See Table 3:12) The LAB is the only party that designates positions for women without voting rights. The chair of the National Labour Women's Commission serves as an ex-officio member for the Labour Party Conference. (See Table 3:12b)

An explanation for the low representation of women in the British Parliament could be the possible difficulty experienced by underrepresented groups in traditional two-party systems. According to International I.D.E.A. (2004), the United Kingdom utilizes a *First-Past-The-Post* (FPTP) electoral system, which as explained earlier is a plurality system. A similar system is in effect in the United States, which is another two-party system. This electoral system is considered less favorable for women's inclusion.



Table 3:12- United Kingdom, Representation of Women, Parliamentary Candidates and MPs<sup>a</sup>

Year	CON	LAB	LIB
1964	24/630 11/304	33/620 18/317	24/365 0/9
1966	21/629 7/253	30/620 19/363	20/311 0/12
1970	26/628 15/330	29/624 10/287	23/332 0/6
1974	63/1245 15/574	90/1246 31/620	89/1136 0/27
1979	31/622 8/339	52/623 11/269	52/577 0/11
1983	40/633 13/397	78/633 10/209	75/633 0/23
1987	46/633 17/376	92/633 21/229	106/633 2/22

a- Women Parliamentary Candidates/Total Candidates  
Women MPs/Total MPs

In addition, the parties of Great Britain are right of center in ideology, in comparison to European democracies, another factor that lends to the lesser influx of women in the British parliament.

Chart 3:12 United Kingdom - Women MPs in Government




Table 3:12a- United Kingdom, Rules For Women's Inclusion  
Within Political Parties

<b>Party</b>	<b>Rule for Non-Voting Capacity at some level</b>	<b>Rules for Voting Capacity at some level</b>	<b>Specified Participation At some level</b>	<b>Party has Women's Organization</b>	<b>Rule for Parliamentary Candidates National level</b>
LAB	Yes Chair, Nat'l Labour Women's Comm. Ex-officio of Party Conference	Yes- Women appointed according to female membership	No	Yes	No
SDP	No	Yes- Parity for the Party Conference, 4 members elected by nat'l membership must be women	No	Not Specified	Yes- need to ensure a reasonable balance between the sexes
LIB	No	Yes- 1/3 elected to Nat'l Exec. Must be women	No	Not Specified	Yes
CON		Yes, but not specified	Yes- Chairs of Women's Committee	Yes	No

### Conclusion

Perhaps, the best way to analyze European nations in regard to stagnation is to first acknowledge that the threshold for which the representation of women would be considered suppressed is higher for proportional representation –list systems when compared to the rate of women’s participation in Single-Member-District systems. Further, when we consider the viewpoint that stagnation may not occur, we counter this argument with our analysis of party rules. As stated in the beginning of the chapter, stagnation does not necessarily acknowledge that

the rate of women's participation will remain at a specific rate. But it does acknowledge that the greater influx of women may be prevented in some form. For example, a nation may have women legislating in the national legislature at a rate of 30%. However, if rules are in place that in some way bias candidates based on gender, these rules could prevent the true number of women's potential as legislators to be realized. Often times, we find that political parties in several European nations have documented rules for which women serve in positions that do not include voting rights (i.e. Austria, Norway (KRF party only), Finland, Sweden (S Party only), Germany (CSU Party only), Italy, The Netherlands (PvdA only) and the United Kingdom (LAB only). Of all European parties included in this study, only the Italian Republican Party (PRI) of Italy and the Labour Party (PvdA) of the Netherlands have rules for women in non-voting positions while also having quota rules for women in the national parliament. This is inconsistent with the theory of stagnation because these cases present situations in which women are designated to non-voting positions, while the party may present the appearance of encouraging women's participation with decision-making capabilities. The scenario posed by these two parties would not seem contradictory if those positions designated were not gender-specific. Basically, if the parties designated non-voting positions to different factions of the party that would mean the seats could be occupied by either men or women, the rules would not seem contradictory. On the contrary, the rules of both parties suggest that members of the party's women's organization hold these posts. These rules

should also raise concern that something else is going on in the system that cannot be overtly detected. They are indeed suspect. All other parties that have rules that place women in non-voting positions do not have quotas for women as MPs, an idea consistent with my expectations. It is plausible that if a party documents rules for women's participation in non-voting positions that it will not embrace quotas for women in parliamentary seats which are the highest ranking decision-making bodies in democracies. Still, we should understand the implications of these rules as well. Parties acknowledge women as viable actors who are able to participate in politics. However, designating non-voting positions are inherently limiting. The significant difference between voting and non-voting positions is obvious, in that the positions appear to be gender-specific. An excellent source of information that is not currently available would be to ascertain whether both men and women can be members of the party's women's organization and whether men currently or in the past ever occupied the ex-officio positions designated for members of the respective women's organization.

Other expectations of the study of European party systems reveal support for the theory that stagnation exists among multi-party systems. Clearly, there is a sharp distinction between countries that tend to lean right-of-center in ideology versus left leaning states. The Scandinavian nations, collectively were more left leaning, on average among European nations. They tended to have smaller, unicameral governments and utilized PR-List systems in electing its national

legislatures. While these governments had fewer seats, they elected a higher percent of women when compared to other European nations. Those right-of-center states in the study (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and United Kingdom) tended to have significantly larger governments, utilized other types of electoral systems in conjunction with PR-List system and had more seats, on average. These states seated significantly fewer women in their national parliaments. Several of these nations also experienced sharp regime changes during WWII (Austria, Germany, and Italy) that shifted democratic politics and thus the natural progression of women's influx into Parliament. These findings were consistent with the theory presented in this study.

As stated in the beginning of the chapter, I expect that if stagnation exist among multi-party governments, women will be more likely to be rewarded with non-voting positions in government when compared to men. Data presented in Katz and Mair's study reveal that ex-officio status in national party governments are reserved for women elected by the women's organization within respective parties. As stated previously, it is not clear if men are able to participate in the women's factions of party activities.

Finally, I expected parties who win more than their normal share of the popular vote would seat more women than parties that win less than their normal share of the party vote. There was not sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis. In multi-party systems, vote share varies depending on the number

of parties operating in the system. In addition, it seemed that larger parties tended to have fewer women MPs when compared to smaller, emerging parties. The finding is consistent among states that had significantly larger governments and fewer parties operating in the system (The United Kingdom and United States). As Katz and Mair (1992) point out, the discussion of the declining role of parties began primarily with the United States and was later applied to other western democracies. In an examination of the eleven democracies in Katz and Mair's study, a look at women's participation rate reveals that the influence of parties is largely in effect in each nation. Indeed, parties matter.

## Chapter 4

In the previous chapter, I examined how stagnation may be occurring in multi-party systems. What we learned from Chapter 3 is that women may possibly be faced with potential barriers to greater political positions in even the most tolerant and welcoming democratic environments. In many of the parliamentary systems we examined in chapter 3, women participate and legislate, on average, in higher numbers than single-member-district-systems around the world. At the lower levels, women's activism finds influence in the women's organizations within political parties. For many political parties across European parliaments, women serve in reserved seats (ex-officio positions) that lack voting privileges. Most often, this substantially increases the number of women participating in government. Clearly, women's participation in government would be drastically reduced if not for the existence of women's groups in European parties and ex-officio seats. The Parliamentary system highlights an issue in the study of women's politics: there is, in fact a distinction between women's participation in government and women's representation in government. Perhaps social scientists have perceived women's *representation* and women's *participation* as the same idea which had led to our failure in separating the two conceptually. At the core of the theory, stagnation inherently concedes that women being rational, ambitious beings seek to expand their representation in society, while political institutions may envision a democratic society that encourages the greater participation of women. One theory

(participation) concedes that opportunities for women to participate in government abound and the system encourages the influx of women at all levels. The other theory (representation) concedes that opportunities for women to participate in government are only encouraged to an extent and barriers for women to elevate themselves in a political environment are ever present in the system. Chapter 4 will discuss both ideas at length and examine how stagnation may be occurring in the American political system in addition to comparing the uniqueness of the American Congress versus the European parliaments.

Evidence of women's participation and representation have both been defined by social scientists to some extent, by examining the sheer numbers of women operating in politics (Fowler and McClure, 1989, Nelson, 1991, Burrell, 1994). Most organizations that track the numbers of women participating in American government at any level will always present the numbers of women entering office and how those numbers compare to women's participation in the past for any given office or institution under investigation.<sup>22</sup> However, none has defined representation and participation in quite the same fashion as they are defined here. It should be clear that in our study of stagnation that we acknowledge that the discussion involving women's political representation and participation is to some degree the difference of what political institutions endorse and what those same institutions restrict in regards to women. The

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<sup>22</sup> Organizations like CAWP (Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University) and NOW (National Organization for Women).



tricky part is this: regardless of which concept you adhere to, both should result in the greater influx of women in politics. Thus, it is not hard to see how these ideas can be understood to be the same concept. These concepts, however, for the purposes of this dissertation are distinctly different:

*Women's participation: Women's ability to influence government and its decisions by operating in various different positions and at different levels of government.*

*Women's representation: Women's ability to influence government and its decisions by primarily serving in elected positions.*

The concept of participation acknowledges women's ability to influence government in multiple ways, even in the case of an ex-officio position. If we think of participation in regards to an organization, team or group, most would concede that one need not be an organization's leader in order to be effective. One need only do their part. This understanding of participation differs from representation which concedes that influence without authority is limited in both its reach and purpose. In basic terms, the difference is that the concept of representation concedes that women's ability to influence government is most effective in elected office or in leadership positions. The theory of stagnation embraces the idea that women's representation as defined here is suppressed and that while women are able to participate in the system, options available to them politically may be stifled. Stagnation also implies a long-term effect on the rate at which women participate in the system in addition to some inherent variable that holds that rate constant over time. Among possible variables,

political parties as an institution appear to yield the greatest level of influence in regard to who has access to office, simply due to their position as political gatekeepers. Again, the difference between participation and representation as it pertains to women is probably best explained if we use a generic example, the case of third parties in the United States: The American political system draws its greatest distinction from European parliaments in that it is not a multi party system. While minor parties do exist in the United States, electoral laws are structured to primarily endorse two dominant parties: the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The American electoral system is structured in such a way that only the two major political parties essentially have access to office in government. While it is not the law that an ambitious politician must belong to one of the two major parties, the popularity of third parties are suppressed or rather, discouraged by electoral laws written by both Republicans and Democrats in office. While there are many candidates for office whose ideology differ sharply from the platforms of both the Republican and Democratic Parties, few politicians have found success as minor party candidates at the local, state and federal level in the U.S. Although these instances are rare in the grand scheme of American politics, minor parties are still widespread. This discussion on third parties presents an interesting argument on why the stagnation theory applies to the American system with such specialty when compared to the multi party nations of Europe discussed in Chapter 3. Minor parties participate in the system, but are grossly underrepresented. In addition, members of the two

major parties shape electoral policy to discourage the presence and thus restrict minor parties from gaining real influence in the system. Third parties can seem undetectable at times in the U.S., even powerless in many electoral proceedings, but we know they exist and make every effort to participate in the democratic process. Women operate within the system in much the same fashion as third parties. Stagnation contends that their influence is limited.

### Women in Contemporary State Government

State government in the United States is comprised of a wide variety of positions. In the legislative, judicial and elective branches of state government, the number of women serving has stabilized to some degree or declined within the last decade. At the statewide judicial level, women tend to fair better relative to the executive and legislative branches. In 14 states women constitute a minimum of 40 % of the courts of last resort, while encompassing a majority in four states (New York, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin).<sup>23</sup> Ironically, according to the National Center for State Courts, women are not as well represented among judges on the intermediate appellate courts across the country. In 2003, women comprised about 23.1 percent of all intermediate appellate judges.

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<sup>23</sup> Carroll, Susan, 2004 Women in State Government: Historical Overview and Trends. Page 4: *The Judicial Branch*


Elective office at the state level constitutes the office of the Governor, the chief officer of the state. At the statewide elective level, less than 30 women have served as governor of a state. As discussed in Chapter 2, most women who served elected seats prior to the 1960s succeeded either deceased husbands or husbands previously elected who could no longer pursue an additional term.<sup>24</sup> However, since 1975, women were elected, (though few in number) for their own merit. 2004 saw a record number of (eight) women hold governorship across states simultaneously. Five Democrat and three Republican women were chief executives in their states. Holistically, when we examine the number of women in all statewide elected positions in the executive branch (inclusive of secretaries of state, state treasurers, attorney generals, auditors, comptrollers, etc.), we find a significant increase in the past few decades in addition to recent stabilization in numbers. Carroll also notes that while women are better represented in state appointed positions, recent statistics indicate the overall number of women having declined slightly from 2001. The following chart indicates the proportion of women serving in state government over a thirty-three year period. The *elct office* variable indicates the percent of women serving in various elected positions in the Executive branch of state government. These positions include governors, lieutenant governors, secretaries of state, state treasurers, attorney generals, chief education officials, state auditors, public service commissioners, state

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<sup>24</sup> Carroll, Susan. 2004. Women in State Government: Historical Overview and Trends. Taken from the Book of the States, 2004: Lexington, KY

comptrollers and a variety of commissioner positions that vary from state to state. (Carroll, 2004) The *state leg* variable highlights the percent of women serving as state legislators across all states for each year.

Chart 4:1 Women in Elected Office in U.S. State level Government



Source: Center for American Women and Politics, Rutgers University

As Carroll contends, the chart indicates stabilization in the number of women over time at the state level. While some women were elected to serve as state legislators in states before women won the right to vote in 1920, women did not gain substantial strength as state legislators until the mid 1980s. As indicated, the percent of women serving in state legislators in 1971 was merely 5%.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this number climbed considerably. In 1995, we see the beginning of a stabilization period that has not increased substantially since. The numbers for women in state legislatures have hovered around the 22 percent mark for more than ten years. This trend has gotten the attention of social scientists who study women's politics. Carroll (2004) acknowledges that what seems to be happening to women is "puzzling". The concern for the number of women stagnating at the state level is clear: Women gaining experience at the state level comprise the pool of high quality women candidates who need to contend for seats at the federal level. In 2004, 40 of 59 women serving in the U.S. Congress all served in an elected position at the state level: 25 women served in state houses, 13 women served in the state senate and 2 others served in elected positions. Similarly, 10 of the 14 women serving in the U.S. Senate served at the state level before seeking office at the federal level (Carroll, 2004). Thus, public service at the state level is a potential indicator of eligibility for women intent on advancing their political futures at the federal level. Stagnation directly threatens the degree to which women participate in government at the federal level. Carroll identifies political institutions like parties, advocacy organizations and legislative leaders as having the ability to be far more influential in the recruitment efforts of women. Katz and Mair offered an examination into the party organizations around the world. Because the American Congress is essentially a two-party system, data is provided in Table 4:1 and 4:1a concerning party rules regarding women. The American Democratic

Party is the oldest existing political party in the United States. Table 4:1 outlines a historical perspective on women's participation within the party between 1960 and 1990. Table 4:1a offers the same information for the American Republican Party. According to Katz and Mair, the legislative election of 1970 provides us with information on women candidates as well as those who were elected.

While the Democratic Party is viewed as the more welcoming party for women's integration in politics, the likelihood of women getting elected at the federal level is not significantly different across parties. What is interesting is that women appear to have fared slightly better in gaining seats in the U.S. Senate as Republicans versus being Democrats during these years. Between 1960 and 1990, the Democratic Party elected 2 women to the Senate versus 6 women elected by the Republican Party. The middle columns of both tables provide the percent of women candidates that get elected from the entire pool of women candidates that sought office. Between 1970 and 1990, the chances of a woman getting elected to the House of Representatives from the Democratic Party were 37% or greater every election cycle; 25% or greater for the Republican Party. This being said, increasing the potential pool of women candidates is essential to increasing their overall numbers of serving government at the federal level.

According to Katz and Mair, when compared to the political parties of Europe, the two dominant American parties provide no lawful provisions for women to serve in non-voting capacities. Both parties do specify lawful

**Table 4:1 - Representation of Women-Democratic Party  
Candidates and Members of Congress 1960-1990**

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>House of Rep</b>	<b>U.S. Senate</b>
1960	435/-/11	35/2/1
1962	435/-/6	39/1/0
1964	432/-/7	35/1/0
1966	431/-/6	34/0/0
1968	426/-/6	33/1/0
1970	428/15/9 = 60%	35/0/0
1972	425/24/12 = 50%	34/0/0
1974	430/30/14 = 47%	32/2/0
1976	423/34/13 = 38%	33/1/0
1978	413/27/11 = 41%	35/1/0
1980	418/27/10 = 37%	34/2/0
1982	422/27/12 = 44%	33/1/0
1984	413/30/11 = 37%	33/6/0
1986	417/30/12= 40%	34/3/1
1988	423/33/14 = 42%	33/0/0
1990	400/40/20 = 50%	33/2/0

Total candidates/Women Candidates/ Women Elected

**Table 4:1a - Representation of Women - Republican Party  
Candidates and Members of Congress, 1960-1990**

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>House of Reps</b>	<b>U.S. Senate</b>
1960	362/-/7	31/1/1
1962	378/-/6	38/0/0
1964	393/-/4	34/1/0
1966	382/-/5	33/2/1
1968	393/-/4	33/0/0
1970	374/10/3 = 30%	34/1/0
1972	388/8/2 = 25%	34/2/0
1974	376/14/4 = 29%	33/1/0
1976	389/20/5 = 25%	30/0/0
1978	382/19/5 = 26%	33/1/1
1980	392/25/9 = 36%	33/3/1
1982	388/28/9 = 32%	33/2/0
1984	380/35/11 = 31%	32/4/1
1986	380/34/11 = 32%	34/3/0
1988	376/26/11 = 42%	33/2/0
1990	386/30/9 = 30%	32/6/1

Total candidates/Women Candidates/ Women Elected



participation for women in the form of recognizing women's organizations within the party. According to the National Federation of Democratic Women, the Democratic Party officially granted recognition to the organization in 1976 as

Table 4:2 - United States - Rules for Women's Inclusion  
Within Political Parties

Party	Rule for Non-Voting Capacity	Rule for Voting Capacity at some level	Specified Participation at some level	Party has Women's Organization	Rule for Candidates at National Level
Democratic Party	No	No	Yes, Nat'l Fed. Of Dem. Women hold three seats of Party's Nat'l Executive, DNC.	Yes - National Federation of Democratic Women (became official women's org of party in 1976)	No
Republican Party	No	No	Yes, Equal rep for both genders in Party Congress and Nat'l Exec Committee <sup>25</sup>	Yes - National Federation of Republican Women	No

Katz and Mair, 1992

the official women's organization of the party. This recognition reserves three seats for the women's organization on the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee. The National Federation of Republican Women is independent of the Republican Party but was once an auxiliary of the RNC. Neither party has set rules for women seeking federal office. Thus, reserving seats for women is important and essential for women's inclusion, the inherent

<sup>25</sup> Burrell (1994, p.85) RNC created the Republican National Women's Executive Committee in 1918 as an auxiliary to the RNC. The Republican Women's Advisory was created in 1919. Seven of its fifteen seats were designated for women

suggestion is that women need not excel. While the argument immediately seems extreme, these ideas are not new and are applicable in other groups as well. Take, for example the argument of those on both sides of the affirmative action issue. Firstly, we must note that the primary goal of such policies were voted into law after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to offset institutional policies that were in affect during slavery that continue to affect African Americans and other underrepresented groups in American society today. For example, during slavery or even reconstruction, it was unlawful to educate people from underrepresented groups. During the civil rights era, schools were lawfully segregated, which resulted in significantly different levels in the quality of education for underrepresented groups. Specifically, with regard to education, there are those who would argue that preference in university admissions is a necessary means to improve the overall status of underrepresented groups in society. On the other hand, there are those who would argue that race preference in university admissions is reverse discrimination and further uphold the sentiment that underrepresented groups are incapable of excelling academically regardless of systemic differences at the elementary and secondary levels. Thus, advocates of the greater influx of women in politics can appreciate any study that seeks to strengthen the pool of potential women candidates in the states.

Nelson (1991, p127) notes that an important part of the incorporation of women as a minority group in Congress is partisanship. He contends that

during the 1980s, Democratic women as a group were far more influential than Republican women politicians as a result of Democrats having more control over Congress. Nelson found that minority representation of women, African Americans and Hispanic- Americans garnered political influence in chambers for the majority party of Congress but not for the minority party. One could deduce that party influence in recruiting women to run for office is a significant component to the greater influx of women into politics. It should be noted that even in his study across states in the 1980s, Nelson cites that the proportion of women consistently leveled off around the 15% mark. However, Burrell (1994) notes that American political parties are far less influential in determining who runs for office when compared to parties in European democracies, largely because the American practice of primary elections has taken the selection process away from party leaders themselves. She contends that voters, not parties determine who party candidates will be. Furthermore, electoral laws of each state and *not* rules set by each party are what govern the electoral process concerning primary elections. Burrell also notes that many candidates are “encouraged to run by groups other than the parties” or, as the secondary hypothesis of stagnation argues, candidates simply recruit themselves. Many scholars have likewise noted the declining role of political parties over time in American history (Wattenberg, 1996). Given these facts, Burrell suggests that if party influence is declining in America, then we should expect them to “be less of a barrier to women’s candidacies”, given empirical studies like Gertzog and

Simard (1981) which concluded that women were indeed nominated to run in “hopeless” races more often than men. In essence, Burrell suggests that perhaps parties are becoming irrelevant in regards to women facing barriers. At the opposite end of the spectrum, scholars argue that the decline in American party system has not benefited women in any significant way regarding elections (Bledsoe and Herring, 1990). Bledsoe and Herring suggests that the stronger a party organization is, the better women fare overall. In the wake of scholarly findings that party organizations are on the decline, parties have become much more organized in recent years in terms of their structure and resources. Burrell suggests that parties are in transformation, in an effort to strengthen their position within the American electoral system. This environment, she contends has in general become a more favorable place for women. She suggests that this transformation is caused by three primary factors: (1) changes in party leadership, (2) the closing of the gender gap in voting patterns and perhaps the most influential factor is the presence of women’s groups that provide campaign assistance to women seeking electoral office. While parties have transformed overtime to regain political influence in American politics, recruiting women is a major issue for parties, especially in the wake of entrepreneurial campaigns in which viable candidates for office (men and women), with resources other than party organizations are entering politics lacking any particular loyalty to any political party.

## Recruitment Efforts

Political institutions like parties and advocate organizations at the grassroots level need to be more aggressive in recruiting viable women to run for public office. According to Fowler and McClure, recruitment efforts are important because many high quality candidates, or rather 'potential' candidates opt out of congressional races primarily due to the effects of incumbency. The strongest candidates choose to not be involved in electoral battles with incumbents who are politically entrenched with both the financial clout to run multiple campaigns and the name recognition of incumbents among the constituency. As a result, congressional elections are plagued with challengers who are comparably weak to incumbents. Hence, a consequence when the strongest possible challengers or the ones with the greatest likelihood to win choose not to run (Fowler and McClure, 1989). In regards to women, I believe they have been present on both sides of the spectrum. For example, women have often been viewed as "sacrificial lambs" in which they have been selected to run in races where they had very little chance of winning or, on the other hand, women with aspirations for a career in politics selected themselves into races where stronger candidates have already said no. Both scenarios could be happening in these cases. Interestingly, in her work on women in municipalities, Mary Beard (1915, taken from Sapiro p.21) suggests that in the era of women fighting for suffrage, women entered political races that they knew they would not win to strategically handicap the campaigns of opponents who had not acknowledged women as

political actors. This was their way of ensuring that politicians who had realized the “greater vision” of women’s suffrage were elected to office, or at least had better chances of winning. Still, women had to diligently follow the careers of those officials they had helped win office to make sure they stayed true to whatever policies they initially promised to support during their campaigns. Furthermore, women themselves used appointed positions rather than elected ones to gain influence with elected officials and to garner support for women’s rights as well. Thus advocates for the greater influx of women in politics should be concerned with the stabilization of women’s numbers at the state level. While, these advocates seek such an influx at the federal level, the potential pool from which a majority of federal candidates are found is in the state houses. Building the body of potential women candidates in the states is imperative to the continuance of women legislating in Congress.

### Campaign Organizations

Fundraising for women has traditionally been a contributing factor to the lesser success of women in electoral campaigns. Burrell cite several assumptions in the women and politics literature that persist concerning women and fundraising. One assumption is that women are *unfit* for the task of asking for money for themselves. The assertion, is a rather weak empirical question to test, considering women have been, as Mandel (1981) states, at the forefront of fundraising efforts for all causes imaginable in society, including the raising of

campaign funds for many successful male candidates. On the contrary, the assertion suggests that the task of asking for money is a male-oriented one, which I believe most men, especially those that fall within the profile of successful political candidates at any level would find rather humiliating to ask strangers for money in order to work *for them* politically. Another, more popular assumption discussed previously in Chapter 2 is that women experience difficulty in raising campaign funds because they are generally outside the high-end financial circles, long considered the “old boys club” or what many women still see as the glass ceiling; those informal networks in the workplace that they are usually left out of. Furthermore, when the wealthy are unfamiliar with (female) political hopefuls, they are less inclined to invest in them. Additionally, rational-choice theory would suggest that there must be a tangible benefit to the investor. The investor will only invest if they believe there will be a return on that investment. Given the traditional record of women in general seeking office, coupled with their ability to provide the type of influence necessary to benefit investors, less dollars are offered to women candidates overall. Most scholars acknowledge that many women in politics believe that discrimination against women is still very prevalent in the system, but exactly how it happens systematically has not been proven. We do know that the cost of campaigning for political office continues to increase with time. Likewise, raising funds to run in some political races are substantially more expensive than others. For example, open-seat races (at every level) have become the most expensive races

of all. Open-seat contests, especially in the early 1990s were the more popular avenue for ambitious women seeking political office. The problems women faced with regard to fundraising were so evident after the Congressional elections of 1990 that even the media acknowledged it. What followed was the establishment of numerous organizations created with the mission of helping women candidates get elected by getting more money and more exposure. Most notable among the women's PACs are the Women's Campaign Fund, EMILY's List and the National Organization for Women, which all raise money for women candidates (Burrell, 1994). These organizations are high lighted here because their efforts are a direct result of the lesser dollars women candidates were allotted in state and federal races during the 1980s. Most PACs organized to serve women politicians mandate that women seeking their assistance uphold two general criteria: (1) support legislation that upholds the Supreme Court decision in Roe vs. Wade; essentially, a woman's right to an abortion and (2) ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Organizers of most women's PACs are quite unified on the idea that the existence of such legislation would primarily establish women as equal entities on all levels in society and protect the right to do what she wishes with her own body. Many feminists and advocates of women in government believe the right to an abortion is a fundamental means in allowing women an opportunity to make life choices outside the home and advance in fields other than child-rearing. Thus, as



sanctions to obtain funds from many women's PACs, candidates must adhere to these principles above all else.

Among PACs that organized to assist women, the Women's Campaign Fund was the first such Political Action Committee, founded in 1974. The PAC seeks to elect women candidates from any party into government. In addition to financial assistance, the PAC provides both technical and strategic counseling to viable women candidates. Additionally, the Women's Campaign Fund also helps women connect with other PACs that can provide more financial assistance.

Seeking to directly affect the disproportion of dollars contributed to women candidates, EMILY's List was established in the mid 1980s. EMILY's List stands for Early Money Is Like Yeast (in that it raises "dough"). At first, the organization began as an informal network of politically active individuals who sought the greater election of women. They circulated a list of women candidates within the Democratic Party seeking Senatorial seats. The group became a political Action Committee in May 1986. What distinguishes EMILY's List from other PACs is that it operates as a donor network, in which members are able to choose any women from their list and directly fund her campaign, versus other PACs where the Executive Board decides which candidates to support once members send in their donations. According to Burrell, EMILY's List is able to donate an unlimited amount of funds to the campaigns of women seeking political office on their list. EMILY's List was the highest fundraiser for

women candidates during the 1992 election cycle, no doubt attributing to the success rate of women in open-seat races that year. By 1991, WISH List (*Women In the Senate and House*) was created, a woman's PAC that endorses Republican candidates. Both organizations support candidates that are pro-choice.

In recent years, the problem of raising money is far more a candidate-centered issue than one for which parties can be held responsible. There are various avenues for which we can explore problems women face empirically. A more plausible explanation for stagnation, from a candidate-centered prospective is that while women are equally as ambitious as men, they are likely to seek out districts where women before them have been elected. In these cases, ambitious women could be concentrated in similar areas in large numbers. We must consider this alternative in stagnation because it enables us to examine how women themselves are influencing electoral politics outside the party dynamic. In addition, we have seen how little many candidates have come to depend on political parties for financial support as well. Indeed, variables other than political parties have some affect on the success of women in political campaigns. An empirical examination of stagnation must take into account both hypotheses to explain the stabilization of women's numbers in state government.

## Chapter 5

This chapter discusses the collection of the final data set and the construction of the control models for our final analysis. Firstly, we address the essential questions involving the basic logic of the study. This thesis is an investigation of stagnation, the process by which women encounter barriers in the political system to advancing to Congressional office. While many believe that such barriers exist, research has not thoroughly established the sources that impede women's progress through the political ranks. What makes this study unique is how we approach the question of barriers.

Barriers can be the product of some influential source in the system. The dissertation discusses the potentialities of the major influential outlets; political parties, voters and the candidates themselves. All three have been discussed as having potential to serve as inherent barriers to the advancement of women. One objective of this thesis is to ascertain a distinct causal link for the lesser elevation of women to the House of Representatives. In finding fewer women among the overall number of election winners overtime, the data set constructed for the dissertation brings together all of the determinant factors we believe to be consistent among election winners. In order to uncover the nature of that barrier, we must first determine what the primary factors of winning generally are.

In examining congressional election winners, I seek to identify those characteristics that are common or necessary to win. I start by constructing an all-male world in regards to elections; a world where only men run for office and

only they win and loose elections. In this construction, we can identify the essential ingredients for winning elections when gender is not apart of the equation. If we can identify those ingredients, those that we think to have some influence and those whose presence would significantly impact the election outcome, we can ask whether the same effects hold for women.

Constructing an all male model allows us to clearly identify the resources an ambitious male candidate must acquire in order to successfully pursue office in addition to any deficiencies he might have prior to entering a political challenge according to what can be predicted from a study of elections over time. In establishing a model to include all these factors, we can determine the differing levels of influence on winning elections in an all-male world. Once we establish what matters in all male elections, we can examine the effects of those factors on a world with only women. In establishing a world with only women, if voters are essentially neutral about gender, we would anticipate those factors would have the same impact in an all female world. If we find that the same outcomes do not hold for women, we can identify voters among the important sources impeding women. On the other hand, if the same resources have the same effects for men and women, we can turn to investigate whether men and women bring the same resources to the electoral table.

The logic behind the construction of these models is to determine by some finite means a significant difference between the electoral success of men and women in the single member-district system. There are a variety of expectations

for this study. I expect that what determines electoral victory in an all male world will determine victory in a world including women. I expect to find the effects of some variables may be of greater or lesser significance for women. For example, I would expect the level of influence that prior political experience has for predicting electoral success for men may have a greater effect on the electoral success of women. Interestingly, as we examine the sheer number of women entering politics notably in the 1990's when compared to the 1980's, an election year or certain time period may be meaningful to the success of women while it may not mean anything significantly different for men. The analysis seeks to generate control models for gender. This chapter is entirely about those control models as it relates to men only. Another major expectation of this study is that if we are unable to identify any of the major political forces as the inherent source of deficiencies, then the model constructed will have implications for future research by pointing us in the right direction of what that force may be.

## Data

The data set is comprised of a wide variety of variables. I sought election results from the Almanac of American Politics. The Almanac provided a clear indicator of gender for every election winner from 1980 to the present, in that a picture of every winner for each year is provided. The gender of most challengers remained questionable since no picture was available for them.

Thus, I consulted other sources for information such as EMILY's List who

provide financial support to women candidates and databanks like the Center for American Women in Politics (CAWP) who track the candidacy of women in state and national election races. Both organizations had information on female winners and losers. These organizations were invaluable in assisting to confirm gender for all candidates in question. The Almanac proved to be a sound resource for data in that it included the majority of variables found to be essential to this analysis. The Almanac provides the margin of victory of the winner (total votes cast for the candidates), actual dollars spent by candidates in support of their bid for office (for both candidates. This information allows analysis that would determine disparities in funding, if any, and if funding levels can predict votes. Additionally, political information about the district is also important. Data that would provide me with an indication of what the presidential vote share was in a given district will provides a valid indication of how liberal or conservative a district is.

### Setting up the Model

Dependent variable - The dependent variable in the model is whether or not the Democratic candidate won the election. The focus here is winning. The thesis is all about what it takes to win. Noting this, vote percentages do not provide enough information to tell the entire story.

Independent variables - The independent variables of the analysis represent all the pertinent resources we believe impacts winning.

1. Incumbency: Incumbency is the major resource believed to impact whether a candidate wins or loses an election. Because it is believed to be the primary resource affecting election outcomes, it is also believed to interact the most with all other resources. For this purpose, it is important to separate the analyses into two models; one in which incumbency is present (or races where an incumbent is running) and one in which incumbency is not present (an open seat race where incumbents are absent).
2. The presidential vote: The presidential vote is another way to describe whether the district circumstances are favorable or unfavorable for the (Democratic) candidate. The presidential vote in any given district gives us some indication of how the district is expected to respond to another candidate of the president's party or the opposition party. For example, if a Republican president received 30% of the vote share in the district during the last presidential election, this indicates that the district is a highly liberal and a conservative candidate may find difficulty being successful in that particular district. Thus, the presidential vote would provide a good indication of whether the district voters offer favorable or unfavorable circumstances for a given candidate's party, which would be a favorable resource in strategizing on an electoral victory. If we see the presidential vote share as an indicator of public opinion on policy within the district, we should expect that opinion to be a driver in predicting

electoral success. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1989, 1993) found that voters reward and punish parties based on their responsiveness to public opinion at the state level. Thus, we should expect some correlation between congressional election outcomes and presidential vote share percentages within the district.

3. Money: campaign expenditures are a strong resource in electoral success. The amount of funds a candidate is able to raise early is a strong indicator of how well they will in the campaign by way of influence. Money directly effects political influence. Since the study extends over ten congressional election cycles, a new variable was generated that divides the expenditure by the consumer price index, which adjusts for inflation over time. This is the expenditure variable we use throughout the study.
4. Candidate quality: Candidate quality is measured in this study as those having previous political experience versus those who do not have previous political experience. Candidates with previous political experience are considered higher quality candidates. Jacobson and Kernell (1983) state that the quality of congressional candidates is a function of the party's electoral prospects. Considering electoral conditions in the (national) political environment and how these conditions affect district level politics, parties tend to seek higher quality candidates to increase their chances of success in the election.



5. The election years: In this study, we include each election year to indicate whether the year was a good election year or a bad election year for the candidate's party. This variable provides some indication of the tenor of the times for one party's electoral success versus another for each year.

A dataset previously collected by Dr. Michael McDonald and Dr. DeWayne Lucas (1999-2002) regarding all congressional elections from 1962-2000 was also used for this study because it provided the necessary variables to test the models for the study. This data set provided all variables discussed that would be pertinent to the study. The problem most encountered in collecting the data was a consistent indicator for district liberalism or an indicator for the likelihood of the district supporting one party over another. As discussed earlier, the candidate quality variable is always the 1988 presidential vote share for George Bush or Michael Dukakis. This indicator is consistent in the McDonald-Lucas dataset for 1982-2000. Because district lines were drawn in 1982 and redrawn again in 2002, we cannot utilize election year data before 1982 or after 2002. While the initial study coded the gender variable for 1980-2006 and the McDonald-Lucas dataset covers 1962-2000, the final analyses for this dissertation covers all elections between 1982-2000, since all pertinent data is consistent for this time period only. Other important variables in the McDonald-Lucas study include prior political experience indicators, vote-share indicators, whether the candidate won or lost the election and presidential vote-share

indicators. The variables added from the Almanac of American Politics data include the gender variable for the incumbent (or in cases of open-seat races, the winner for the given year) and gender of the challenger for every election from 1980-2000. Prior political experience is an important part of a potential candidate's resume in pursuing higher political office. Vote share indicator variables provide the margin of victory for the actual congressional candidates in the study. The data contain variables that provide the raw vote for candidates according to party and vote percentages as well. Additionally, we have dichotomous variables for each party indicating whether the candidate won the election. The *presidential vote percentages* variable is included in the study to measure how liberal or conservative a district is. In the past, the term typically referred to the ability of the sitting President to rally voters for congressional candidates who belong to the President's party in a given district. However, straight party ballots have been eliminated in most states. Thus, voters must select candidates individually. Because of this, Presidents in recent decades have been more vocal as part of congressional campaigns and thus endorse candidates from their party all over the country. In these recent instances, presidential vote percentages provide more information regarding the President's ability to influence same-party candidate wins in the same district. In prescribing a variable in the data set, the variable is set to measure the 1988 Bush/Dukakis vote share in each district. Essentially, the district lines for most of the districts in the study are the same for the entire time period of 1980-2000. Thus, if we assign

the vote share split between the 1988 Republican presidential candidate George Bush and the 1988 Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis into two variables (Republican vote percent,  $p\$pres\_r$  and Democratic vote percent,  $p\$pres\_d$ ), then we have some indication of how far left or right any given district in the study is leaning. Furthermore, we can use this variable as an indicator of success for one party candidate or another. If this variable is significant in predicting success for one party candidate, the ideological leaning of the district would most likely be in the same direction of the victorious party candidate. The complete list can be found in Table 5:1.

Election years between 1982-2000 produced 4785 cases for this study. These cases represent all congressional House elections for every district in every state during this time period. The analysis is based on two models, one solely for elections where an incumbent is seeking reelection and one in which the incumbent is absent (open-seat). Because incumbency is such a powerful indicator for reelection, it makes sense to separate these types of races. The objective is to first determine what the necessary resources are to gain access to political office at the federal level in an all-male world. In doing so, we can construct two models: an all male world where incumbents run for reelection and one in which only men run in open seat races. Once we establish the factors determining the winner in all-male situations, we can then control for gender and should be able to pinpoint what makes winning different for women, if these differences exist. For now, we focus entirely on the all-male models.

## Coding

Dependent variable: The variable *party\_d* is dichotomous, coded 1 if the Democrat won the election and 0 if the Democrat lost the election.

Independent variables:

1. The incumbency variable, *d\_incumb* essentially tells us when an incumbent is present. It is coded 1 when the Democratic incumbent ran for reelection and 0 the Democratic incumbent did not run for reelection (but the incumbent is Republican).
2. The presidential vote: The presidential vote is defined throughout the study as the presidential vote share for the 1988 Bush versus Dukakis race. Two variables *p\$pres\_d* and *p\$pres\_r* indicate the percentages of the vote share between the two-parties, Democratic and Republican, respectively. In this study, the presidential vote share for Michael Dukakis.
3. Money: There are several expenditure variables in the model. Variables *expc\_di* and *expc\_ri* indicate the expenditures with consumer price index adjustments for the Democratic and Republican incumbents. Variables *expc\_dc* and *expc\_rc* indicate the expenditures with consumer price index adjustments for the Democratic and Republican challengers. The variables represent spending by the thousands. The consumer price index adjusts for inflation over the years.
4. Candidate quality: Candidate quality is indicated by the dichotomous variables *off\_d* and *off\_r*, coded 1 when the candidate has previous political

experience and 0 when the candidate does not previous political experience for Democratic or Republican, respectively.

5. The year variables are represented by each election year in the study.

The first model seeks to measure electoral success when an incumbent is running for reelection. The baseline model consists of all resources believed to influence success of a candidate which includes 15 variables. Among these variables, are those believed to influence success for candidates who face incumbents; expenditures of the challenger, previous political experience of the challenger, the percent of the two-party presidential vote share in the district (or presidential coattails), the incumbent's party (as an indicator of the incumbent's presence) and a variable was created for each year in the study, 1982-2000. As stated in previous chapters, we know that the power of incumbency holds regardless of gender. I expect that moving forward, incumbency will remain influential.

In running our control model for all-male incumbents, we loose 1588 cases with the final model constructed. We loose 435 cases for the year 1980. We eliminate this year because our presidential coattails variable does not apply to 1980. The variable *P\$Pres\_D* indicates the percent of the two-party

Table 5 - Descriptives for Incumbency Model

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev.
P\$Pres_D	3009	21.51	96.06	46.2734	11.8810
Y1982	3197	0	1	.10	.31
Y1984	3197	0	1	.11	.31
Y1986	3197	0	1	.11	.31
Y1988	3197	0	1	.11	.32
Y1992	3197	0	1	8.73E-02	.28
Y1994	3197	0	1	9.45E-02	.29
Y1996	3197	0	1	8.73E-02	.28
Y1998	3197	0	1	9.60E-02	.29
Y2000	3197	0	1	9.57E-02	.29
Expc_Di	3197	0	42	2.47	3.35
Expc_Ri	3192	**	**	**	**
Expc_Dc	3069	0	35	.63	2.02
Expc_Rc	3003	0	25	.78	1.88
Off_R	3196	0	1	7.45E-02	.26
Off_D	3195	0	1	7.23E-02	.26
D_Incumb	3197	0	1	.57	.50
Valid N	2699				

Bush/Dukakis presidential vote share for 1988 applies for most districts in all states from 1982 through 2000 because the district lines were the same. The few exceptions are Louisiana (1982) and Ohio (1982-1986). The variable measures how liberal or conservative a district is. The data set loses another 452

cases because we eliminate all open seat races from the study. Again, this model must include incumbents only. Another 331 cases are eliminated because the incumbents present in the system in these cases are actually women. For this model, we want all cases where men alone are running. We continue to lose another 370 cases in the data set as a result of women appearing in the system as challengers in incumbent races, leaving 3197 cases. Finally, we lose 498 cases because of missing data as a result of redistricting. The final analysis includes 2699 cases<sup>26</sup>.

### The model and findings

The computation of the first model for races where an incumbent (seeking reelection) is present is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Party\_D = & -7.6782 + .0830 (P\$Pres\_D) + 1.7048 (Y1982) - 1.0046 (Y1984) + \\ & .3109 (Y1986) - .0165 (Y1988) - 1.2178 (Y1992) - 2.4321 (Y1994) + .5972 (Y1996) \\ & +.2611 (Y1998) -.6514 (Y2000) + .0120 (Expc\_DI) -.1201 (Expc\_RI) +.4250 \\ & (Expc\_DC) - .3549 (Expc\_RC) - .5682 (Off\_R) + 1.1020 (Off\_D) + 8.7813 (D\_incum). \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>26</sup> The conditions applied to the final dataset to run the model on incumbent males only is as follows: *Year ~ = 1980 & open seat = 0 & gender = 0 & challgen = 0*

**Table 5:1: Variables Predicting Electoral Success in Congressional Races When Incumbents Run for Re-election**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Sig</b>
P\$PRES_D	.0830	.0157	<b>.0000</b>
Y1982	1.7048	.5689	<b>.0001</b>
Y1984	-1.0046	.5579	<b>.0358</b>
Y1986	.3109	.5769	.2949
Y1988	-.0165	.6129	.4892
Y1992	-1.2178	.5770	<b>.0179</b>
Y1994	-2.4321	.5243	<b>.0000</b>
Y1996	.5972	.5842	.1533
Y1998	.2611	.6161	.3359
Y2000	-.6514	.6056	.1410
EXPC_DI	.0120	.0394	.3798
EXPC_RI	-.1201	.0624	<b>.0272</b>
EXPC_DC	.4250	.0650	<b>.0000</b>
EXPC_RC	-.3549	.0502	<b>.0000</b>
OFF_R	-.5682	.3111	<b>.0339</b>
OFF_D	1.1020	.3452	<b>.0007</b>
D_INCUMB	8.7813	.4966	<b>.0000</b>
Constant	-7.6782	.8587	<b>.0000</b>



Table 5:1a: Classification Table: Predictions for  
Electoral Success in Incumbent Races


Observed	Predicted		Percent Correct
	0	1	
0	1105	66	94.36
1	51	1477	96.66

**Overall 95.67**

The dependent variable is whether the Democratic candidate won or lost the election. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logit analysis was used to compute our model. The model is interpreted as for every one unit increase in the chances of the Democratic candidate to win leads to a .25 unit change of the coefficient on each variable if the Democratic candidate otherwise has a 50% chance of winning. Again, because the study uses logit analysis, the true effects of each variable in the study is actually  $\frac{1}{4}$  or .25 of the actual coefficients produced by the analysis. A positive coefficient indicates an increase by .25 units on that particular variable. As is the case with the expenditure variable for the Democratic incumbent. As the chances of winning increase by one percent, the Democratic incumbent's spending (coefficient = .0120) increases by 25% of .0120 units more. If the coefficient is negative, as is the expenditure variable for the Republican incumbent (coefficient = -.1201), this indicates that as the chances of the Democratic candidate increases by one unit, the expenditure of the

Republican Incumbent decreases by .25 units or by -.4804 units. Graph 5:1 provides a better illustration<sup>27</sup>. The graphs illustrates the probabilities of the Democrat candidate winning in two scenarios: 1) when facing a Republican Incumbent (as indicated by the solid line in the graph) and 2) when the Democrat is the incumbent facing a Republican challenger (as indicated by the dashed line in the graph).

Graph 5:1 - Illustration of the Probability of a Democrat Winning in Varyingly Liberal Districts as a Democratic Incumbent OR When Facing a Republican Incumbent<sup>28</sup>



The results were generated at each percentage point of the district's Democratic presidential vote share based on the coefficients generated by the analysis in

<sup>27</sup> The log-odds were used to predict scores for both the Republican and Democrat incumbents as presented in Chart 5:1. 100 scores were generated and plotted to illustrate the probabilities for both scenarios.

Table 5:1. The graph demonstrates that a Democrat facing a Republican Incumbent has less than a 20% chance of winning on average, even when the Democratic Presidential vote share is 50% in a given district.

However, a Democratic Incumbent has about a 45% chance of winning on average in the same district when the Democratic presidential vote share is 0.

The graph illustrates a clear advantage for the Democrat incumbent over the Republican incumbent in winning.

We find that the Democratic candidate winning the election is predicted 95% of the time, based on the model presented. The model is a two-tailed test and all significance levels have been divided by two. We consider the model to be robust in that the variables indicated in the analysis will predict the democratic candidate

winning more than 95% of the time over an extended period of time. The model's strength is that it can be used to test other theories regarding gender because we have a clear foundation for what success looks like for incumbents where only men are running. Now that the model is constructed, we know, with 95% accuracy what the necessary ingredients are for winning in a single-member district system when an incumbent is present. The model is consistent with theories regarding incumbency, as the incumbent variable is the strongest predictor of winning in the study. The incumbent variable has a coefficient of 8.7813. Other variables found to be significant in predicting victory include expenditures, previous political experience and certain years in the study in

which the Democrats made gains in the House. As expected with expenditures, we know the more money candidates spend, the greater the likelihood of winning, especially when coupled with incumbency. Other significant variables include the percent of the two-party presidential vote-share in a given district or presidential coattails; also an expected predictor for candidates who are members of the sitting president's party. 1982 is significant in the study because while the president was Republican, the Democrats continued to gain seats in the House and held a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. 1984 is a significant year also with a negative coefficient of -1.0046. While the Democrats continued to hold onto their majority after the 1984 elections, they suffered losses in the House, dropping to 253 seats from 269 prior to the election. 1984 meant gains for the Republicans, hence the coefficient is significant and in the right direction. Years 1992 and 1994 were significant but in the opposite direction. The coefficients were -1.2178 and -2.4321 respectively. In 1992, the Democrats held the majority of the seats in the House but suffered losses to the Republicans after the election. In 1994, the Republicans won enough seats to take control of the House of Representatives. Hence, we see a larger, negative coefficient for 1994. Ironically, as the Democrats defeated a Republican incumbent for president, the Republicans gained control of the House in 1996. Thus, both years were significant years in the study that worked against the Democrats in House elections. Previous political experience was another variable expected to be a predictor of winning elections. The expenditure variables for both the

Democratic and Republican incumbents were included in the model. What was unexpected was that the expenditure variables were significant for Republican candidates and incumbents, and Democratic challengers but was not significant for the Democratic incumbent. They were however, in the right direction in that the Republican incumbent (expenditure) variable was negative and the Democratic incumbent (expenditure) variable was positive, respectively. The expenditure variables for the Democratic and Republican challengers were both significant. This was unexpected in that, due to the ever-present power of incumbency, I assumed the amount of money challengers spend would be important but not necessarily significant in the study. In theory, however, it is understood that what an incumbent spends will level off at some point or more precisely, once incumbents reach a certain level of spending, expenditures no longer have the same effect<sup>29</sup>. This variable was significant for the Democratic candidate only because the model was designed to predict the Democrat winning and of those that won in the study, previous political experience was a constant attribute for those cases in the study. The model could have been constructed with a Republican winning, in which case, the expectation would be that the *previous political experience* variable for the Republican would be a significant predictor of winning versus the same variable for the Democratic candidate. The constant in the study or the baseline condition, *whether the*

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<sup>29</sup> We investigated the log effects of the expenditure variables to ensure that the effects were the same and the coefficients for the Republican incumbent and challenger and the Democratic challenger were all significant at the point .05 level. Essentially, the expenditures for all except the Democratic incumbent significantly matter in predicting victory.

*Democrat won the election* has a negative coefficient of -7.6782. This is also expected in that we realize that there are a plethora of potential influences on getting elected to Congress and the variances are innumerable from one district or state to another. The intercept starting from a point lower than zero is in line with what we can expect to be able to measure absent of all variables we expect to influence victory for the Democratic candidate. See Table 5:1.

### Open seats

As stated earlier, there are two baseline models for this study. The first predicts winning congressional elections when an incumbent is present. Our second model includes all factors believed to influence electoral success when an incumbent is not present. Again, incumbency is a strong predictor of reelection, one which holds significant regardless of whether the incumbent is male or female. The purpose is to establish all factors that will influence success when incumbency is both present in elections *and* absent or when the race is an open seat. These are the two types of races in a single member district system. Our goal is to bring together the necessary variables in predicting winning in both scenarios to establish our control models before analyzing the effects of gender. Initially, we start with a total of 493 cases in the entire data set which are the total number of open seat races in the system from 1980-2000. We lose 43 cases for the total number of open seat races in 1980. Again, presidential coattail affects do not apply to 1980 because the (1988) Bush/Dukakis vote-share would apply for

most districts between the years of 1982-2000 because the district lines were the same in these years. Another 124 cases are eliminated for all open seat races where women appear as candidates. Prior to running the analysis, we have 326 cases. 28 cases are eliminated for missing data which is believed to be the cause of redistricting. The final analysis has 298 cases<sup>30</sup>.

In an all-male world where incumbency is absent, we expect to predict victory using the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} Party\_D = & -5.7619 + .1620 (P\$Pres\_D) - .5774 (Y1982) - 2.2362 (Y1984) - \\ & .8301 (Y1986) - 1.0812 (Y1988) - 1.2266 (Y1992) - 2.8419 (Y1994) - 1.7850 (Y1996) - \\ & 1.3674 (Y1998) - 2.0056 (Y2000) + .1119 (Exp\_DC) - .1345 (Exp\_RC) - .8687 (Off\_R) \\ & + .8432 (Off\_D). \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable is again, whether the Democratic candidate won or lost the election, as it was for our first model. The model is interpreted as for every one unit increase in the chances of the democratic candidate to win causes a .25 unit change on each of the variables in the study. Where the variable coefficient is positive as with *the previous political experience* variable for the Democratic candidate (coefficient = .8432), the model indicates that as the chances of the Democratic candidate winning increases by one percentage point, the previous political experience of the Democratic candidate increases by .25 units or .2108

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<sup>30</sup> The conditions placed on the final dataset to generate the model on all-male candidates in open seat races are as follows: *Year* ~ 1980 & *open seat* = 1 & *gender* = 0 & *challgen* = 0

units. Where the variable coefficient is negative, as is the previous political experience of the Republican candidate (coefficient =  $-.1345$ ), the model indicates that as the chances of the Democratic candidate winning increases by one percentage point, the previous political experience of the Republican candidate decreases by  $.25$  units of the coefficient, or by  $.2171$  units.

Table 5:2 Descriptives for Open-seat Model

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev.
P\$Pres_D	306	26.58	90.41	44.8412	10.6947
Y1982	326	0	1	.15	.35
Y1984	326	0	1	7.06E-02	.26
Y1986	326	0	1	.12	.32
Y1988	326	0	1	7.06E-02	.26
Y1992	326	0	1	.17	.38
Y1994	326	0	1	.10	.31
Y1996	326	0	1	.13	.33
Y1998	326	0	1	6.440E-02	.25
Y2000	326	0	1	6.44E-02	.25
Expc_Dc	325	0	53	4.62	4.17
Expc_Rc	322	0	41	4.81	3.97
Off_R	324	0	1	.52	.50
Off_D	323	0	1	.59	.49
Valid N	298				



Table 5:2a - Variables Predicting Electoral Success in  
Open seat Congressional Races

<b>Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Sig</b>
P\$PRES_D	.1620	.0263	<b>.0000</b>
Y1982	-.5774	.7367	.2166
Y1984	-2.2362	.8275	<b>.0034</b>
Y1986	-.8301	.6905	.1146
Y1988	-1.0812	.7851	.0842
Y1992	-1.2266	.6828	<b>.0362</b>
Y1994	-2.8419	.7872	<b>.0001</b>
Y1996	-1.7850	.7237	<b>.0068</b>
Y1998	-1.3674	.8776	.0596
Y2000	-2.0056	1.0121	<b>.0237</b>
EXPC_DC	.1119	.0566	<b>.0241</b>
EXPC_RC	-.1345	.0661	<b>.0209</b>
OFF_R	-.8687	.3332	<b>.0045</b>
OFF_D	.8432	.3316	<b>.0055</b>
Constant	-5.7619	1.2650	<b>.0000</b>

The model designed predicts the Democrat winning the election correctly 80.54% of the time for all open seat elections in the study. Again, the model is a two-tailed test and all significance levels have been divided by two. The coefficient for the baseline condition has a coefficient of -5.7089, which is expected.

Table 5:2b - Classification Table: Predictions for Electoral Success in Open Seat Races

	Observed		Percent Correct
	0	1	
0	132	25	84.08
1	33	108	76.60

**Overall 80.54**

Given all of the possible variables that influence victory, as stated earlier, those variables and their level of influence change from district to district.

Furthermore, these variants are multiplied when an incumbent is not present in the race. Thus, we should expect that before any influences are applied to the constant, we should start from a point lower than zero to measure effects. The constant is significant at the .05 level in our second model. Other variables in the model that were found to be significant predictors of winning in open seat races include presidential coattails variable, elections years 1984, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, expenditures for both the Republican and Democratic candidates, and the previous political experience of both candidates. In regards to candidate expenditures, the clear expectation was that the expenditure variable for both parties would be significant in the study. Political challengers realize that every dollar spent in an open seat race can achieve more than in races where they face incumbents already in a seat of influence among voters. Thus,

facing another challenger requires financial strategy and often being the first to target certain segments of the voting population. Expenditure variables for both party candidates were significant at the .05 level of confidence testing. However, it was expected that spending would be the strongest predictors, holding more variance for victory than any other variables in the study. The strongest predictors of victory according to the model were actually previous political experience for both candidates. These findings make sense in that what legitimizes a politician's candidacy when they are seeking congressional office is that they have served in some capacity prior to seeking federal office. Name recognition is a luxury for incumbents but challengers must build a campaign base among voters familiar with some political record. Thus, voters would expect candidates to see congressional office as an opportunity to further whatever politics they have built at some lower level. Both expenditure and experience coefficients for the Republican challenger are significant and negative (which implies that the chances of winning move in the opposite direction the stronger those variables are for the Republican which should be expected).

All of the election year variables in the open seat model were all negative and significant indicating that the losses to the Democrats meant significant gains for the Republicans in each instance. The *year 1984* variable is significant for our open seat model with a negative coefficient of -2.2362. The coefficient indicates that the losses the Democrat party suffered in 1984 were significant in giving the Republican party an edge in the House of Representatives, at which

time, Republicans controlled the Senate and the presidency. Open seat races in 1984 resulted in losses for the Democratic party. Additionally, open seat races in 1992 resulted in losses for the Democratic party. The Democrats maintained a majority after the 1992 elections but lost seats to the Republicans due to open seat races that year. The coefficient for 1992 is -1.2266. The year 1994 coefficient was also significant at the .05 level and negative (-2.8419). The Democratic party controlled the presidency, Senate and House of Representatives in 1993. Open seat races in 1994 hurt the Democrats in that they suffered significant losses in key open seat races that eventually gave the Republicans control of the House.<sup>31</sup> The coefficients for year 1996 and 2000 are -1.7850 and -2.0056 respectfully. They are both significant. While the Republican party held onto their majority in the House from 1994 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2001, they lost seats to the Democratic party overall.<sup>32</sup> The open seat races resulted in victory for the Republicans in 1996 and 2000.

## Conclusion

Both control models for the study have been outlined. We have now constructed what the world would look like if men alone ran in electoral races with incumbents and in open seat races between the years of 1980-2000. Our

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<sup>31</sup> Party split in the House of Representatives was 258 for Democrats in 1993 which shifted to the Republicans who held 230 seats by the end of the 1994 elections.

<sup>32</sup> Overall includes incumbent races and open seat races. Republicans won more than 50% of all open seat races in 1996 and more than 75% of open seat races in 2000. In both election years, the Democrats made gains in the House.

control model including incumbents predicted victory 95% out of 100% of the time for 2699 out of 4785 elections in the study. Our control model for open seat races predicted victory 80% out of 100% of the time for 298 out of 452 open seat elections in the study. Given the strength of our models, we should expect that we can predict outcomes for women with the same resources 95% of the time in races where incumbents are present, and 80% of the time in open seat races where women are present, given they have the same resources as men. The following chapter explores the effects of gender on our control models and what is significantly different about the world when women participate in single-member district type elections.

## Chapter 6

In the previous chapter, we created control models for gender by constructing an analysis of what the political world (in America) looks like without women. The logic behind this is that to uncover the effects of stagnation on the election of women, it is essential to first define the factors that determine electoral success. Since the majority of participants in the electoral system are men, we constructed a model that predicts success for men only. If we are able to predict success for men based on our model, then we should be able to predict success for women if resources matter in the same ways. At the very least, we seek to know if at the level of election, women have the same resources as men, their candidacies translate into wins at the same rate as male candidacies.

This research is important to the body of work in gender politics for three primary reasons. First, this research provides a solid model predicting electoral success for any prospective political candidate. Thus, regardless of gender, the study has implications that inform and guide future political candidates at all levels. Second, the research seeks to uncover the barriers believed to be inherent in the system as they relate to women in regard to tangible resources. Scholars have effectively argued that political institutions are “gendered” in that they are shaped by the majority gender that occupy those institutions (Perkins and Fowlkes, 1980, Hawesworth, 2003, Tolleson-Rinehart, 2006) Examining differences in tangible resources such as expenditures (Herrnson, Lay and Stokes, 2003, Gimpel, Lee and Kaminski, 2006, Gimpel, Lee and Pearson, 2008)

and political experience (Palmer and Simon, 2003) based on gender will provide evidence that inherent barriers are present in congressional electoral process and potentially other levels. Third, the chapter will, at the very least direct future research on women in politics and whether other theories of stagnation could be at work in explaining variance in resource differences. Particularly, if barriers to the election of women are not determined to be present at the level of the election, it is most likely present at some earlier level of the political process.

Consequently, there may be some other way by which stagnation develops if in fact, some force other than the candidates themselves in the political system do not directly influence outcomes for women. This chapter seeks to apply gender to the model to uncover what is different about the world in terms of electoral outcomes, given the same resources when the candidates are women. Thus, we construct a model of the world where women are first present in the system with men to examine if those variables have the same effects when men and women are present in the system.

### The Model Predicting Success of Women Incumbents

Over the 18 year time period between 1982-2000, our study examines eleven congressional election cycles. Our first model includes women as incumbents or challengers during this time period. Constructing the model this way allows men to remain in the data set as both incumbents and challengers, but it also allows us to see if the system responds differently based on the

presence of women. We should expect that the impact of the variables on the election of the Democratic incumbent (the dependent variable) will be the same. In that time period, women appeared in 703 elections as incumbents or as challengers. We lose 109 cases due to missing data as a result of redistricting during this time period. This initial model is constructed for incumbent races only. The final analysis for elections including incumbents has 594 cases<sup>33</sup>. The computation of the first model is as presented in chapter 5. Note that more details are provided in Table 6:1. The computation is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Party}_D = & -8.0574 + .1099 (P\$Pres\_D) - 2.4892 (Y1982) - 3.0768 (Y1984) - \\
 & 2.2622 (Y1986) - 1.9873 (Y1988) - 2.2622 (Y1992) - 4.6368 (Y1994) + .3187 (Y1996) - \\
 & 1.3690 (Y1998) - 1.9583 (Y2000) - .0098 (Expc\_DI) - .2177 (Expc\_RI) + .4891 \\
 & (Expc\_DC) - .2026 (Expc\_RC) - .6513 (Off\_R) -.9137 (Off\_D) + 10.1194 (D\_incum).
 \end{aligned}$$

We find immediately that the analysis offers the same overall results as we found in our initial effects in chapter 5. Refer to Table 6:1. The model constructed predicts electoral success correctly at an overall rate of 95%. Furthermore, with the exception of the election year variables, the primary variables in the study retain their significance when women enter the political system. The expenditure variables for both Democratic and Republican challengers and the Republican incumbent are significant in the study. Only the Democratic incumbent's expenditure were found not be significant in the study. This finding

<sup>33</sup> The conditions applied to the final dataset to run the model including women as incumbents or challengers is as follows:  $Year \sim= 1980 \ \& \ open \ seat = 0 \ \& \ ( \ gender = 1 \ OR \ challgen = 1 )$



Table 6:1: Variables Predicting Electoral Success in Congressional races when Women Incumbents run for re-election

<b>Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Sig</b>
P\$PRES_D	.1099	.0412	<b>.0038</b>
Y1982	-2.4892	1.7888	.0820
Y1984	-3.0768	1.7066	<b>.0357</b>
Y1986	-2.2622	1.8586	.1117
Y1988	-1.9873	1.6321	.1116
Y1992	-2.8423	1.5768	<b>.0357</b>
Y1994	-4.6368	1.5021	<b>.0010</b>
Y1996	-.3187	1.3130	.4041
Y1998	-1.3690	1.4416	.1711
Y2000	-1.9583	1.6421	.1165
EXPC_DI	-.0098	.1309	.4702
EXPC_RI	-.2177	.1293	<b>.0461</b>
EXPC_DC	.4891	.1507	<b>.0006</b>
EXPC_RC	-.2026	.1004	<b>.0218</b>
OFF_R	-.6513	.8422	.2196
OFF_D	.9137	.7981	.1261
D_INCUMB	10.1194	1.5102	<b>.0038</b>
Constant	-8.0574	2.3502	<b>.0003</b>

Table 6:1a : Classification Table: Predictions for Electoral Success In Incumbent Races

Count	Party_D		Percent correct
	Observed	Predicted	
Observed	347	18	95.07
Predicted	21	341	94.64

is consistent with findings from our analysis in chapter 5. Because the model seeks to predict electoral success for the Democratic incumbent, we believe that at some point, the effects of expenditures for the Democratic incumbent will level off and lose its initial level of influence in determining whether the Democratic candidate will win. The expenditure variables for the Republican incumbent and Republican challenger are significant and as expected, in the opposite direction (coefficients are -.2177 and -.2026, respectfully). The *previous political experience* variables for both the Republican and Democrat are also significant and the coefficients are in the right direction, (-.6513 and .9137 respectfully). The *Democratic incumbent* variable has a large coefficient of 10.1194 which is also significant at the .05 level. Among the election year variables, 1984, 1992 and 1994 all have negative coefficients that are significant, with coefficients of -3.0768, -2.8423 and -4.6368 respectively. The finding is consistent with what we know of congressional politics in all these years, in which the Republicans gained seats in Congress. Our model for men in chapter 5 finds all three election years negative and significant as well. Because we are predicting the election of the Democratic

incumbents (which is the dependent variable, *party\_d*), this coefficient is expected to be negative. The model constructed to include women as incumbents or challengers in incumbent races are consistent with our control model in Chapter 5 for male incumbents.

### The Model of Women Only

Now that we have added women to the political system and have found that the findings from this model are consistent with the level of prediction provided in the control model of chapter 5, we conducted an analysis of women only. The findings for this analysis can be found in the Appendix for chapter 6, Table A6:1. It was essential to evaluate the effects of our model when the analysis captures women only functioning in the political system. We find that when we remove men from the analysis and only women are present as both incumbents and challengers, the analysis produces large coefficients that do not provide us with a reasonable interpretation of how the system responds when women only are present in the system. We speculate that the analysis has returned numbers that are uninterruptible because there may not be enough women in the overall political system to conduct an analysis of a world made up of only women. When we estimate the effects of the resources on women incumbents, we get excellent results, 240 of 244 cases are predicted (See Table A6:1). But the individual coefficients of the model are unreliably estimated and

we do not know if resources are converting to electoral success for women in the same way.

Rather than relying on the particular coefficients, I predict female incumbent wins and loses, based on having the same resources as men. Those predicted outcomes are presented in Table 6:2. In an effort to apply what we already know about predicting success among male incumbents to women, we take the credible resources we know to predict success for men and use them to predict success for women. In so doing, we compute a new variable (*p\_w\_inc*) for the data set to predict women. In the computation, we use the coefficients produced for each variable in the analysis used to predict success for men in chapter 5. The coefficients from Table 5:1 in Chapter 5, predicting incumbent wins for men only are used to compute outcomes for the new variable below. We compute this new variable to now predict wins among incumbent women. The definition and computation for the new variable is as follows:

#### **Equation for predicting electoral success for women incumbents**

**p\_w\_inc** = variable predicting women incumbents

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p\_w\_inc} = & (\text{p\&pres\_d} * .0830) + (\text{y1982} * 1.7048) + (\text{y1984} * -1.0046) + (\text{y1986} * \\ & .3109) + (\text{y1988} * -.0165) + (\text{y1992} * -1.2178) + (\text{y1994} * -2.4321) + (\text{y1996} * .5972) + \\ & (\text{y1998} * .2611) + (\text{y2000} * -.6514) + (\text{expc\_di} * .0120) + (\text{expc\_ri} * -.1201) + \\ & (\text{expc\_dc} * .4250) + (\text{expc\_rc} * -.3549) + (\text{off\_r} * -.5682) + (\text{off\_d} * 1.120) + \\ & (\text{d\_incum} * 8.7813) + -7.6782 \end{aligned}$$

The formula indicates how the variable predicting women incumbents was generated. Once the variable was generated, the analysis produced 305 elections where women were present. 60 cases had missing data and the final analysis

included 244 cases (the same number of cases as the model in Table A6:1 for women only). The cross tabulation provides the prediction results for the new model, predicting women only within the dependent variable. A new variable was generated to indicate the new odds on the variable predicting success for women, *p\_w\_inc*, with a cut off point if the odds of winning were less than .5, the variable was scored 0 and if the odds were greater than .5, the variable would be scored 1.

Table 6:2 -Cross tabulation of electoral success and Women Predicted to Win in Incumbent races

Count	Party_D		Total
	Observed	Predicted	
Cut_Fem Observed	97	4	<b>101</b>
Predicted	5	138	<b>143</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>244</b>

The analysis eliminates the expenditure variable for both the Democrats and Republicans and the incumbent variable for the Democrat since these variables are constant for all cases and since a constant has already been requested for the model. Given that the model with women only operating in the political system has so few cases, the cross tabulation of the new variable predicting women provides an account of what success looks like for women based on the rate of prediction using the model predicting success for men only. The model predicts success for women within the dependent variable (with the newly computed variable, *p\_w\_inc*) and we find the model returns the predicted outcome 98.36%

of the time, observing 140 of 142 cases. The cross tabulation, versus the logistic regression analysis provides a vivid account of what success looks like for women in electoral races, given they have the same resources as men. Overall, the model predicts success for incumbent women with the same consistency as our previous model from chapter 5 and the first model of chapter 6 where women are present in the system as incumbents or challengers, alongside men. Thus, we must infer that incumbent women running for political office with the same resources as men will be just as successful as men.

#### The model predicting success for women in open seat races

Lastly, we seek to analyze statistics predicting success for women in open seat races. We are interested to know if the model returns the same rate of prediction for women as our previous analysis did in chapter 5 predicting success for women in open seat races, when men are also present as challengers. The analysis contains 112 cases and loses 10 cases for missing data. The final analysis contains 102 cases. The computation for open seats with new statistics are as follows<sup>34</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} Party\_D = & -6.3663 + .1828 (P\$Pres\_D) + .2481 (Y1982) - 1.2206 (Y1984) - \\ & 1.5888 (Y1986) - 2.7599 (Y1988) + .3976 (Y1992) - 2.3243 (Y1994) + 1.3700 (Y1996) - \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>34</sup> Conditions applied to the final dataset to generate the model predicting success for women in open seat races are as follows: *Year* ~1980 & *open seat* = 1 & (*gender3* > 9). All values of the *gender3* variable scored less than 9 indicate women incumbents, while all values greater than 9 indicate women challengers.

.8160 (Y1998) -2.1279 (Y2000) + .0468 (Expc\_DC) - .1987 (Expc\_RC) - 1.6684 (Off\_R)  
+ .8649 (Off\_D).

See Table 6:3. What is most interesting is that the model predicts success 87% of the time versus the control model for open seats in Chapter 5 which predicted success for men at a rate of almost 81%.

**Table 6:3: Variables Predicting Electoral Success for Women in Open seat Races**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Sig</b>
P\$PRES_D	.1828	.0568	<b>.0006</b>
Y1982	.2481	1.7950	.4450
Y1984	-1.2206	1.9326	.2638
Y1986	-1.5888	1.9477	.2073
Y1988	-2.7599	2.1976	.1046
Y1992	.3976	1.5773	.4007
Y1994	-2.3243	1.7358	.0902
Y1996	-1.3700	1.9136	.2370
Y1998	-.8160	1.7437	.3199
Y2000	-2.1279	2.2111	.1680
EXPC_DC	.0468	.0578	<b>.2090</b>
EXPC_RC	-.1987	.1144	<b>.0412</b>
OFF_R	-1.6684	.7491	<b>.0130</b>
OFF_D	.8649	.7516	<b>.1249</b>
Constant	-6.3663	3.1354	<b>.0211</b>

Secondly, the variables believed to have the most influence on electoral success, the ideological leaning of the district, expenditures and previous political experience are all significant and in the right direction. See Table 6:3a. Again, we have very few cases in the model and so, we calculate a new variable, *open\_win* to predict success for women in open seats, using the coefficients provided in Chapter 5, predicting success in open seats for men only. See Table 5:2. Again, we want to ensure that the resources are converting to women in the same way the do for men according to our model in Chapter 5.

**Table 6:3a: Classification Table: Predictions for Electoral Success in Open seat Races**

	Predicted	Observed	% correct
0	<b>49</b>	6	89.09%
1	7	<b>40</b>	85.11%
		<b>Overall</b>	<b>87.25%</b>

**Equation for predicting women winning in open seats**

**Open\_win** = variable predicting women's success in open seat races

$$\text{Open\_win} = (\text{p\&pres\_d} * .1620) + (\text{y1982} * -.5774) + (\text{y1984} * -2.2362) + (\text{y1986} * -.8301) + (\text{y1988} * -1.0812) + (\text{y1992} * -1.2266) + (\text{y1994} * -2.8419) + (\text{y1996} * 1.7850) + (\text{y1998} * 1.3674) + (\text{y2000} * -2.0056) + (\text{expc\_dc} * .1119) + (\text{expc\_rc} * -.1345) + (\text{off\_r} * -.8687) + (\text{off\_d} * .8432) - 5.7619$$



Table 6:4 Cros tabulation of Electoral Success and Women  
Predicted to Win in Open Seat Races

	Party_D		Total
	0	1	
<b>Open_Win</b>	52		66
0 Count %in Party_D	88.1%	26.4%	58.9%
1 Count % in Party_D	7	39	46
	11.9%	73.6%	41.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>112</b>
	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>81.25%</b>

The computation for the variable *open\_win*, which predicts women winning in open seats races where women are present along with men, utilizes the coefficients from our control model for open seats in chapter 5. Again, we take the known resources we know to predict success for men and add those coefficients to our model for each variable in the study. In doing so, we are providing women in our study with the same resources our control model assigned to men in chapter 5. Our goal is to see what the observed outcomes for women in open seat races are when we assign them the same resources as men. Table 6:3a illustrates what our predictions and outcomes are with very few cases. The cross tabulation returns 87% of our predictions as observed outcomes. These findings are in line with the predicted outcomes in our open seat model for men in chapter 5.

Conclusion

The control models of chapter 5 detailed the resources believed to influence electoral success for political candidates. Those models additionally provided an illustration of what the world looked like politically, if only men participated in congressional elections. These models returned strong predicted outcomes for races where incumbents were present and in open seat contests, both for men only. The rationale for running the analysis in this manner was to apply those outcomes to women – add them to the political system and provide them with the same resources as men. In doing so, we test the hypotheses presented, with the expectation that the world will operate the same for women as it would for men. According to the findings of our models in this chapter, we find that our design returns outcomes for women that are just as strong as men. Therefore, we accept the null hypotheses for both models and conclude that there is no significant difference between men and women when given the same resources to succeed. In accepting the findings, I continue to seek the reasons behind the low number of women experiencing success at the congressional level of government.

Now that we know that men and women have the same chances of winning if they had the same resources, the following chapter will examine just that; do men and women in fact have the same resources in seeking electoral success or is there a difference in resource levels across gender that impacts the election outcome across gender? We revisit theory and examine the resources we now know to significantly influence electoral success. More specifically, in

analyzing the resource variables, the ideological leaning of the district, candidate expenditures and previous political experience are the strongest predictors in both the control models and test models for incumbent races and in open seat races. We must now analyze if in fact those resources were applied equally for men and women during the elections between 1982-2000. If there are inconsistencies for any of the resource variables according to gender, we look to identify a consistent pattern of women lacking that particular resource overtime.

## Chapter 7

The test models in chapter 6 reveal that there are no significant differences for men and women with the same resources in congressional election outcomes. This chapter will investigate whether men and women actually received the same resources. The models of Chapter 5 and 6 reveal that the strongest predictors of electoral success in both incumbent races and open seat races were 1) the ideological leaning of the district, 2) candidate expenditures and 3) previous political experience. In this chapter, I examine the differences for men and women with respect to all three variables.

The first resource of interest is the ideological leaning of the district. The ideological leaning of the district is defined by the presidential vote share received by President George H.W. Bush. Essentially, we are interested in knowing whether or not women run more often when her opponent's party is favored to win, provided, she has the same resources as men. For example, if the district is highly conservative (conservative is defined as George Bush's vote share in the district being greater than 50%) and the woman candidate is a Democrat or liberal, we want to examine if this happens more than *an average* amount of the time for women versus men. In short, the question is whether female candidates are little more than sacrificial lambs. The same measure would be taken if the female is Republican or conservative and running as a candidate in a district that is highly liberal (liberal is defined as Bush's vote share being less than 50%). We examine the means of male candidates in these

scenarios and look to see if there is a significant difference between the means for men and women. We expect that if this sort of bias does exist for women that they will run more often in districts where the opposite party had a higher presidential vote share.

For expenditures, we expect that if the same resources were not available to candidates, based on gender, the means test will reveal that women challengers spend less money on average than male challengers to run in congressional races. Spending less infers that the candidate raised less money than their opponent. Expenditures reported in the Almanac of American politics provides what the candidate actually spent to run. Candidates raise and borrow money to run campaigns. We assume that candidates who raised less money also spent less money.

In regard to previous political experience, we also expect to see a difference in the overall percent of women having previous political experience than men prior to running. The expectation is that if there are differences, it would be that women are less experienced than men on average. Because our previous political experience indicator is dichotomous, the assumption is that on average fewer women will have previous experience when compared to men.

The presidential vote share of the district provides an indication of how liberal or conservative a district is. As a resource, the expectation is that we should be able to identify liberal women running more often in districts that are more conservative when compared to districts where liberal men are candidates.

The same would be true for conservative women running in districts that are more liberal when compared to those where conservative men were running as candidates (if, there is a difference in resources). No difference in resources would indicate that liberal men and women, on average are running in districts with the same level of conservatism and conservative men and women are running in districts with the same level of liberalism, on average.

### Analysis for Incumbent Elections

#### District liberalism/Conservatism

The first of the variables that we use to compare means is the ideological leaning of the district. In order to compare means based on gender, we identify variables in the study that will allow us to pinpoint candidates according to gender and party identity. The *R\_chall* and *D\_chall* variables identify Republican and Democratic challengers in the data with a 0/1 score, 1 indicating the challenger is either Republican or Democrat. We qualified the data by first excluding unwanted cases. If the gender variable = 0, this indicates we want to include men only for some analyses, we used this selection in means testing. If the gender variable = 1, this indicates we want to identify women only for some cases. We also selected cases according to the *open seat* variable (coded 0 = incumbent race, 1 = open seat race) to ensure we selected the type of congressional race we intended to analyze. Lastly, we selected all election years

Tables 7:1 and 7:1a - Means Presidential Vote Share for the  
Republican when opponent is a Male Democrat

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
3270	94%	208	6%	3478	100%

Challenger is a Democrat	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Democrat is not male	49.4975	2082	12.6902
Democrat is male	60.2606	1188	6.7691
Total	53.4077	3270	12.0813

Tables 7:2 and 7:2a - Means Presidential Vote share for the  
Republican when opponent is Female Democrat

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
401	95.2%	20	4.8%	421	100%

Challenger is a Democrat	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Democrat is not female	45.3945	162	12.2477
Democrat is Female Incumbent	44.5779	36	13.7878
Democrat is female challenger	59.4145	203	7.7212
Total	52.4186	401	12.5487

excluding 1980, since the presidential vote share indicator does not apply prior to 1982 because of redistricting, in that all election years in the study are relative to 1990. The majority of the districts in the study over all years for 1982-2000 are the same. After selecting out cases to ensure we identify the elections of interest,

we use the  $p\$pres\_r/p\$pres\_d$  variables which indicates the percentage of the presidential vote share that President George Bush (a Republican) won in the district during the 1988 presidential election. This percentage is what we intend to compare in each case selected. Tables 7: 1-7:13 provide mean comparisons based on gender for all three variables for incumbent races only.

Table 7:1 provides the means for the coefficient  $D\_chall$  which is a dichotomous variable indicating 0 if the challenger was not a Democrat or 1 if the challenger was a Democrat. We find 1188 cases in which the  $D\_chall$  variable is scored 1, or 1188 cases in which a Democratic male faced a Republican incumbent. The mean for all cases is 60.26. We interpret this number as for all districts in which the Democratic challenger was male, President George H.W. Bush (R) received an average of 60.26% of the presidential vote share. Chart 7:2a provides the means for the coefficient  $Dem\_Fem$  which is coded 0 when both candidates are male, 1 when one incumbent is a Democratic female and 2 in all cases where the Democratic challenger is female. We are interested in the mean for  $Dem\_Fem$  when scored 2. The analysis finds 203 cases in which a Democratic female faced a Republican incumbent. The overall mean in these cases is 59.41. This finding is interpreted as Democratic women ran as challengers in districts where on average, President George H.W. Bush received 59% of the presidential vote share in 1988. Given these findings, the districts show about the same level of conservatism in both cases. There were no substantial differences in the ideological leaning of the districts based on gender. Tables 7:3 and 7:4 examine



the opposite – how Republican men and women fare in highly conservative districts.

Tables 7:3 and 7:3a provide the means in cases where Republican men run as challengers against Democratic incumbents and find 1555 cases. We are concerned with the means for the variable *R\_Chall* when coded 1, indicating the Republican challenger was male. The mean for all cases when the challenger was Republican is 48.19, which indicates that, on average Republican male challengers ran in districts where President George Bush received 48% of the presidential vote share.

Tables 7:4 and 7:4a provide the means in cases where Republican women ran in against Democratic incumbents. The means also provide an indication of whether or not Republican women ran in districts that were more liberal than those districts, on average where Republican men ran. We find the means for the variable *Rep\_Fem*, which is coded 0 when both candidates are male, 1 when the incumbent is a Republican female and 2 when the challenger is a Republican female. We are concerned with the mean for all cases where the variable is coded 2. We find 198 cases where the variable is coded 2 and the mean for the ideological leaning of the districts is 45.25. This indicates that on average, Republican women ran in districts where President George Bush received 45% of the vote. Republican women challengers, however, tended to run in districts that were slightly more liberal than Republican male challengers. Overall, there is no substantial difference among means in regard to the ideological leaning of the

district when women run against men in both cases for incumbent races.

However, we qualify this by noting that Republican women are disadvantaged to a statistically significant extent.

Tables 7:3 and 7:3a - Means Presidential Vote share (R) for the Republican when opponent is Republican Male

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
3270	94%	208	6%	3478	100%

Republican is male	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Republican is not male	58.1329	1715	10.0937
Republican male is the challenger	48.1964	1555	11.9520
Total	53.4077	3270	12.0813

Tables 7:4 and 7:4a - Means, Presidential Vote share ( R) for the Republican when opponent is Republican Female

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
401	95.2%	20	4.8%	421	100%

Republican is Female	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Republican is not Female	59.5361	184	7.7185
Republican is a Female Incumbent	58.1195	19	7.1763
Republican is a Female Challenger	45.2573	198	12.5577
Total	52.4186	401	12.5487

## Expenditures

The second analysis for incumbent races involves expenditures. We evaluate whether men and women spend the same across all elections in our study. Expenditure variables were highly significant in the control and test models of chapters 5 and 6. What we found was that in predicting electoral success, expenditures held the same level of significance for men and women running as challengers in races where an incumbent was present and in open seat races. Also, the expenditures of the Republican incumbent was an important factor. Here, we seek to examine if in fact women had the same resources as men overtime in incumbent races in our study. As with our first set of tables, we selected out cases according to the challenger and gender variables in addition to eliminating open seat races. Table 7:5 illustrates the means for the various expenditure variables in the study. *Exp\_Di* and *Exp\_Ri* both indicate Democratic and Republican expenditures by the \$100,000s and adjusted for the consumer price index. On average, Democratic incumbents in our study spent an average of \$246,350 (*Exp\_Di* = 2.4635). Republican incumbents spend an average of \$202,930. Democratic challengers spend an average of \$64, 570 and Republican challengers spend an average of \$78,840 in running for congressional office. The following three groups of charts provide the means of expenditures spent by incumbents and challengers according to gender. Again, these comparisons are for incumbent races only.

Table 7:5 Descriptives - Expenditure variables in the study

	Cases (N)	Min	Max	Mean
Expenditures for Dem Incumbent	3233	.00	42.36	2.4635
Expenditures for Rep Incumbent	3228	.00	52.29	2.0293
Expenditures for Dem challenger	3105	.00	35.29	.6457
Expenditures for Rep challenger	3032	.00	24.64	.7884
Valid Cases	2899			

Tables 7:6 and 7:6a - Means, Expenditures for Democratic Males opposing Republican Incumbent

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
3105	96%	128	4%	3233	100%

Democrat Challenger	Mean	N	Std Dev.
Democrat challenger is not male	.0000	2046	
Democrat challenger is male	1.8932	1059	3.1130
Total	.6457	3105	2.0270

Tables 7:6 and 7:6a provides mean expenditures for Democratic male challengers when running against a Republican incumbent. We are concerned with the *D\_chall* variable score of 1 which indicates that the challenger was a Democratic male. For the 1059 cases in which the Democratic challenger was

male in an incumbent race, the average expenditure was \$189,320 as indicated by mean = 1.8932. Tables 7:7 and 7:7a provide expenditure means for Democratic females running against Republican incumbents.

The *Dem\_Fem* variable is scored 0 when both candidates are male, 1 when the Democratic incumbent is a woman and scored 2 when the Democratic challenger is a female. Thus, we are concerned with the mean expenditure for the variable scored at 2 which indicates 2.4258 or an average of \$242,580 spent by the Democratic female challenger seeking congressional office. This number is substantially higher than what Democratic male challengers spent running for office during the same time period. Thus, we can conclude that on average, Democratic women spend more money (about \$50,000 more) than Democratic men when running for congressional office. In further analysis of Democratic women, we learn that of the 203 women who ran as challengers in incumbent races, 11 women spent more than one million dollars to run for office. (See Appendix, Tables A7:2a) These handful of women drive the average for all Democratic women up substantially. Without these 11 elections, the mean expenditure for Democratic women is 1.9, indicating Democratic women on average spent about \$190,000, a figure more consistent with what other candidates spend in congressional elections against incumbents (See Table A7:1 in the appendix and Table A7:3a for mean expenditures excluding women who spent more than \$1 million) .

Tables 7:8 and 7:8a provide the mean expenditures for Republican male challengers facing Democratic incumbents. The study finds 1287 cases where the *R\_chall* variable is scored 1, indicating the challenger was Republican. The mean is 1.87, indicating that Republican male challengers spent an average of \$187,000 to run for congressional office.

Tables 7:7 and 7:7a - Means, Expenditures for Democrat Females opposing Republican Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
647	97%	20	3%	667	100%

Democrat Female Challengers	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Democrat challenger is not Female	.6827	247	2.2660
Democrat female is a challenger	2.4258	205	3.0907
Total	1.0293	647	2.4406

Tables 7:8 and 7:8a - Means, Expenditures for Republican Male challenger when opposing Democratic Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
1628	89%	201	11%	1829	100%

Republican Challengers	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican challenger is not male	.00	341	
Republican challenger is male	1.85	1287	2.55
Total	1.47	1628	2.39

Tables 7:9 and 7:9a Means Expenditures for Republican Female challenger opposing Democratic Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
625	93.7%	42	6.3%	667	100%

Republican Female	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican is not female	.8372	329	2.5051
Republican Female Is the challenger	1.8469	188	2.7060
Total	.9963	625	2.4282

Tables 7:10 and 7:10a - Means, Democratic Male challenger experience when opposing Republican Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
3231	99.9%	2	.1%	3233	100%

	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Democrat is not male	4.89E-04	2046	2.21E-02
Democrat male is the challenger	.20	1185	.40
Total	7.40E-02	3231	.26

Tables 7:9 and 7:9a provides mean expenditures for Republican female challengers when facing a Democratic incumbent. Again, we are concerned with the mean for the *Rep\_Fem* variable when it has a score of 2, which indicates when the female challenger is Republican. Tables 7:9a finds 188 cases where the Democrat incumbent faced a Republican woman. The average expenditure was

\$184,690 for Republican female challengers. We find that there is no substantial difference between what Republican male and female challengers spent in running for congressional office.

### Previous Political Experience

The third resource of interests in our models is previous political experience. We compare means according to gender to determine if there is any substantial difference between men and women in regard to previous political experience. We know from our models in chapter 6 that men and women will have the same chance at electoral success if they have the same resources. Now we compare means of the variable *off\_d* and *off\_r* which are indicators of previous political experience, scored 0 if the party candidate had no previous political experience or 1 if they had previous political experience. By comparing means, we can determine if in fact there was any substantial difference in previous political experience based on gender. Tables 7:10 and 7:10a provide the mean percent of Democratic male challengers with previous political experience. We are concerned with the *D\_Chall* variable when it is scored 1, indicating the male challenger was a Democrat. We find 1185 cases with an overall mean of .20, indicating that 20% of all Democratic male challengers had previous political experience when facing an incumbent. Tables 7:11 and 7:11a provide the mean score for all Democratic female challengers who ran against Republican incumbents with previous political experience.



Tables 7:11 and 7:11a - Means Democratic Female challenger experience when opposing Republican Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
664	99.6%	3	.4%	667	100%

	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Democrat is not female	8.53E-02	258	.28
Democrat Female Is the challenger	.23	212	.42
Total	.11	664	.31

Tables 7:12 and 7:12a - Means Republican Male challenger experience when opposing Democratic Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
3232	100%	1	.0%	3233	100%

	Mean	N	Std Dev.
Republican is not male	5.73E-04	1741	2.40E-02
Republican male Is the challenger	.16	1491	.37
Total	7.58E-02	3232	.26

We are again concerned with the *Dem\_Fem* variable when scored 2, indicating the Democratic challenger is a woman. We find 212 cases in the data with a mean of .23. This indicates that 23% of all Democratic women challengers had previous political experience when facing an incumbent.

Tables 7:13 and 7:13a - Means Republican Female challenger experience when opposing Democratic Incumbents

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
666	99.9%	1	.1%	667	100%

Variable <i>Rep_Fem</i>	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican is not female	5.68E-02	352	.23
Republican Female Is the challenger	.17	206	.38
Total	8.41E-02	666	.28

Democratic women were slightly more likely than Democratic men to have previous political experience, but there is no significant difference between the means for previous political experience among Democratic men and women. Tables 7:12 through 7:13a provide the means for the percentages of candidates with previous political experience for Republicans. Tables 7:12 and 7:12a provide the mean for the percent of Republican male challengers with previous political experience who faced Democratic incumbents. We find 1491 cases where the Republican male challenger faced a Democratic incumbent. The chart indicates a mean of .16 or 16% of all Republican male challengers in the data who had previous political experience when facing an incumbent. Tables 7:13 and 7:13a provide means for previous political experience for Republican females when facing a Democratic incumbent. We find 206 cases in which the *Rep-Fem* variable is scored 2, indicating the Republican challenger was a woman. The

mean is .17. This indicates that 17% of all Republican female challengers in the data had previous political experience when facing an incumbent. While Republican women are slightly more likely to have previous political experience on average, we learn that there is no substantial difference in the level of previous political experience based on gender in incumbent races.

Overall, our analysis for incumbent races on the ideological leaning of the district and previous political experience indicate that the differences between men and women challengers are only slight differences and are not statistically significant. However, we do find that in regard to expenditures, Democratic women, on average do in fact spend substantially more than Democratic men in running for congressional office. There was no substantial difference in spending among Republican male challengers when compared to Republican women.

#### Analysis of Open seat Races

Our analysis continues with our investigation of equality in resource allotment in open seat races for men and women who ran in congressional elections in our study. Open seat races are rare and desirable opportunities in congressional elections because the probability of winning increases to 50% when the incumbent is absent. Because incumbency is such a powerful variable in predicting electoral success, its absence opens up a large amount of variance to be explained by other influential factors such as presidential coattails, expenditures and previous political experience, among other factors. It is

essential to analyze incumbent races separate from open seat races because the rules that govern these races are substantially different. The initial variable we analyze is ideological leaning of the district. We evaluate the vote percentage of President George Bush in each district and compare means to ascertain a difference based on party and gender. Essentially, we expect that if bias exists, there will be a substantial difference in the Bush vote share in districts where men are running as candidates versus districts where women run. Before we ran each analysis, we qualified the number of cases by selecting out the cases that did not apply. We first selected out all elections in 1980 because presidential coattails did not apply for those elections. Again, district lines for most states in the study were primarily the same for all elections after 1982 because of redistricting. Second, we coded the *open seat* variable to equal 1, indicating the analysis should include only open seat races. Lastly, we coded the *gender3* variable to be 0 indicating men only are included in the study for male analyses and *gender3* is coded 1 or 11 for our female analyses indicating 1 if the female faced a male or 11 if both candidates were female. In either case, we wanted to capture all women challengers in the study. Once we selected the necessary cases, we ran each analysis according to party and gender.

Tables 7:14 and 7:14a provide the mean for the (Bush) presidential vote percentage for open seat races when the Democrat is a male. The analysis finds 306 cases in which the Democrat in an open seat was male and the mean score is 55.09, indicating that on average, George Bush received 55% of the presidential

vote share in the district. Tables 7:15 and 7:15a provide the mean for the Bush presidential vote percentage for Republican male challengers in open seat races. Table 7:15 finds a total of 301 races where the male challenger was Republican and the mean score is 55.334, indicating that on average the Bush vote share in the district was also 55% when Republican male ran in open seat races.

Tables 7:14 and 7:14a - Means - Presidential vote share for the Republican in open seat races with Democratic Male challengers

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
308	93.9%	20	6.1%	328	100%

Variable D_Chall	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Democrat is not male	65.7853	2	8.3816
Democrat male Is the challenger	55.0901	306	10.6495
Total	55.1595	308	10.6603

Tables 7:15 and 7:15a - Means - Presidential vote share for the Republican in open seat races with Republican male challengers

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
308	93.9%	20	6.1%	328	100%

Variable R_Chall	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican is not Male	47.6234	7	11.8090
Republican male Is the challenger	55.3348	301	10.5900
Total	55.1595	308	10.6603

Tables 7:16 and 7:16a provide the mean presidential vote share for George Bush for both Democratic and Republican women together. To analyze women, we used the *opengen* variable to draw our means for open seat races. *Opengen* is coded as 1 if the female in an open seat races was a Democrat, 2 if the female in an open seat race was Republican and 3 if both candidates in an open seat race were women. Table 7:16 found 65 open seat races where women were present. The analysis found 38 races where Democratic women challengers ran in open seat races opposing a male and the mean score was 59.196. (See Table 7:16a) This indicates that on average, Democratic women ran in districts where the presidential vote share for George Bush was 59%, putting women at a slight disadvantage when compared to male Democratic candidates. The analysis found 16 cases where Republican women ran in open seat races opposing a male and the mean score is 50.462. This indicates that Republican women ran in districts where George Bush received 50% of the presidential vote share. The analysis also found 8 cases in which both candidates were women in the open seat race and the mean score was 51.932. Here, we can identify a difference in means for Bush vote share based on gender. What we learn is that on average, when men of either party run in open seat races, the Bush vote share is about 55% (55.09% for Democratic men and 55.33% for Republican men on average). However, when Democratic women ran in open seat races, the Bush vote share was 59%, and when Republican women ran, the Bush vote was 50% on average.

For Democratic women, the district was highly conservative and for Republican women, the district was ideologically split. Our analysis found that there is a difference in means for presidential vote share in districts that male challengers ran in versus districts that women ran in on average for open seat races. The implications remain that the ideological leaning of the districts look different when women run in open seat races.

#### Expenditures in Open seat races

Next, we evaluate expenditures based on party and gender. In our evaluation of incumbent races, we found that Democratic women spent more money on average than men when running for congressional elections against Republican incumbents. High level spending is also the result of a handful of Democratic women challengers in our analysis that spent more than a million dollars to run for office. Expenditures for Democratic males, Republican males and Republican females, indicated no substantial difference in spending levels in incumbent races. The expectation in our analysis on open seat races is that all candidates will spend more to run versus what is spent by challengers in incumbent races because the probability of winning increases to 50% in open seat races due to the absence of an incumbent. We seek to analyze whether this is true in open seat races. Tables 7:17 through 7:19a provide these data. In each scenario, we selected out all elections prior to 1982 because presidential coattails or district lines for these elections were not consistent with the majority of the

elections in our study. We again selected the *open seat* variable to be scored 1 for all cases, which excludes all incumbent races in the study from the analysis. We use the *exp\_dc* and *exp\_rc* variables to evaluate the average expenditures.

Tables 7:16 and 7:16a - Means - Presidential vote share for the Republican in open seat races with Democratic and Republican Female challengers

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
65	95.6%	3	4.4%	68	100%

Variable <i>Opengen</i>	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
No women in race	67.9652	1	
Democrat is female	59.1968	38	6.7453
Republican is Female	50.4628	16	7.9898
Both candidates are women	51.9327	10	10.7421
Total	56.0642	65	8.7203

Tables 7:17 and 7:17a - Means, Spending in open seat races by Democratic Male challengers

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
381	99.7%	1	.3	382	100%

Variable <i>D_Chall</i>	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Democrat is not Male	.00	3	
Democrat Male Is the challenger	5.15	378	5.62
Total	5.11	381	5.61



These variables indicate the expenditures for Democratic and Republican candidates respectfully, by the \$100,000's. Tables 7:17 and 7:17a provide the mean expenditures for Democratic male challengers in open seat races. The study finds 378 cases in which the Democratic challenger was male with a mean score of 5.15.

Tables 7:18 and 7:18a - Means, Spending in Open seat races by Republican Male Challengers

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
374	97.9%	8	2.1	382	100%

Variable R_Chall	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican is not male	.00	9	
Republican male Is the challenger	5.05	365	4.57
Total	4.93	374	4.58

This indicates that on average Democratic male challengers spent about \$515,000 in running for Congress in open seat races. Tables 7:18 and 7:18a provide the mean expenditures for Republican male challengers running for Congress in open seat races. Table 18 finds a total of 365 open seat elections in which the Republican challenger was male. Table 7:18a provide the mean of 5.05. This indicates that on average, the Republican male challenger spent about \$505,000 to run for congressional office. These scores include the mean for all races.

Tables 7:19 and 7:19a provide mean scores for Democratic and Republican women in addition to mean scores when they faced men in open seat races. Again, we used the *opengen* variable in our analysis (*opengen* = 1 Democratic female, 2 = Republican female and 3 = both candidates are women) and compared mean for both expenditure variables. Table 7:19a reveal that Democratic women ran in 38 open seat races and their mean spending score was 6.49 or \$649,000. In those same elections, the Democratic female opposed Republican men whose mean score for the exact same races is 8.46, indicating Republican men spent \$846,000 when they faced women in open seat races. Consistently, we find that Republican women ran in 17 open seat races against Democratic men and the mean score was 4.72, indicating they spent about \$472,000 on average. Democratic men, in these 17 races spent an average of \$710,000 indicated by the mean score of 7.10. The analysis found a total of 10 races where women faced each other in open seat races (1 contest was not contested by the Republican female candidate) and the mean score for the Democratic female was 7.77, indicating she spent about \$777,000 to run in the open seat race. The Republican female had a mean score of 5.44 for female only contest, indicating she spent about \$544,000. The analysis found evidence that all candidates regardless of party spent significantly more to run in open seat races than they spent in incumbent races. This was expected, given the nature of open seat races as the power of incumbency is absent.

Tables 7:19, 7:19a, 7:19b – Means- Spending in open seat races by Democratic and Republican Female challengers

Democratic challenger expenditures \* Women in Open seats

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
66	97.1%	2	2.9	68	100%

Republican challenger expenditures \*Women in Open seats

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
67	98.5%	1	1.5	68	100%

Variable <i>Opengen = Women in Open seat races</i>		Expenditures by Dem Challenger		Expenditures by Rep Challenger	
<b>0</b>	Mean		.36		6.68
	N		1		1
	Std. Deviation		.		.
<b>Dem</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Female</b>	6.49	<b>Rep Male</b>	<b>8.46</b>
	N		38		40
	Std. Deviation		4.72		8.42
<b>Rep</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Male</b>	7.10	<b>Rep Female</b>	4.72
	N		17		17
	Std. Deviation		2.65		4.09
<b>Both</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Female</b>	7.77	<b>Rep Female</b>	5.44
	N		10		9
	Std. Deviation		5.73		3.52
<b>Total</b>	Mean		6.75		7.08
	N		66		67
	Std. Deviation		4.45		7.10

The analysis on open seat races and expenditures reveal that there is in fact a significant difference in spending according to gender. Regardless of party identity, women are spending substantially more than men on average to run for congressional office in open seat races, but not as much as their particular opponent. The means tests allow us to observe whether there is a difference in

resources according to gender and the tests in both incumbent and open seat races reveal that there is in fact a difference. Women candidates for both parties spend less than men to run for congressional office when they oppose men.

However, women spend the most when they face each other. What is even more insightful is that male candidates from both parties spend more when they face a woman in an open seat race. Table 7:17a indicates that when Democratic men run, they typically spend about \$515,000 when run in open seat contests. However, of 378 open seat races where the challenger was a Democratic male, they only faced a Republican female 17 times (See chart 7:19a) and in those contests alone, Democratic men spent an average of \$710,000. Republican men ran in 365 open seat races and spent an average of \$505,000. However, they faced a Democratic woman in 38 contests and spent an average of \$846,000 in those contests alone. Contests where women appear on the ballot drive up spending for both parties. These findings provide evidence that there is a significant difference between spending for men and women in open seat contests.

### Previous Political Experience

Lastly, we examine the third and final variable of influence found in the analyses of chapters 5 and 6. Previous political experience of congressional candidates was found to influence electoral success during the election years in the study. In the following charts, we provide means for all candidates with

previous political experience according to party and gender. We exclude incumbent races by coding the *open seat* variable 1 and used the *gender3* variable to indicate gender in all cases (*gender3* =0 or 10 when challengers are male and *gender3* = 1 or 11 when challengers are female). We compared means based on the *off\_d* and *off\_r* variables which were coded 0 if the candidate had no previous political experience and coded 1 if they had previous political experience. We seek to determine if there is a substantial difference between men and women in regards to having or lacking previous political experience when running for congressional office. Tables 7:20 through 7:22a provide mean scores for candidates with previous political experience based on party identity and gender. Tables 7:20 and 7:20a provide the mean for Democratic male challengers with previous political experience. The study finds a total of 376 cases where the Democratic male challenger was male, indicated by the *D\_chall* variable being scored 1. The mean score is .62. This indicates that on average about 62% of all Democratic male challengers in open seat races had previous political experience. Tables 7:21 and 7:21a provide the mean of previous political experience among Republican male challengers in open seat races. Our study finds 371 cases in which the *R\_Chall* variable is scored 1, indicating the Republican challenger in the open seat race was male. The mean is .53 indicating that of all Republican male challengers who ran in open seat elections, 53% of them had previous political experience. Tables 7:22 and 7:22a provide the mean of previous political experience among Democratic and Republican female challengers

Tables 7:20 and 7:20a – Means, Democratic male challengers and previous political experience in open seat races

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
379	99.2%	3	.8	382	100%

Variable D_Chall	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Democrat is not male	.00	3	
Democrat male Is the challenger	.62	376	.49
Total	.61	379	.49

Tables 7:21 and 7:21a – Means, Republican male challengers and previous political experience in open seat races

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
380	99.5%	2	.5	382	100%

Variable R_Chall	Mean	N	Std. Dev.
Republican is not male	.00	9	
Republican male Is the challenger	.53	371	.50
Total	.52	380	.50

who ran in open seat races. Table 7:22a provides mean scores on open seat races where a woman faced both men and women. The study finds a total of 68 open seat elections where data indicating previous political experience was valid. The analysis found that 50% of Democratic women had previous political experience when they faced Republican men in an open seat. However, 60% of all Democratic women who faced a Republican woman had previous political

Tables 7:22, 7:22a, 7:22b - Means- Democratic and Republican Female challengers and previous political experience in open seat races

Democrat challenger's Experience \* Women in Open seats

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
68	100%	0	0	68	100%

Republican challenger's Experience \* Women in Open seats

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
68	100%	0	0	68	100%

Variable <i>Openen</i>		Previous Political Experience by a Democrat		Previous Political Experience by a Republican	
<b>0</b>	Mean		.00		.00
	N		1		1
	Std. Deviation		.		.
<b>Dem</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Female</b>	.50	<b>Rep Male</b>	.68
	N		40		40
	Std. Deviation		.51		.47
<b>Rep</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Male</b>	.82	<b>Rep Female</b>	.35
	N		17		17
	Std. Deviation		.39		.49
<b>Both</b>	Mean	<b>Dem Female</b>	.60	<b>Rep Female</b>	.40
	N		10		10
	Std. Deviation		.52		.52
<b>Total</b>	Mean		.59		.54
	N		68		68
	Std. Deviation		.50		.50

experience. The analysis found that 35% of Republican woman had previous political experience when they faced Democratic men in open seat races but 40% of Republican women had previous political experience when they faced Democratic women. Essentially, what we find is that women tend to have more experience when they face another woman in the election versus when they run

against men. While higher quality women tend to run against each other, we note that women are at a disadvantage here. When compared to men, women are significantly fewer in number overall as candidates in all years in the study. As higher quality women run against each other their numbers do not increase in Congress as it would if higher quality women ran against men. In essence, as we inferred in earlier chapters of the dissertation, women could potentially increase their overall numbers in Congress if they sought out races against men as higher quality candidates. Because our variable indicating previous political experience only indicates whether the candidate has previous experience, the scope and extent of that experience may further highlight quality among candidates as oppose to a measure that indicates participation in politics previously.

## Conclusion

In chapters 5 through 7, we have taken on the task of evaluating a series of variables believed to affect the success of women in congressional elections. We first identified in chapter 5 the variables that would influence winning in an all-male world. Among the influential variables, the primary factors to account for most of the variance in electoral success were found in three primary variables: ideological leaning of the district, candidate expenditures and previous political experience. We identified significance for these three variables consistently for both models analyzing incumbent and open seat races. In chapter 5, we identified these resources in our analysis predicting electoral success in an all-



male world. In chapter 6, we applied these resources to a world where women were included to see if the same rules applied in terms of their ability to predict electoral success. We found that these variables maintained their significance for both men and women. Because the analyses of chapter 6 were models predicting electoral success, we concluded that there was evidence to support electoral success for women at the same rate as men if in fact they have the same resources. According to our predictive models, we should expect success for women at the same rate as men who win. In fact, we used our outcome coefficients for all variables generated in our all-male-world model and applied those coefficients to a model including women and looked to see if the model produced different results based on gender. We found that the model responds to women in the same manner it did for men. We accepted the null hypothesis for our control model and concluded that based on our predictions, there was no substantial difference between men and women in terms of electoral success *given* they have the same resources. This conclusion was the same for our predictions on incumbent races as it was for open seat races. Now that we identified strong predictions for success in electoral elections in chapter 6 if men and women have the same resource, we sought to determine in chapter 7 if in fact men and women had the same resources during the elections in our model. In this chapter, we used mean testing to determine if men and women in all elections in our model did in fact have the same resources at the time of election. In order to determine if they had the same resources, we used means testing in

comparing the means of each coefficient for the variables that demonstrated the greatest influence on the dependent variable; which was winning the election. Chapter 7 began with means testing of each of the three important variables that demonstrate the greatest influence on winning elections; 1) ideological leaning of the district, 2) candidate expenditures and 3) previous political experience. First, we ran means tests for congressional candidates in incumbent races in all categories; Democratic male challengers, Democratic female challengers, Republican male challengers and Republican female challengers respectfully.

For each of the three influential variables on electoral success, we produced four means tests. For the ideological leaning of the district variable, we compared the mean score for the 1988 presidential vote share for George Bush in each district. We found that Democratic men ran in districts where Bush received about 60% of the presidential vote on average when facing an incumbent. Democratic women ran in districts where George Bush received about 59% of the presidential vote. Democratic men, on average ran in districts that were slightly more conservative than Democratic women, when facing an incumbent. Republican men ran as challengers in districts where George Bush received about 48% of the presidential vote on average. Republican women ran as challengers in districts where George Bush received about 45% of the presidential vote. We find that Republican women ran in districts that were slightly more liberal on average than Republican men when they faced an incumbent. Overall, our means tests found only slight differences for the

average vote share scores when broken down by party and gender in incumbent races.

We next examined expenditures of the challengers to find if there was a substantial difference between what men and women spend based on party identification in races where an incumbent is present. Democratic men spend an average of \$189,000 to run for office against incumbents while Democratic women spend an average of \$242,000 to run against an incumbent. Republican men spend an average of \$185,000 while Republican women spend an average of \$184,000 to run against an incumbent in congressional races. The expenditures for Democratic women were substantially higher than spending by Democratic men, Republican men and Republican women who all spent between \$184,000 and \$189,000. In a closer evaluation of expenditures for Democratic women, we find that a small number of Democratic female challengers (11 women out of a total of 205) spent more than a million dollars to run for office. (See Appendix Table A7:1). These findings reveal that these eleven cases are driving the mean score for all expenditures in this category higher than it would be usually, which is an average of \$190,000. Overall, however, there is no significant difference in what challengers spend in incumbent races in all categories for party and gender. In our evaluation of previous political experience, we found that 20% of all Democratic male challengers facing incumbents had previous political experience versus 23% of all Democratic women who ran against incumbents. Consistently, 16% of all Republican male challengers facing an incumbent had

previous political experience compared to 17% of all Republican female challengers. In both cases, women were, on average, slightly more experienced than men challengers from their same party. These differences however, were slight versus substantial differences that would indicate further analyses in these areas are warranted. Based on the means testing for incumbent races, we find no significant difference in previous political experience based on party and gender. The means testing done on variables of influence in incumbent races verifies our expectations for the predictive models of chapter 5 and 6.

The final part of our analysis in chapter 7 involved means tests on all three variables of influence for open seat races. Open seat elections are important races to determine if differences exist in resources based on gender because the power of incumbency is absent. Incumbency alone is such a powerful factor that explains so much variance in electoral success. When incumbency is absent, the challenger's probability of winning is 50%, giving challengers greater incentive to run. Open seat races put all challengers on a leveled playing field, making disparities based on gender are identifiable. Our tests provide evidence that women experience deficiencies when compared to men for all three variables. The first of these tests involved the ideological leaning of the district using the 1988 Bush/Dukakis vote percentage. Again, each test was done separately for party identity and gender. For open seat races, we used the *open* variable to identify all women in open seat races. The variable is coded 1 if the Democratic candidate in the race was a woman, 2 if the Republican candidate in the race was

a woman and coded 3 if both candidates were women. Thus, the means for Democratic women and Republican women are presented together in one chart for all three variables of influence. The analysis found that for both Democratic and Republican men who ran in open seat races, George Bush received 55% of the presidential vote share on average in those districts. Democratic women however, ran in districts where George Bush received 59% of the presidential vote share, on average. Republican women tended to run in districts where George Bush received 50% of the presidential vote share on average. The findings from these means tests suggest that both parties tend to run women more often in districts that are considered ideologically to be *un-winnable*, if based solely on the presidential vote-share of the president. Republican women, on average run more often in districts that are highly liberal while Democratic women run in higher numbers in highly conservative districts. The findings suggest that women representing both parties experience some deficiency in open seat races on average at a higher level than men in regard to the type of district they run in for the open seat election.

The second variable we analyzed was candidate expenditures in open seat races. Democratic male challengers spent an average of \$515, 000 to run in open seats overall. However, Democratic men running against women in open seats, spent about \$710,000 on average. Democratic women on average spent about \$649,000 in open seat races when they faced a male opponent in the election but spent an average of \$777,000 when they faced an opponent who was female.

Republican men spent an average of \$505,000 to run in open seat races overall. However, when a Republican male challenger faced a female opponent in an open seat race, he spent an average of \$846,000. When Republican women ran in open seat races, she spent about \$472,000 on average when facing a male opponent. However, when she faced a female opponent, she spent \$544,000. The spending gap is substantial for candidates based on gender. Men spend more than women to run in open seat races. In fact, they spent the most when they face women. Women also, spend the most when they face each other. Expenditures are, of course an important variable. The data suggest that opponents to women (regardless of gender) are able to raise more money when a woman is on the ballot. This finding has implications in regards to furthering research on barriers women face in gaining access to congressional office by way of open seat elections.

The final variable analyzed using means testing is previous political experience. The models of chapter 5 and 6 found that a candidate's quality increases when they have previous political experience. The analysis sought evidence for whether or not women similar levels of previous political experience on average, as men in the open seat elections in our model. Essentially, we found that on average, 62% of all Democratic male challengers had previous political experience. However, of all Democratic men that faced a female in an open seat race, 82% of them had previous political experience. 50% of Democratic women had previous political experience when she ran against a

male on average. However, of all Democratic women who ran against another woman in an election, 60% of them had previous political experience. Of all Republican male challengers who ran in open seat races, 53% of them had previous political experience on average in open seat races. However, of all Republican men who faced a female in an open seat election, 68% of them had previous political experience. Of all Republican women who ran in open seat races, 35% of them had previous political experience on average. However, of all Republican women who ran against another woman, 40% of them had previous political experience. Again, the findings are substantial in regards to the actual resources the candidates have based on gender. Overall, men are more experienced than women on average. But women candidates with the most experience tend to run against other women who are also highly experienced.

The analyses of chapter 7 found differences in all three of our primary resources in open seat races. The ideological leaning of the district is different on average for men and women, in that women from both parties are slightly more disadvantaged than men. Means testing for expenditures revealed that male candidates spend more than women in overall. However, the interesting finding is that men spend the most when they run against women. Women, on average spend less than men but spend the most when they oppose another woman, outspending men in all other scenarios. The analysis on previous political experience found differences based on gender as well. On average, men are more experienced than women. However, the analysis suggests that men

with the most experience run against women. Women are less experienced than men, on average. However, the most experienced women run against other women. Clearly, the findings indicate that the political environment changes for women in open seat races in our analysis of all three variables. These findings are important in terms of how they will influence and guide future research on women and politics. The body of research on women in politics has not provided solid evidence regarding disparities in actual resources based on gender. Here, we successfully identify how women encounter differences in regards to obtaining the necessary resources to electoral success. Chapter 8 concludes this study with an analysis of how to process what we've learned and apply it to the advancement of political research in the body of work on gender politics and closing the gender gap in legislative office.



## Chapter 8

The research of this dissertation finds evidence for the existence of barriers to the increased election of women. There are at the very least three distinct ways in which women experience barriers to congressional election, all working collectively to limit the number of women in government. In particular, the study finds evidence of disparities based on gender for three primary variables that occur in open seat scenarios; 1) the political demographic of the district or the ideological leaning of the district is different for candidates based on gender. 2) The expenditures of the candidates are different based on gender and 3) the previous political experience of the candidates are different based on gender. Throughout the study, the consistent message is that there are first and foremost too few women in the pool of viable congressional candidates. Open seat races are prized opportunities for parties in that institution and thus provide rare instances to invoke influence on a process, typically explained by the power of incumbency. As we look across open seat races for every election in the study, races containing women candidates were less than a fraction of races where both genders were represented and even less of races where men only were present. Because women run in such rare instances, I speculate that opportunities for deviating from whatever standard processes may be in place are more prevalent during those instances.

## District Demographics

In examining the ideological leaning of the district, we safely assume that a conservative candidate will find electoral success in a district most of the time, that is, in a district where a Republican presidential candidate received more than 55% of the vote share. We can also safely assume that a conservative candidate will most often encounter difficulty in winning an election in a district where the Bush vote percentage was 50% or less. We find that on average, male candidates from both parties ran in districts where the Bush vote share was an average of 55%. Democratic women on average ran in districts where Bush's vote share was 59%; meaning the likelihood of a Democratic candidate winning was lower in these scenarios than when Democratic men ran. Likewise, Republican women ran in districts where the average vote share for George Bush was about 51%, which means that there was a greater likelihood that Republican women ran in open seat races where the Republican position had no safety when compared to the Republican position when Republican men ran. In both instances, women candidates were in significantly harder races to win versus the playing field being leveled for male candidates of both parties in open seat races. Overall, Republican women experienced greater difficulty in achieving electoral success when compared to Republican men in open seat races during the elections in our study. Democratic women found greater difficulty achieving electoral success when compared to Democratic male candidates in open seat races. Likewise, the most competitive races; those closest to the 50% mark, where

no party could distinctly identify a majority is where the majority of all-women races averaged out. Women candidates from both parties faced each other in districts where the average vote share for George Bush was 51%. Republican women ran in a total of 16 open seat races versus Republican men who appeared in 301 open seat races. Democratic women ran in 38 open seat races during this period versus Democratic men who appeared in 306 races. Women faced women in only 10 open seat races covered here.

### Candidate Expenditures

Raising expenditures for congressional campaigns is a huge undertaking that can make or break any candidate seeking congressional office. The study found important evidence regarding differences in campaign expenditures based on gender in open seat races. When we compare overall expenditures, all candidates spend more than twice as much in open seat races compared to elections involving incumbents which are rare and prized opportunities for candidates who have avoided running in races where they oppose strong incumbents. Thus, because both candidates in open seat races are new, both tend to spend much more money in these races versus what they would have spent had the opponent been an incumbent. Findings for expenditures in open seat races revealed sharp differences based on gender. Three important findings to highlight are that 1) on average, men consistently outspent women, 2) men spent more when they faced a woman in an open seat race than in men-vs.-men

contests, on average, and 3) women outspent men in all categories when they faced each other. Typically, men raise and spend more money than women for open seat races.

The findings suggest that when a woman is on the ballot, men are able to raise more than average expenditures to oppose her. This is consistent for women vs. women races as well. When a woman is on the ballot, women are able to raise more than the average expenditures she would have raised, had she faced a man. There is something to be said concerning the perception of women on the ballot. Why is it that men are able to raise more money than women in general, but are somehow able to raise even more money when their opponent happens to be a woman? The system responds differently to women in that when a woman is on the ballot, her opponent is afforded more resources, on average in terms of expenditures to oppose her. For women, the analysis finds that women raise less money to run for congressional office until she opposes another woman, in which case, she is able to raise more than she would had she opposed a man. The findings are in line with the original hypothesis of chapter 3, suggesting that women may potentially stagnate their own numbers as candidates because they are more inclined to seek out races where another woman is running or already serving. Psychologically, ambitious women candidates may find races against other women more attractive because gender provides a leveling of the playing field to some extent with voters. However, logically, it does not follow that women would intentionally seek out women-vs.-

women contests because they expect to raise more money to run. Thus, this finding was unexpected to the researcher. Woman versus woman open seat races are the rarest and most expensive congressional races collectively found in our study. Still, we find that since the early 1990s, organizations such as EMILYs List and NOW were established in part to provide funding assistance to women candidates at all levels. While half of the elections in our analysis saw more women entering politics with the financial assistance of these and other organizations, women continue to experience financial barriers in raising funds for campaigns overtime. Again, one of the hypotheses outlined in this study as to how stagnation may be occurring is that women intentionally seek out races where women are already serving or where they have the greatest likelihood of opposing another woman. While much of what occurs in open seat races is not pre-determined, there is a financial incentive for women to oppose women in that they raise more money on average, versus when they oppose men. Consequently, the system encourages women-vs.-women contests.

### Previous Political Experience

Lastly our research found differences in the previous political experience of candidates in open seat races based on gender. Findings indicate that (1) on average, men have previous political experience more often than women. (2) Where men opposed women in open seat contests, men were more experienced, on average, and (3) women who ran in woman vs. woman contests where the

most experienced. Men being more experienced than women speak directly to the fact that there are simply too few women in the candidate pool. Secondly, the variable in this study indicating previous experience is dichotomous, scored 1 when the candidate had previous experience and 0 when they had no previous political experience, as opposed to a variable that would measure experience in years or number of previous political positions. Such a variable would provide much more information regarding the candidate's true experience and would have closely correlated with success. The findings for the *previous political experience* variable further provide evidence to the specialty of *woman vs. woman* contests. The highest caliber female candidate runs more often in contests where her opponent is another woman. All woman open seat contests occur most often in districts that have the least predictability as to whom the voters will support, are the most expensive races among all open seat contests and have the most experienced female candidates. The findings speak to a wide range of issues we already know about the political system but were uncertain as to how deficiencies are manifested in the electoral outcomes.

### Looking Forward

How exactly do the findings offer opportunities for advancement of what we have learned? While the barriers outlined in this research keep the number of women steady, it can be argued that we cannot identify a clear culprit. In examining the district demographic variable, it is possible that party leaders

continue to play a major role in pushing candidates into certain races within the state. The evidence suggests that parties play a role here. However, it remains unclear if parties can solely be held accountable. Fund raising and campaign spending is certainly a candidate-centered function. Empirically, it remains unclear whether women candidates alone can be held responsible. Also, it is unclear whether all funds raised are spent in campaigns. For example, in chapter 6, we identified eleven cases where women candidates spent more than one million to run for office. All cases did not translate into wins, but it would help to ascertain the qualitative nature of each election; what was unique about these races? The fact that women were able to raise large sums of money for some races and not others speaks to various dynamics that may be specific to certain races or be quantified to examine on a larger scale. Previous political experience is important for all candidates. However, having more women in local office would eventually equate to a viable pool of potential women candidates who bring previous political experience to more candidacies.

While we are able to say with some degree of certainty that stagnation occurs, the specific forces driving the phenomenon remain unclear. Woman vs. woman open seat contests remain a logical choice for ambitious women candidates to pursue. Given what we have learned by this research, women must first feel encouraged to work in lower level political positions. Without a strong support system for women to work at the lower levels, we cannot expect an expansion of the candidate pool at the congressional level. Greater

representation means wider name recognition when planning for future fundraising campaigns. However, the foundation to nurture any potential candidate must already be in place prior to the congressional campaign stage. Speaking more directly to current women candidates, women must be ready to demonstrate their talents in open seat contests in districts where the district demographics are in their party's favor, combined with potential male candidates who lack comparable previous political experience. The research here suggests that as these factors align the woman candidate's ability to raise more funds will likely increase. Making the decision to run in incumbent races is difficult (and considering the likelihood of winning, somewhat irrational) to make. Short of witnessing a catastrophic political event during an incumbent's tenure, I find it difficult to encourage women to shy away from the experience of running for congressional office, in that these experiences bring with it name recognition that could carry future benefits in other campaigns. Balance is key: When all other factors are present, races opposing strong incumbents who are deeply entrenched are to be avoided. In open seat contests, challenging a less experienced male candidate is met with enthusiasm here since women must exhibit the necessary characteristics to raise large sums of money. Because our statistics show that male candidates possess on average the ability to raise more money because his opponent is a woman, those other factors are crucially important for the woman's success. Ambitious women must take into account the demographic picture and inhibit other factors to pull off the win. In making



the decision to run against another woman, I still contend that any ambitious woman would be less inclined to move away from considering these races because when all is equal, gender effectively levels the playing field. Simultaneously, gender must speak to the ambitious candidate in the form of comparison more clearly. Scholars have argued for years that the political world is effectively “gendered” (Perkins and Fowlkes, 1980, Tolleson-Rinehart and Carroll, 2006). Others argue that politics is equally “raced,” presenting additional barriers for candidates of color, further layering those barriers for women of color seeking political office (Hawesworth, 2003). Examination of resources when race is applied would advance the analysis presented in this thesis. Other factors such as previous political experience, the scope of the opponent’s experience, district demographic and candidate name recognition should all be considered carefully. If a woman finds herself potentially opposing a candidate with all of these factors in line, these races may also need to be avoided as well.

## Appendix for Chapter 5

### Variables List for final Dataset

**ID** – An 8-digit variable indicating the Year, state and the district of each state in which an election took place.

**Year** – 4-digit variable indicating the year

**State** – 1-2 digit variable indicating the number of each state in alphabetical order.

**District** – 1-2 digit variable indicating the number of each district in each state.

**RVote** – Republican raw vote in each district

**P\$RVote** – Percent of Republican vote as part of the total vote

**DVote** – Democratic raw vote

**P\$DVote** – Percent of the Democratic vote as part of the total vote

**OVote** – Other candidate raw vote

**P\$Rvote2** – Republican percent of 2-party vote

**P\$Dvote2** – Democratic percent of 2-party vote

**Tvote** – total vote

**Open seat** – coded 1 if race for open seat, coded 0 if race not open seat

**R\_incumb** – coded 1 if Republican sought re-election, 0 if not

**D\_incumb** – coded 1 if Democrat sought re-election, 0 if not

**R\_chall** – coded 1 if challenger is Republican, 0 if not.

**D\_chall** – coded 1 if challenger is Democrat, 0 if not

**Party\_R** – coded 1 if Republican won election, 0 if they did not win

**Party\_D** – coded 1 if Democrat won election, 0 if they did not win

**Pres\_R** – Republican presidential vote in the district (raw)

**P\$Pres\_R** – Percent of the 2-party presidential vote in the district (raw)

**Pres\_D** – Democratic presidential vote in the district

**P\$Pres\_D** – Percent of the 2-party presidential vote in the district (raw)

**Exp\_R** – Expenditure by Republican

**Exp\_D** – Expenditure by Democrat

**Exp\_O** – Expenditure by candidate other than Democrat or Republican

**Exp\_R2** – Expenditure by the Republicans divided by \$100,000

**Exp\_D2** – Expenditure by the Democrat divided by \$100,000

**Exp\_RI** – Expenditure by the Republican incumbent by \$100,000's

**Exp\_DI** – Expenditure by the Democratic incumbent by \$100,000's

**Exp\_RC** – Expenditure by the Republican challenger by \$100,000's

**Exp\_DC** – Expenditure by the Democratic challenger by \$100,000's

**CPI** – Consumer Price Index

**CPI\_X** – Reciprocal of the CPI (1 divided by value of CPI)

**EXPC\_RI** – Expenditure with CPI adjustment for the Republican Incumbent

**EXPC\_DI** – Expenditure with CPI adjustment for the Democratic Incumbent

**South** – coded 1 if state is part of the 11 states of the former confederacy

**Off\_R** - coded 1 if Republican challenger has previous political experience, 0 if they do not have previous political experience

**Off\_D** - coded 1 if Democratic challenger has previous political experience, 0 if they do not have previous political experience

**Gender** - coded 1 if female, 0 if male

**Gender3** - coded 0 if both candidates are male, coded 1 if female challenger opposes male incumbent, coded 10 if Female incumbent opposes male challenger, coded 11 if both candidates are female.

**Rep\_Fem** - coded 1 if Republican is female, 0 if not

**Dem\_Fem** - coded 1 if Democrat is female, 0 if not

**OpenGen** - coded 1 = Democratic is female, 2 = Republican is female, 3 = both candidates are female

**Data points for Figure 14: Graph 5:1** Graph: Probability of a Democrat Winning in Varyingly Liberal Districts as a Democratic Incumbent OR When Facing a Republican Incumbent.

Presdem	Repincum	Demincum
0	.004	.456
1	.004	.477
2	.004	.498
3	.005	.518
4	.005	.539
5	.005	.560
6	.006	.580
7	.006	.600
8	.007	.620
9	.008	.639
10	.008	.658
11	.009	.677
12	.010	.694
13	.010	.712
14	.011	.728
15	.012	.745
16	.013	.760
17	.015	.775
18	.016	.789
19	.017	.802
20	.019	.815
21	.020	.827
22	.022	.839
23	.024	.850
24	.026	.860
25	.028	.870
26	.030	.879
27	.033	.888
28	.035	.896
29	.038	.903
30	.042	.910
31	.045	.917
32	.049	.923
33	.053	.929
34	.057	.934
35	.062	.939
36	.067	.943
37	.072	.948

38	.078	.952
39	.084	.955
40	.090	.959
41	.098	.962
42	.105	.965
43	.113	.968
44	.122	.970
45	.131	.972
46	.141	.974
47	.151	.976
48	.162	.978
49	.173	.980
50	.186	.982
51	.199	.983
52	.212	.984
53	.226	.986
54	.241	.987
55	.257	.988
56	.273	.989
57	.290	.990
58	.307	.990
59	.325	.991
60	.343	.992
61	.362	.993
62	.382	.993
63	.402	.994
64	.422	.994
65	.442	.995
66	.463	.995
67	.483	.995
68	.504	.996
69	.525	.996
70	.545	.996
71	.566	.997
72	.586	.997
73	.606	.997
74	.626	.997
75	.645	.998
76	.664	.998
77	.682	.998
78	.700	.998
79	.717	.998
80	.733	.998
81	.749	.999
82	.765	.999
83	.779	.999
84	.793	.999
85	.806	.999
86	.819	.999
87	.831	.999
88	.842	.999
89	.853	.999
90	.863	.999
91	.873	.999
92	.882	.999
93	.890	.999
94	.898	1.000
95	.905	1.000
96	.912	1.000
97	.919	1.000
98	.925	1.000
99	.930	1.000
100	.936	1.000

Appendix for Chapter 6

Table Appendix A6:1 Variables Predicting Electoral Success for Women Incumbents -Women Only

<b>Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Sig</b>
P\$PRES_D	.5867	.2138	<b>.0030</b>
Y1982	-4.9962	7.3058	.2470
Y1984	1.7091	10.9371	.4379
Y1986	-4.3730	8.3380	.3000
Y1988	-5.1734	5.9874	.1938
Y1992	-7.9503	5.9276	.0899
Y1994	-17.4717	7.7274	<b>.0119</b>
Y1996	4.6342	6.7296	.2455
Y1998	.5135	6.5399	.4687
Y2000	-10.1179	7.4937	.0885
EXPC_DI	.7787	.6168	.1034
EXPC_RI	.0441	.7029	.4750
EXPC_DC	.8652	1.1745	.2306
EXPC_RC	-.5720	.3801	.0662
OFF_R	-5.7555	2.9932	<b>.0272</b>
OFF_D	6.7079	5.6885	.1191
D_INCUMB	27.1337	10.4177	<b>.0046</b>
Constant	-39.4269	15.6415	<b>.0058</b>

Table A61a: Classification Table: Predictions for Electoral Success in Incumbent Races, Women Only. (Cut value is .50)

Observed	Predicted	Percent Correct
0	1	
<b>100</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>98.04</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>98.59</b>

**Overall 98.36**

Appendix for chapter 7

Table A7:1 - Frequencies - Democratic female challengers spending more than 1 million in incumbent races

**Statistics**

ID		
N	Valid	11
	Missing	0

Year	State	District	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1986	Maryland	02	1	9.1	9.1	9.1
1996	California	01	1	9.1	9.1	18.2
1998	California	49	1	9.1	9.1	27.3
1998	Ohio	01	1	9.1	9.1	36.4
1998	Washington	02	1	9.1	9.1	45.5
2000	Alabama	04	1	9.1	9.1	54.5
2000	Florida	22	1	9.1	9.1	63.6
2000	Kentucky	03	1	9.1	9.1	72.7
2000	New Hampshire	01	1	9.1	9.1	81.8
2000	New Jersey	03	1	9.1	9.1	90.9
2000	Texas	43	1	9.1	9.1	100.0
Total			11	100	100	

Tables A7:2 and A7:2a Means, Democrat Female challengers spending more than 1 million dollars to run in incumbent races

Democratic Challenger spending by Year, by State, by District

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
11	100%	0	0	11	100%

Democratic Challenger Spending

Year	State	District	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
1986	Maryland	02	12.77	1		13	13
		Total	12.77	1		13	13
	Total	02	12.77	1		13	13
		Total	12.77	1		13	13
1996	California	01	11.90	1		12	12
		Total	11.90	1		12	12
	Total	01	11.90	1		12	12
		Total	11.90	1		12	12
1998	California	49	10.13	1		10	10
		Total	10.13	1		10	10
	Ohio	01	9.86	1		10	10
		Total	9.86	1		10	10
	Washington	02	8.43	1		8	8
		Total	8.43	1		8	8
	Total	1	9.86	1		10	10
		2	8.43	1		8	8
		49	10.13	1		10	10
		Total	9.47	3	.91	8	8
2000	Alabama	04	9.37	1		9	9
		Total	9.37	1		9	9
	Florida	22	18.05	1		18	18
		Total	18.05	1		18	18
	Kentucky	03	12.90	1		13	13
		Total	12.90	1		13	13
	New Hampshire	01	8.63	1		9	9
		Total	8.63	1		9	9
	New Jersey	03	13.36	1		13	13
		Total	13.36	1		13	13
	Texas	05	12.42	1		12	12
		Total	12.42	1		12	12
	Total	1	8.63	1		9	9

		3	13.13	2	.32	13	13
		4	9.37	1		9	9
		5	12.42	1		12	12
		22	18.05	1		18	18
		Total	12.46	6	3.36	9	18
Total	Alabama	04	9.37	1		9	9
		Total	9.37	1		9	9
	California	01	11.90	1		12	12
		49	10.13	1		10	10
		Total	11.02	2	1.25	10	12
	Florida	22	18.05	1		18	18
		Total	18.05	1		18	18
	Kentucky	03	12.90			13	13
		Total	12.90			13	13
	Maryland	02	12.77	1		13	13
		Total	12.77	1		13	13
	New Hampshire	01	8.63	1		9	9
		Total	8.63	1		9	9
	New Jersey	03	13.36	1		13	13
		Total	13.36	1		13	13
	Ohio	01	9.86	1		10	10
		Total	9.86	1		10	10
	Texas	05	12.42	1		12	12
		Total	12.42	1		12	12
	Washington	02	8.43	1		8	8
		Total	8.43	1		8	8
	Total	1	10.13	3	1.65	9	12
		2	10.60	2	3.07	8	13
		3	13.13	2	.32	13	13
		4	9.37	1		9	9
		5	12.42	1		12	12
		22	18.05	1		18	18
		49	10.13	1		10	10
		Total	11.62	11	2.79	8	18



Table A7:3, A7:3a - Means - Democratic female challenger spending less than \$1 million in incumbent races

Expenditures of the Democratic Challenger by \* Democratic Female

Cases Included	Included %	Cases Excluded	Excluded %	Total N	Total %
194	100%	0	0	194	100%

Expenditures for Democratic challenger

Variable Dem_Fem	Mean	N
Dem Female challenger	1.90	194
Total	1.90	194

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### Notes for Chapter 3

Statistics for Table 1, Chart 1 and all graphs presented in Chapter 3 were taken from *Inter-Parliamentary Union, Series No. 23, Women in Parliaments, 1945-1995*.

Data for Tables 3:2 -3:12 were taken from Katz and Mair's 1992 Data handbook. Katz, Richard and Peter Mair. 1992. *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook*. London, Sage.

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